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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the past three decades, the Delgamuukw trial and its subsequent court decisions on 
the Gitxsan Nation’s land ownership rights has constructed a legal narrative that has slyly 
substituted ‘aboriginal title rights’ for the pre-existing nation-to-nation relationship 
between the Gitxsan Nation and the Canadian state. By focusing on how the colonial 
courts denied and then recognized aboriginal title rights, this legal narrative privileges 
judicial agency and misrecognizes Gitxsan self-determination as a bureaucratic  pursuit of 
state-granted rights that can be infringed upon and extinguished to serve the interests of 
settler society. 
 
Rejecting this colonial politics of recognition, I narrate Delgamuukw as a forgotten story 
of resurgence that signifies and prefigures a grassroots Gitxsan nationhood movement 
continually striving to achieve the ideal of peaceful coexistence based on equality and 
respect as articulated by the hereditary chiefs on the first day of trial. To feed this 
ancestral desire for peaceful coexistence, I present my thesis as a philosophical feast and 
invite two minority public philosophers, Taiaiake Alfred and Benedict Spinoza, to share 
their expansive notions of peace. In the feast dialogues that ensue, we remember how the 
first four hereditary chiefs to take the stand at trial strategically responded to four 
premises of colonialism during cross-examination that blocked the achievement of 
peaceful coexistence: state sovereignty, imperial Christianity, colonial legal supremacy, 
and the imaginary uncivilized other. By dialogically engaging Alfred and Spinoza’s 
ideas, these premises are deconstructed and non-imperial, democratic alternatives are 
presented. The dialogues then turn their attention to how Alfred and Spinoza self-
consciously engage their ancestral traditions for constructive tools capable of building 
peaceful coexistence with the state, the church, the self, and the other as understood in 
their historically different locations. Informed by the ideas shared by the hereditary chiefs 
and our philosophical guests, I conclude the dialogues by self-consciously engaging the 
Gitxsan tradition by narrating Wiigyat trickster stories, effectively creating within the 
intellectual space of the Feast Hall a Mohawk-Spinozistic-Gitxsan hybrid vision of 
peaceful coexistence between the grassroots Gitxsan Nation and all of its relations.   
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(2nd ed.) 
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TPT     Theologico-Political Treatise, trans. Martin D. Yaffe.  
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Furthermore, following Nancy Levene’s format, I have used the following abbreviations 
when citing sections of Spinoza’s Ethica:  
 
app     appendix 
 
a     axiom 
 
c    corollary  
 
d     definition 
 
Def.Aff. Definition of the Affects (located at the end of Part III) 
 
dem    demonstration 
 
Exp    Explanation 
 
p    proposition 
 
pref    preface 
 
s    scholium 
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GLOSSARY  
 
The spelling of Gitxsanimx words follows Xsiwis’s (Dr. Jane Smith’s) pedagogical 
resource, Gitxsanimx Speller: Text for Adult Gitxsanimx Class. With this text, along with 
her other innovative pedagogical materials and methods, Dr. Smith is teaching us how to 
once again find our voices in the language of our ancestors.  
 
Aats’ap: Door; used to refer to the open doors of the Feast Hall.  
 
Adaawk: Oral histories owned by each Gitxsan wilp network which express ancestral 
connections to wilp homelands. The Wet’suwet’en refer to their oral histories as kungax. 
To respect the intellectual property of each Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en wilp network, I do 
not make any direct citations of the chiefs’ adaawk or kungax in my “remembering” 
sections.  
 
Am goosinsxw: The feast protocol of remembering the absent; practiced at the 
beginnings of chapters 2-5 by remembering the first four hereditary chiefs to take the 
stand at trial. 
  
Anhooya: Tool or tools; used to refer to Alfred and Spinoza’s ideas as conceptual 
toolkits capable of deconstructing colonial premises and building peaceful coexistence 
with the state, the church, the self, and the other.  
 
Ansbahyaxw: Hiding Place; used to refer to the Kispiox reserve-village. In my 
introductory statement, “Ansbahyaxw wil’jogy” translates as ‘my village is Kispiox.’  
 
Ant’aa: Designated feast seat(s); used to welcome Gitxsan and non-Gitxsan readers to 
take their places and participate in our philosophical feast.  
 
Ant’imahlasxw: Narratives used to instruct, guide, inform, and entertain. As opposed to 
the adaawk which are private property owned by each wilp network, the ant’imahlasxw 
are common property owned by all Gitxsan. The Wiigyat trickster stories are a form of 
ant’imahlasxw.  
 
Aws litinsxwit: Feast announcer responsible for introducing distinguished guests and 
communicating important feast business; Alfred and Spinoza are welcomed in the spirit 
of the feast announcer.  
 
Ayook: Gitxsan law, precedent, order, rule; used to refer generally to the Gitxsan legal 
order.  
 
Delgamuukw: A head chief name from the Lax See’l/Frog Clan of the Gitxsan Nation. 
The land claim case brought forward by the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en Nations went by 
the name “Delgamuukw” as it was the first chief name on the plaintiffs list. 
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Gawagyanii: A celebration of peace feast historically held by a wilp network or the 
entire Gitxsan Nation after a war; a post-Delgamuukw philosophical feast is hosted in the 
spirit of the gawagyanii. 
 
Gawagaani: Peace.    
 
Gawgaani di daxgyat: Peace with power; used to refer to state sovereign power.   
. 
Gawagaani di ‘niin: Peace with the other.  
 
Gawagaani di nii’y: Peace with the self.  
 
Gawagaani di wilp ama dal gaasxw: Peace with the church. 
 
Gitxsan: People of the river of mist (the Skeena River).  
 
Gwooyim: Spring time; used to refer to the historical event of the Delgamuukw trial that 
began in the spring of 1987.  
 
Ha gwilii win: Walk gently on a path covered with eagle down.  
 
Haldowgit: The spiritual practice of witchcraft.  
 
Hawow: Wing chief name meaning ‘mountain lion’; currently held by my grand-uncle 
George Wilson of the wolf clan from Kispiox. 
 
Hlo’omsxw: Respect; the foundational value of the Feast Hall.  
 
K’otsgesxw: The feast protocol of acknowledging the contributions made at a feast by 
members of the host’s father clan. Used to refer to the conceptual contributions made by 
our philosophical guests.  
 
k’uba wilxsitxw: Children of chiefs.  
 
Lakw: Fire.  
 
Lax Gibuu: Wolf Clan.  
 
Laxsingigyat: Ancestors.  
 
Laxyip: The Gitxsan homelands. The territorial home of the Gitxsan Nation is a vast area 
in the upper Skeena Valley in Northwestern Central British Columbia.  
 
Li’ligit: feast; a word which is also translated as “there’s a feast going on.”  
 
Lippgyt: To be my own person (sing.); free people (plural).  
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Miinli’ligit: Feast host. 
 
Pdeek: Clan affiliation; the wilp-centric Gitxsan Nation is comprised of four clans: 
Laxsee’l (frog); Lax gibuu (wolf); Gisk’ahaast (fireweed); and Lax xsgiik (eagle).  
 
Sabax: It is finished; the end.  
 
 
Simgigyat, Sigidim haanak’, gant k’uba wilxsitxw: Formal address in Feast Hall 
acknowledging the male chiefs, the high-ranking women chiefs, and the children of 
chiefs.  
 
Sim’oogit: Chief (singular).  
 
So’o: Excess food leftover from the feast given to guests to take home. Guests are not 
allowed to refuse food or gifts given to them in the Feast Hall.  
 
T’ets: Messengers sent out to invite guests for a feast.  
 
T’uu’w: The act of attending a feast.  
 
Wa: Name; wa’y is the possessive ‘my name’ and wams is the plural ‘names.’  
 
Wanimsit: Feast seater. 
 
Wii: Big.  
 
Wiigyat: Big Man, the Gitxsan Nation’s trickster figure who humorously teaches the 
Gitxsan generations the dangers of greed, lust, envy, selfishness, etc. “Big Man” has also 
been spelt in English as We-gyet by the K’san Book Builders.  
 
Wil’naat’ahl: Maternal relatives within a wilp network.  
 
Wilp: A network of families that historically lived together in cedar houses; the Gitxsan 
Nation is wilp-centric, constituted by over 60 huwilp or “houses” of the land.   
 
Wilp ama dal gaas xw: The Christian churches located on the Gitxsan homelands.  
 
Wo’os: Historically, fruit given to the person or people selected to do work for the host 
clan at a feast; used to refer to the Wiigyat trickster stories served at the end of each feast 
dialogue to all those who contributed (i.e. the hereditary chiefs, our philosophical guests, 
and reader-witnesses).   
 
Yukw: A big feast in which all Gitxsan villages are invited; wii yukw is used to refer to 
the audience size that will be garnered by our post-Delgamuukw philosophical feast. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
 
LI’LIGIT 
 
Simgigyat, Sigidim hanaanak’, gant ku’bawilxsihlxw, 
lax gibuu miinli’ligit, wilb’y Hawow, Ansbahyaxw wil’jogy, 
hlaa yukw dim gawagaanihl lax gibuu. 
Chiefs, high-ranking women chiefs, and children of chiefs, as the hosting wolf of 
the house of Hawow (George Wilson) from the reserve-village of Kispiox, I announce the 
wolves will have a feast to make peace.  
Following li’ligit protocol, I acknowledge the t’ets who have gone out to the 
territories, reserve-villages, towns, and cities to incite and invite all who hunger for 
peaceful coexistence, a widening-circle that will make for a wii yukw, a very big feast 
indeed. Among the hungry ones are all the un-extinguishable Gitxsan lifeworlds located 
in-between the margins of Gitxsan and settler societies, from the nameless and clanless to 
the inner-city poor and homeless to the addicted and gang-affiliated to the banished, 
foster cared and incarcerated.1 To fulfill the prophetic words found in the Bible of 
decolonization— “the last shall be first”—you are the first to be welcomed as engaged 
                                                 
1 The Gitxsan Nation consists of a diverse 13, 000 (and growing) wilp members living on or away from 
their homelands located—to reluctantly use colonial geography—in northwest British Columbia. For a 
Gitxsan nation-building model that identifies citizenship reclamation as a critical project, see Val 
Napoleon, “Who Gets to Say What Happened? Reconciliation Issues for the Gitxsan,” in Intercultural 
Dispute Resolution in Aboriginal Contexts, eds. Catherine Bell and David Kahane (Vancouver, BC: UBC 
Press, 2004), 190-191.  Rather than framing citizenship reclamation as a piece of “reconciliation 
homework” as Napoleon does, I re-frame it here as a critical part of a cultural and political rite of 
resurgence. In making this distinction, I place my thesis in the resurgence paradigm developed by Taiaiake 
Alfred, Glen Sean Coulthard, and Leanne Simpson. These indigenous scholars share the view that the now 
hegemonic discourse of reconciliation dismisses indigenous peoples’ critical consciousness of past and 
present colonial injustices as pathological expressions of anger and resentment and reproduces colonial 
relations of domination under the pretext of a liberal politics of recognition. For a comparative discussion 
of the indigenous resurgence paradigm in relation to the conciliatory paradigm supported by the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, see Taiaiake Alfred, “Restitution is the Real Pathway to Justice for Indigenous 
Peoples,” in Response, Responsibility, and Renewal: Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation (Ottawa, ON: 
Aboriginal Healing Foundation, 2009): 181-187.  
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witnesses and peacemaking agents of our rising Gitxsan Nation.2 Alongside these Gitxsan 
trickster wanderers are the equally hungry Gitxsan house members actively re-building 
the 64 matrilineal kinship networks known as the huwilp of the land, from the youth and 
elders to the women and men to the resilient Gitxsan with dis/ability to the proud Gitxsan 
of the GBLTQ2S community.3 Beyond the wilp-centric Gitxsan Nation, the hungry ones 
can be found among indigenous, settler, and all those in-between citizens, civic activists, 
scholars, and researchers in the humanities and social sciences who are invested in 
creating a new society that truly transcends Canadian colonialism. The Feast Hall doors 
are open, inviting you all to a post-Delgamuukw philosophical feast, a Gitxsan rite of 
resurgence, that feeds the ancestral desire4 for peaceful coexistence expressed by our 
Simgigyat gant Sigidimhanaak’ during the Delgamuukw trial that erupted in the spring of 
1987. 
                                                 
2 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York, NY: Grove Press, 2004), 2: “Decolonization, 
therefore, implies the urgent need to thoroughly challenge the colonial situation. Its definition can, if we 
want to describe it accurately, be summed up in the well-known words: ‘The last shall be first.’” Here I am 
providing a non-violent reinterpretation of Fanon’s description of decolonization, one which understands 
decolonization as actively including and involving the “last” or marginalized within indigenous nations. 
This non-violent reinterpretation takes its inspiration from Fanon’s direction to the Algerian people that any 
national liberation movement should give the lumpenproletariat “maximum attention” since this group of 
people, while lacking political consciousness, are the most ready to revolt if led, see 87. Homi K. Bhabba 
cites Stuart Hall as identifying The Wretched of the Earth as the “Bible of decolonization” in light of how 
the text is long on prophecy and polemics and short on policy and planning. See Bhabba, “Foreword: 
Framing Fanon,” The Wretched of the Earth, xvi.    
 
3 GBLTQ2S is an acronym for Gay, Bisexual, Lesbian, Trans, Queer, and Two-Spirited. For scholarly 
work at the intersection of queer theory and indigenous studies see the anthology, Queer Indigenous 
Studies: Critical Interventions in Theory, Politics, and Literature, eds. Qwo-Li Driskill et al. (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2011).  
 
4 By “ancestral desire,” I am not making a romanticized historical claim. Like all peoples, the Gitxsan 
have engaged in war and peacemaking practices throughout their histories with others. Rather than 
suggesting a historical state of permanent peace and harmony, I am signifying and prefiguring a 
phenomenological state of being in which we Gitxsan upbuild and transform our  “trickster desire,” viz. a 
politically unconscious state in which Gitxsan are distracted by the pursuit of selfish ends (i.e. for power, 
pleasure, prestige, etc.) into ancestral desire (i.e. a politically conscious, ethical-spiritual state of self-
generated love, respect, generosity, and other virtuous ingredients that create peaceful coexistence). For an 
extended Spinozistic description of the phenomenological relation between trickster and ancestral desire, 
the reader is directed to section 6.3 of the conclusion.   
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I host this feast in a Gitxsan trickster-ancestral spirit informed by the gawagyanii, 
a celebration of peace feast historically held by the Gitxsan after a war. 5 Throughout our 
history with settler society, we have learned to skilfully defend ourselves against imperial 
forces. When the Canadian colonial state legalized cultural genocide by criminalizing the 
li’ligit under the Indian Act between 1884 and 1951, for instance, our house chiefs 
continued to peacefully practice the li’ligit underground.6 Tahltan-Tlingit philosopher 
Nastaywuu from the house of Yinyetti, our territorial neighbour and wolf clan relative, 
teaches that the criminalization of the feast functioned as a colonial pre-emptive measure 
against the percolation of powerful ideas that naturally emerge out of large indigenous 
gatherings.7 In the face of this failed colonial measure, I continue in the everyday Gitxsan 
feasting method of peaceful anti-colonial struggle.    
                                                 
5 Historically, land boundary conflicts between the Gitxsan Nation and neighbouring indigenous nations 
were resolved through a gawagyanii. For a study that explores the way in which conflict resolution between 
the Gitxsan and the Nisga’a over present-day land claims is obstructed by settler-colonial governmental 
processes, see Neil J. Sterritt et al., Tribal Boundaries in the Nass Watershed (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 
1998). For an English translation and definition of gawagyanii, see Simalgax Working Group, “Names of 
Feast”, Ha’niimagooansxwhum Algaxhl Gitksen – Gitksan Gitkxsenimx – Gitxsanimax to English 
Dictionary: Learner’s Edition, Vol. 1 (British Columbia: Ministry of Education Branch).  
 
6 It is largely due to the courageous everyday feasting practices of house chiefs like Klii Yem Laxha (a 
head chief title currently held by John Olsen of the wolf clan from Kispiox) during the potlatch ban that the 
li’ligit survives and continues to flourish on the Gitxsan homelands today, from death feasts to headstone 
and totem pole raising feasts. For a Gitxsan account of Klii Yem Laxha’s underground feasting practices 
and his resultant life imprisonment, see ‘Wii Muk’ Willixw (Art Wilson), Heartbeat of the Earth: A First 
Nations Artist Records Resistance and Injustice (Gabriola Island: New Society Publishers, 1996), 28-29.  
 
7 Personal Communication, Wednesday, January 28, 2015. I identify Nastaywuu (Tony Bob) as an 
indigenous philosopher who is engaging the first project of Dale Turner’s critical indigenous philosophy, 
viz. the project of orally articulating indigenous thinking and worldviews carried out by Elders who are 
recognized in their communities as keepers of these distinct ways of knowing the world. As a Tahltan-
Tlingit Elder contracted by the Correctional Service of Canada, Nastaywuu is carrying out this project of 
critical indigenous philosophy in federal penitentiaries located in the lower mainland of British Columbia, 
translating Tahltan-Tlingit difference in rehabilitative programs designed to assist indigenous prisoners in 
their journeys of personal decolonization. For an outline of the three distinct and interconnected intellectual 
projects that comprise a critical indigenous philosophy, see Dale Turner, This Is Not a Peace Pipe: 
Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 9. 
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As a practice of Gitxsan diplomacy, I draw on our Canadian ally and civic partner 
James Tully’s “public philosophy in a new key” as an additional methodological guide to 
serve the purpose of gawagyanii.8 Tully explains that just as jazz musicians play in a new 
key with classic performances and present audiences, the public philosopher trained in his 
school improvises in dialogues with contemporary and classic public philosophers, 
engaged citizens, and in response to the political problems that confront and move him or 
her.9 This gawagyanii feast improvises in dialogues with contemporary public 
philosopher Taiaiake Alfred and classic public philosopher Benedict Spinoza, along with 
engaged citizens within, in-between, and outside of the Gitxsan Nation, in response to the 
political problem of settler-colonialism confronted by the hereditary chiefs at the 
Delgamuukw trial. In Gitxsan musical terms, this gawagyanii feast introduces a new 
drumbeat into public philosophy. That is, in light of the Canadian colonial state’s 
historical tactics to extinguish liberating ideas shared over the feast table, you are openly 
                                                 
8 James Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key: Volume 1: Democracy and Civic Freedom (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008). While Tully acknowledges that his approach has philosophical 
roots going back to the Greeks and up through Renaissance humanism and Reformation critical philosophy, 
he identifies public philosophy with its three most recent phases: 1) the practice-based political philosophy 
of the Enlightenment (Rousseau, Wollstonecraft, Hegel, Marx, and Mill); 2) the criticisms and reforms of 
this body of work by Nietzsche, Weber, Heidegger, Gadamer, Arendt, Dewey, Collingwood, Horkheimer 
and Adorno; and 3) the reworking of this tradition in the light of new problems by scholars over the last 
twenty years, including Quentin Skinner and the Cambridge school; the critical and dialogical hermeneutics 
of Charles Taylor; and the critical histories of the present initiated by Michel Foucault. For more on Tully’s 
methodological approach, see chapter 1, “Public Philosophy as a Critical Activity.”  I am indebted to Dale 
Turner for suggesting Tully’s approach as an effective way for indigenous scholars to participate in legal 
and political discourses, see This Is Not a Peace Pipe, 73-74: “The political philosophy of James Tully is 
useful for showing how political theorists and other concerned citizens can understand, not only the nature 
of the political relationship, but also how our participation in a particular kind of dialogue can enrich our 
self-understandings of who we are as participants in a just and coexistent relationship. . . [A dimension] of 
Tully’s work is his idea that political philosophy is a critical activity – that political thinking is a dialogical 
process between often competing participants, each vying to have its voice legitimated in the on-going 
dialogue…I defend this way of ‘doing’ political philosophy because it allows indigenous voices to 
participate in legal and political discourses on their own terms.” In light of Turner’s comment that Tully’s 
approach is “necessarily limited” as it does not tell indigenous peoples how to participate in the on-going 
dialogue of indigenous rights, sovereignty, and nationhood, I creatively apply Tully’s methodological 
approach to serve the peaceful purpose of our post-Delgamuukw philosophical feast.  
 
9 Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key: Volume 1, 9.  
A Post-Delgamuukw Philosophical Feast: 
Feeding the Ancestral Desire for Peaceful Coexistence  
5 
invited to think and move to a new beat by subversively feasting on a powerful union of 
Mohawk-Spinozistic-Gitxsan conceptions of peace. 
As part of li’ligit protocol, I inform you beforehand of the philosophical business 
to be conducted at our gawagyanii. Chapter 1 begins with a Longhouse dialogue between 
the Mohawk Nation’s Taiaiake Alfred and Audra Simpson. In their dialogue, Alfred 
identifies Spinoza as a kindred philosophical spirit who complements the Mohawk 
understanding of peace as a state of mind. From a Gitxsan perspective, Alfred and 
Simpson’s dialogue raises questions about the Gitxsan Nation’s efforts to achieve peace 
in a post-Delgamuukw era. To free our minds from the constraining colonial version of 
Delgamuukw, we invite the Gitxsan trickster Wiigyat to wander through our collective 
political imagination to demolish aboriginal title rights. We then freely remember the 
galvanizing vision of peaceful coexistence voiced by Delgamuukw (Ken Muldoe) and 
Gisdaywa (Alfred Joseph) on the very first day of the trial. To help us feed the ancestral 
desire for peaceful coexistence, we formally welcome our philosophical guests, Taiaiake 
Alfred and Benedict Spinoza, into the intellectual space of the Feast Hall. Joined by a 
Two-Row Wampum friendship treaty timeknot, we learn how Alfred and Spinoza are 
ideally suited for continuing the over three-century-old conversation between indigenous 
people and settlers in the self-conscious Gitxsan tradition of philosophical feasting.  
Chapters 2 through 5 share a common feasting order.10 Each chapter begins with 
the lil’ligit protocol of am goosinsxw by remembering one of the hereditary chiefs who 
                                                 
10 To my knowledge, the precedent for structuring scholarly work as an indigenous ceremony is 
Taiaiake Alfred’s Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto 2nd ed. (Don Mills, ON: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). Hereafter cited as PPR. In this dialogical text, first published in 1999, Alfred 
draws on his Rotinohshonni people’s condolence ritual as a metaphorical framework for his thoughts on 
indigenous politics and the critical role indigenous traditions can play in alleviating grief and discontent 
among indigenous people. My Gitxsan philosophical feast method follows Alfred’s trailblazing, self-
conscious traditionalist approach to scholarship.  
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took the stand and shared their oral histories at trial, from Gyolugyet (Mary McKenzie), 
to Antgulilbix (Mary Johnson), to Gwaans (Olive Ryan), to Gisdaywa (Alfred Joseph). 
Under cross-examination, we witness how each chief skilfully responded to adversarial 
questions raised by the government’s lawyers. Building on the chiefs’ efforts to transcend 
adversarial relations with their teachings of peace, we will practice the li’ligit protocol of 
k’otsgesxw by accepting Alfred and Spinoza’s ideas as anhooya (tools) for 
deconstructing each of the premises of colonialism confronted at trial: state sovereignty 
(c. 2), imperial Christianity (c. 3), colonial legal supremacy (c. 4), and the imaginary 
uncivilized other (c. 5).11 Continuing with the li’ligit protocol of k’otsgesxw, we will then 
witness how Alfred and Spinoza self-consciously engage their traditions for constructive 
anhooya capable of building peaceful coexistence in their historically different locations. 
In chapter 2, our guests draw on their ancestral governance systems—the Iroquois 
confederacy and the Hebrew commonwealth—for diverse democratic federalist models 
that function to critique and transform oppressive state structures. In chapter 3, we will 
witness how they reinterpret their peoples’ spiritual traditions—from indigenous 
ceremonial practices to biblical narratives—to create democratic, action-oriented belief 
systems capable of achieving peace among their people. In chapter 4, we will see how our 
guests reconstruct the morally virtuous figures of their traditions—the warrior and the 
prophet—as models to inspire their people to transform themselves peacefully by 
                                                 
11 For a Canadian scholar who argues that the debate between Left-wing and Right-right postmodernists 
turns the postmodern belief that politics is a project of arbitrary power into a reality and thus leaves no hope 
or space for peaceful coexistence, see Shadia B. Drury, Alexandre Kojéve: The Roots of Postmodern 
Politics (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 208. While our philosophical feast will involve an 
element of deconstruction, we will not be glorifying criticism for its own sake. Rather, our constructive 
purpose is to conceptualize the conditions for peaceful coexistence between the grassroots Gitxsan Nation 
and the state, the church, the self, and the other. Thus, the ideas shared at our philosophical feast are not 
ideologically located on the postmodern Left, Right, or Centre of the political spectrum. Rather, the ideas 
that are shared in our feast dialogues are located along the Skeena River as living outgrowths of the land 
and the people of the misty river.  
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practicing the ethical principles revealed in their legal traditions. In chapter 5, we will 
witness how Alfred and Spinoza draw on their respective ancestral treaty models—the 
Two Row Wampum and the Hebrew Pactum—as relational guides for developing 
democratic relationships of love with the foreign other. Intellectually filled by the ideas 
offered by our hereditary chiefs and our philosophical guests, I conclude each feast 
dialogue by serving wo’os to all who have contributed to each feast dialogue by narrating 
Wiigyat trickster stories. Whether it is the Big Man’s misadventures with his wooden 
slave, wooden jaw, warrior feminist wife, or the loyal lynx, Wiigyat’s blunders will 
vividly illustrate the philosophical and political themes developed in each feast dialogue 
and effectively function to create a hybrid Mohawk-Spinozistic-Gitxsan vision of future 
peaceful relationships between the grassroots Gitxsan Nation and the state, the church, 
the self, and the other.  
We will conclude our philosophical business by consuming so’o, the excess food 
for thought leftover from our feast. First, we will remember the children of chiefs and 
reflect on how they are disclosing the promising future of the Gitxsan Nation by 
imaginatively positioning themselves in the resurgent Delgamuukw narrative. We will 
then reflect on the way in which the intellectual space created in the Feast Hall effectively 
disrupts the intellectual and political landscapes maintained by academic and Gitxsan 
elites alike. We will end by critically reflecting on how the intellectual space of the Feast 
Hall functions to transform post-Delgamuukw self-determination efforts from a 
bureaucratic reality managed by political elites to a phenomenological reality generated 
by the grassroots Gitxsan people committed to feeding the ancestral desire for peaceful 
coexistence.  
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With the feast business outlined, we now proceed with the seating. For all who 
have chosen to t’uu’w and respectfully stand at the Feast Hall doors, please be guided by 
the wanimsit. All Gitxsan may take their ant’aa at their wilp tables and all of our guests 
may take their ant’aa at the visitor tables. By taking your place in the Feast Hall, you are 
actively participating in the Delgamuukw story as witnesses and peacemaking agents of 
resurgence.12 Like the chiefs at the Delgamuukw trial, your work is also about striving to 
transform adversarial relations into peaceful relations with all those who are, indeed, here 
to stay.13
                                                 
12 For a Canadian sociologist who considers resurgence from a settler perspective, see Richard J.F. Day, 
“Angry Indians, Settler Guilt, and the Challenges of Decolonization and Resurgence,” in This Is An Honour 
Song: Twenty Years Since the Blockades, eds. Leanne Simpson and Kiera L. Ladner (Winnipeg, MB: 
Arbeiter Ring Publishing, 2010), 267: “This raises the question then of settler resurgence through 
withdrawal from the dominant order, and the construction of alternatives to it. Something that is bound up 
with decolonization, but is, at least for me, much more difficult to think through, to act upon. For. . .  I 
know I am not really of the land, anywhere. Just as I am landless, it is also very unclear who are my people, 
other than. . . that I am some kind of European settler.” 
 
13 I am alluding here, of course, to the pithy reminder left to us by Supreme Court Justice Antonio 
Lamer at the end of his ruling on the Delgamuukw case: “Let us face it, we are all here to stay.” See 
Delgamuukw: The Supreme Court of Canada Decision on Aboriginal Title (Vancouver, BC: Greystone 
Books, 1998), 122. The hereditary Nuu-chah-nulth chief and scholar Umeek (E. Richard Atleo) provides an 
expansive indigenous interpretation of Justice Lamer’s statement, see Principles of Tsawalk: An Indigenous 
Approach to Global Crisis (Vancouver, B.C.: UBC Press, 2011), 124: “‘Let us face it, we are all here to 
stay,’ is one way to express the constitutional principle of continuity. Although this phrase refers 
exclusively to human relationships, it can, from an indigenous perspective, be generalized to include all life 
forms – plants, animals, and humans. An indigenous interpretation of the phrase would take it to mean 
sustainability, or the maintenance of balance and harmony, between various life forms. This is not the case 
from the Government of Canada’s perspective, however, as, for one thing, the Indian Act presents a major 
obstacle to such an interpretation.”   
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CHAPTER 1: 
GAWAGYANII 
TA: What does peace mean to you? 
AS: It’s when people’s minds are aligned—when your mind or the collective mind is 
unencumbered by grief or by suffering. Peace is what we strive for. War, as I’m thinking 
of it [as a form of communication that is intellectual and deconstructive], is a way of 
achieving that peace because sometimes you need to change the other person’s mind. My 
definition comes from our [Mohawk] culture. 
TA: The way you’ve described it, as a state of mind, is exactly how Spinoza, the 
philosopher, referred to it. He said that peace is more than the absence of war; in his 
words, it is a “disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice.” Can you think of a time 
in our [Mohawk] history when peace has been achieved by our people? 
AS: Aside from the original Great Peace that started it all off, I don’t think we’ve ever 
achieved it. Personally, I can’t think of a time in my life when my mind has been 
unencumbered by the grief and stresses and worries of the present situation we live. I 
don’t know peace in my life, and I don’t think any of us do. We hold it up as an ideal and 
we strive for it in our lives and in our work. And I know many other people are driven by 
this principle and are driven to achieve it too. I think that’s why our people are so 
difficult; because we’re frustrated that we can’t get to this point of peace. People say 
we’re so difficult; you know how we are! 
TA: Oh, I know. . . It’s one thing to have stability, but another thing to have happiness. 
We see peace as happiness. 
AS: And this can only be achieved when your relations are in order and your mind is at 
ease. We value respect, we value peace of mind and thinking clearly above all else. Isn’t 
that a beautiful thing? It’s so enlightened, such a brilliant and just way of being in the 
world. And it’s what we all want but can’t have because of who and where we are right 
now, living in the seat of unease. 
 
 –Taiaiake Alfred in Dialogue with Audra Simpson1 
 
With their words and ideas adding to the rafters, this Longhouse dialogue between the 
Mohawk Nation’s Taiaiake Alfred and Audra Simpson is a noisy work of intellectual 
construction that echoes across Turtle Island from the east coast to the west coast.2 It is a 
Longhouse dialogue that shares with all who have ears to hear—indigenous, settler, and all 
                                                 
1 Taiaiake Alfred, Wasáse: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom (Toronto, ON: University of 
Toronto Press, 2009), 161. Hereafter cited as Wasáse. 
 
2 While Alfred conducted the actual interview with Audra Simpson in the Restaurant Porto Fino in 
Montreal, Quebec in September 2001, I describe it as a “Longhouse dialogue” in light of Alfred’s  
characterization of his overall scholarly project to be one of  “adding to the rafters” of the Mohawk Longhouse. 
See PPR, 31.  
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those in-between—not only Alfred and Simpson’s culturally rooted Mohawk understanding 
of peace but a kindred and biblically rooted notion of peace articulated across the pond over 
three centuries ago by an exiled Portuguese-Jewish philosopher named Benedict Spinoza.3 
For both the Mohawks and Spinoza, who are equally acquainted with the “seat of unease” as 
members of minorities disrupted by Empire, peace is more than the absence of war.4 Peace, 
as reflected in the intellectual harmony between these minorities, is a “virtue which comes 
from strength of mind” and consists in “the union or harmony of minds.”5  
                                                 
3 Spinoza’s definition of peace as a “virtue that arises from strength of mind” (PT, 5.4) is a less substantive 
re-articulation of his biblically rooted notion of peace stated in TPT. Drawing on  the biblical prophets Solomon 
and Isaiah for an understanding of peace as a rational state of mind, Spinoza defines peace as dependent on 
“one’s own internal virtue” through the cultivation of one’s “natural understanding” (TPT, 51-52).  
 
4 In terms of regarding Spinoza as a fellow minority voice and kindred philosophical spirit, the Mohawk and 
the Gitxsan have a precursor, and what a precursor in Malcolm X! In his autobiography, Malcolm X shares how 
he first read Spinoza in Colony Prison located in Norfolk, Massachusetts. See The Autobiography of Malcolm X 
as told to Alex Haley (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1992), 180: “I don’t think anybody got more out of 
going to prison than I did. In fact, prison enabled me to study far more intensively than I would have if my life 
had gone differently and had I attended some college. . . Spinoza impressed me for a while when I found out 
that he was black. A black Spanish Jew. The Jews excommunicated him because he advocated a pantheistic 
doctrine, something like the ‘allness of God,’ or ‘God in everything.’ The Jews read their burial services for 
Spinoza, meaning that he was dead as far as they were concerned; his family was run out of Spain, they ended 
up in Holland, I think.” Despite the geographical inaccuracy, viz. Spinoza’s family actually fled Portugal, 
Malcolm X’s brief paragraph on Spinoza illustrates the appeal the exiled Sephardic Jew has and continues to 
have for minorities in North America. As an aside, it should also be noted that Malcolm X expressed incredulity 
towards the rhetoric of “peaceful coexistence” which he associated with white society. See, 368: “‘Peaceful 
coexistence!’ That’s another one the white man has always been quick to cry. Fine! But what have been the 
deeds of the white man? During his entire advance through history, he has been waving the banner of 
Christianity. . . and carrying in his other hand the sword and the flintlock.” One can only speculate as to what 
Malcolm X’s views would be on our Mohawk-Spinozistic-Gitxsan harmony of ideas on peaceful coexistence.  
 
5 PT, 6.4. It is difficult to locate where Spinoza actually describes peace as a “disposition for benevolence, 
confidence, justice” as cited by Alfred in his interview with Audra Simpson. E IV App. XV may be the proper 
source: “The things which beget harmony [viz. peace] are those which are related to justice, fairness, and being 
honourable.” However, Grant and Therese Havers attribute the source to a popular misquote available on the 
Internet. Regardless of its true source, what Spinoza definitely wrote about peace implies a “disposition for 
benevolence, confidence, justice.” In PT, 5.4, for example, Spinoza contrasts his concept of peace with the 
Hobbesian notion that peace is simply the “absence of war.” Unlike Hobbes, Spinoza did not believe that peace 
was possible among citizens who had a “sluggish spirit” and were “led like sheep to learn simply to be slaves” 
in obedience to the laws of the commonwealth. For Spinoza, citizens needed to have a “steadfast will to carry 
out orders enjoined by the general decree of the commonwealth.” Spinoza’s terms “steadfast will” and “strength 
of mind,” especially when contrasted with terms like “sluggish spirit,” imply an active disposition for 
benevolence, confidence, and justice. Therefore, such a mental disposition is a necessary precondition for peace 
as “the union or harmony of minds” as described by Spinoza in PT, 6.4.  
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Alfred and Simpson’s Longhouse dialogue on the Mohawk and Spinozistic meanings 
of peace can be clearly heard from the Feast Hall deeply rooted in Gitxsan cognitive country. 
Their dialogue invites us to ask ourselves: How have our people been driven to achieve the 
ideal of peace, or what in Gitxsanimx is known as gawagaani? Have we too been miscast as 
“difficult” in our historical efforts to free our minds from grief and suffering? Are we—the 
present and future Gitxsan generations—still striving to achieve gawagaani with all our 
relations? Who among us is engaging in a form of communication that intellectually 
deconstructs and transforms colonial mentalities? Who among us is self-consciously and 
creatively drawing on our Gitxsan tradition for constructive tools capable of building 
peaceful coexistence?  
These questions are not only inspired by our Mohawk Brother and Sister, they are 
organic outgrowths from the living, breathing story that goes by the Gitxsan name of 
Delgamuukw.6 As conventionally told by the master storytellers of settler society—colonial 
judges and the media and scholars who report and analyze their decisions7—Delgamuukw 
begins as a “land claim” case brought forward by the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en “Indians” of 
northern British Columbia in the 1980s, a land claim that was first denied by Justice Allan 
                                                 
6 Delgamuukw (Del-GA-Muuxw) is a Gitxsan head chief name passed down from generation to generation 
within the Laxsee’l (frog) clan since time immemorial. Since the case was first filed, the Delgamuukw name has 
been successively held by three Gitxsan frog clan members: Albert Tait, Ken Muldoe, and (at present) Earl 
Muldoe. I italicize Delgamuukw only when referring to the trial or one of its court decisions. I do not use italics 
when referring to the chiefs themselves.  
 
7 For the court decisions, see Delgamuukw v. The Queen (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185 (B.C.S.C.); 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1993) 104 D.L.R (4th) 470 B.C.C.A) As noted by Dr. Napoleon, this decision 
is erroneously cited as Uukw v B.C.; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R 1010. For a sample of the 
many media reports on the SCC’s decision, see Ken McQueen, “Gitxsan History Set Right,” Vancouver Sun, 
December 12, 1997, A14; Melvin H. Smith, “What the court ignored in Delgamuukw,” Globe and Mail, 
January 7, 1998; Rich Ouston, “B.C. Indian Chiefs Lay Claim to Entire Province, Resources,” Vancouver Sun, 
February 2, 1998, A1. For a legal scholar affiliated with the Gitxsan Treaty Society who attempts to formulate a 
citizen-state type of Gitxsan-Canadian political relationship based on the SCC’s decision, see P. Dawn Mills 
For Future Generations: Reconciling Gitxsan and Canadian Law (Saskatoon, SK: Purich Publishing Limited, 
2008). 
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McEachern in the Supreme Court of British Columbia on March 8, 1991. Two years later on 
June 25, 1993, the plot thickens with the B.C. Appeal Court’s decision. Although the 
majority ruled against the Gitxsan claim to “ownership,” the minority ruling articulated by 
Justice Lambert suggested aboriginal “title” rights were sui generis (“in a class of their own”) 
rather than site-specific. Four years later, on December 11, 1997, the story climaxes as a 
“landmark” Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decision. The SCC not only recognized 
aboriginal title existed as a sui generis right to the land itself, it also unanimously ruled 
Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en oral histories were a valid form of evidence to prove aboriginal 
title. Since the SCC’s landmark ruling, the story has been left in the bureaucratic hands of 
political elites to negotiate an aboriginal title rights settlement. Beyond its sly denial of 
Gitxsan ownership, the fundamental problem with this conventional telling of Delgamuukw 
is that it privileges the judicial agency of colonial courts and reinforces the metanarrative of 
Canadian progress by emphasizing how the courts first denied and then recognized aboriginal 
land rights.8 By casting the colonial courts as the protagonists in this legalized grand 
                                                 
8 There are multiple ways of construing judicial agency in the scholarly literature. For example, Frances 
Widdowson and Albert Howard describe an activist form of judicial agency in Disrobing the Aboriginal 
Industry: The Deception Behind Indigenous Cultural Preservation (Montreal and Kingston:  McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2008), 84: “The stealthful [sic] gains made in influencing government policy also have been 
buttressed by an increasingly activist judiciary. The most significant court decision in this regard was the 1997 
Delgamuukw Supreme Court of Canada Decision.” By contrast, Tom Flanagan describes a “big government” 
form of judicial agency, First Nations, Second Thoughts (Montreal and Kingston:  McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2000), 132: “Chief Justice Lamer’s theory of infringement is the sword that cuts the Gordian knot of 
communal, inalienable aboriginal title. Governments can legally do the things that the aboriginal owners cannot, 
as long as it engages in appropriate consultation and pays appropriate compensation, both subject to judicial 
review.” In contrast with Flanagan’s “big government” form of judicial agency, the sociological duo, James S. 
Frideres and Rene R. Gadacz, describe the court’s judicial agency as a unilateral, anti-governmental creation of 
new ethical relations, Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, 9th ed. (Toronto, ON: Pearson, 2012), 13: “[T]he courts 
have recently brought about a new relationship between governments and Aboriginal people. This new 
relationship focuses on the notion of sanctioned rights, which is defined as those rights recognized by the state 
as justified claims against its actions toward a particular group. . . This new ethic has been brought to the 
forefront not by government but as a result of a number of court decisions that have gone against the 
government.”  
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narrative, these master storytellers relegate the true stars of Delgamuukw—the grassroots 
Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en peoples—to the role of docile “extras.”9 
In light of how Delgamuukw has been authorized by the master storytellers of settler 
society as nothing more than a domesticated legal matter about aboriginal title rights 
administered by the colonial courts, how can we rekindle a resurgent memory of 
Delgamuukw and re-author our lives as Gitxsan people striving to achieve gawagaani?10 As 
grassroots Gitxsan people living in a post-Delgamuukw era, we need to reject our assigned 
role as the silent audience that receives this settler-saturated version of Delgamuukw as a true 
story rather than the colonial fiction it is. We need to transform ourselves into resurgent 
Gitxsan storytellers who narrate and perform Delgamuukw as a living, breathing story that 
signifies and prefigures the grassroots Gitxsan Nation continually striving to achieve the 
ideal of peaceful coexistence with all its relations. As resurgent Gitxsan storytellers, a 
creative means of unburdening our minds of the colonial version of Delgamuukw is to 
                                                 
9 My point here is similar to Val Napoleon’s, see Ayook: Gitksan Legal Order, Law, and Legal Theory 
(Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Victoria Faculty of Law, 2009), 315: “[A]s plaintiffs the Gitksan 
were agents in Delgamuukw in the fullest sense. In other words, Delgamuukw did not happen to the Gitksan; 
rather, the Gitksan made Delgamuukw happen.” Borrows makes a similar point about the way in which legal 
cases and court decisions on indigenous rights restricts indigenous forms of agency, see Drawing Out Law: A 
Spirit’s Guide (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 24-25. Also see his companion text Canada’s 
Indigenous Constitution (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 170.  
 
10 This question and the answer that follows draws from the psychotherapeutic school of thought known as 
narrative therapy developed in the 1970s and 1980s by Australian counsellor Micheal White and his New 
Zealand based colleague David Epston. These postmodern counsellors base their therapeutic approach on the 
ideas of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. Specifically, they draw on Foucault’s power/knowledge notion 
of people experiencing the constitutive effects of power through normalizing “truths” that shape their lives and 
relationships. These “truths” are found in society’s dominant discourses which marginalize some groups and 
empower others. These discourses are then internalized in people’s personal stories, functioning as norms that 
reinforce oppressive societal values. White and Epston use the Derridean technique of deconstruction to assist 
their clients in subverting “taken-for-granted realities and practices; those familiar practices of self and of 
relationship that are subjugating of people’s [lives].”  To empower the oppressed, White and Epston modify 
Foucault and Derrida’s ideas to fit their belief that people have a capacity to make changes in their life stories. 
For more, see White and Epston’s seminal text, Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends (New York, NY: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1990).  
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exercise the “right to narrate”11 the misadventures of Wiigyat, that giant trickster figure first 
imagined by our inventive ancestors.12 Narrating the on-going blunders of the ever-hungry 
Big Man creates a union or harmony of Gitxsan minds of the past, present, and future.13 By 
wandering through our political imagination at this critical juncture in our history, Wiigyat 
will teach us the dangers of greedily consuming title rights. Can you hear the two-spirited 
trickster’s loud giant steps and growling belly nearing? 14   
                                                 
11 I borrow this phrase from the influential postcolonial theorist Homi K. Bhabba, see his “Preface to the 
Routledge Classic Edition,” The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994, 2004), xx, xxv. 
 
12 My strategy of exercising the “right to narrate” Wiigyat trickster stories as a way to subvert the legal 
version of Delgamuukw responds to the Anishinabek legal scholar John Borrows’ call for a trickster resurgence 
made over two decades ago. See “Contemporary Traditional Equality: The Effect of the Charter on First 
Nations Politics,” University of New Brunswick Law Journal, 43 (1994), 23 n. 26: “First Nations people should 
be familiar with the ability to transform and subvert ideas and events. The trickster is a cultural hero who 
teaches us about these possibilities. We need an awakening of the trickster in First Nations intellectual 
discourse.” Interestingly, Borrows neglects to mention Wiigyat, the Gitxsan Big Man, among the various 
trickster personas he lists in Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto, ON: University 
of Toronto Press, 2002), 216, n. 1: “First Nations across Canada know the Trickster by different names. 
Nanabush has various personas in different cultures. The First Nations people of the coastal Northwest know 
him as Raven; he is Glooscap to the Mi’kmaq of the Maritimes; and is known as Coyote, Crow, Wisakedjak; 
Badger, or Old Man among other First Nations people in North America.”  
 
13 From Gitxsanimx to English, Wiigyat (Wee-GET) literally translates as “Big Man.” With an insatiable 
desire for food, Wiigyat has wandered through the collective Gitxsan imagination since time immemorial, 
teaching the people the dangers of over-indulgence, greed, and laziness, always using humour to ensure the 
survival of his stories. Wiigyat closely resembles Raven, the trickster-transformer of Haida and Tlingit histories 
but with the historical difference that Wiigyat never creates; he manipulates, duplicates, instigates, and 
disseminates but never creates. As the K’san Book Builders further describe him, “We-gyet [is] the essence of 
all man’s frailties exaggerated into gentle humour or ribald laughter. . . We-gyet’s blunders, tricks, and 
falsehoods changed the face of the earth and the shape of many of earth’s creatures. . . We-gyet was caught 
between spirit and flesh. He was no man, yet all men.” For fifteen Wiigyat stories written in both English and 
Gitxsanimx, see K’san Book Builders. We-gyet Wanders On: Legends of the Northwest (Seattle, WA: Hancock 
House Publishers Ltd, 1977). The K’san Book Builders are made-up of 86 Gitxsan community members who 
have transcribed a single version of the rich variety of Wiigyat stories in circulation at the time of publication. 
The K’san Book Builders incorporated the narrative details accepted by the majority of Gitxsan Elders who are 
knowledgeable of the Wiigyat stories in their oral form. Hence, We-gyet Wanders On is not a product of Frantz 
Boas’ “salvage ethnology” which presumed a vanishing Gitxsan culture. Rather, We-gyet Wanders On is a 
proud product of the nation-building efforts initiated by the grassroots Gitxsan in the 1970s.   
 
14 While Wiigyat is conventionally portrayed in male-gendered terms as the Big Man, he nevertheless 
transgresses gender conventions. See, for example, “We-gyet and His Wife,” We-gyet Wanders On, 22: “This 
wife was not only busy, she was beautiful. Her flame-coloured hair sparkled like those chips off the sun, the 
stars. W-gyet greatly admired this hair and wished his could be the same.” From this passage we can accurately 
understand Wiigyat as a “two-spirited” mythical hybrid figure constituted not only by human and divine spirits 
but by male and female spirits as well. While his male spirit is expressed physically in an exaggerated “manly” 
embodiment, his female spirit is expressed in his exaggerated desire to embody “womanly” beauty. By 
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As aboriginal title rights grew, court case by court case—from Delgamuukw to 
Tsilqotin—Wiigyat could not resist wondering how such a crystallized creation tasted. He 
had heard a lot about this legal cuisine from the Gitxsan as he wandered blindly through the 
legal and political systems of the colonial state. Having enjoyed the delicacies on the Gitxsan 
homelands since time immemorial, Wiigyat thought that since these Gitxsan so strongly 
desired title it must be good for him too! 
One day when the Justices were out for lunch, Wiigyat wandered east and entered 
their chambers. Stacks of white papers surrounded each wooden bench, documenting the 
tempting idea of aboriginal title. Wiigyat salivated and wet his lips as he read sentence after 
sentence. Unable to resist the lure of title, Wiigyat demolished the concept one bite at a time. 
Little did Wiigyat know the trick was on him. When the Justices returned to the courthouse, 
they laughed at the sight of the giant trickster figure holding his stomach, lying in the middle 
of their burgundy carpet.  
“Owwww! My belly roars in pain!” 
 “Oh haven’t you heard Mr. Wiigyat?!” The Justices said in unison. “Aboriginal title 
is like juice crystals! Sugary and sweet at first, but then it dissolves and infringes upon the 
insides! There is no fulfilling nourishment in title! Who hasn’t heard of this, Mr. Wiigyat? 
Do you have a tin ear too?”15 
                                                                                                                                                       
exaggerating conventional notions of “maleness” and “femaleness,” Wiigyat, in true trickster fashion, 
challenges us to reflect on the socially constructed nature of gender and how gender informs our identities. 
Highlighting Wiigyat’s two-spirited nature is especially relevant in light of Dr. Val Napoleon’s remarks that 
tricksters are portrayed “primarily as male which is a loss.” See her Interview with Michael Hutchinson on 
Face-to-Face that aired on the Aboriginal Peoples Television Network (APTN) on April 14, 2015, accessible at 
aptn.ca. 
 
15  I am alluding here to a famous interaction between Gitxsan Chief Antgulilbix (Mary Johnson) and Justice 
Allan McEachern during the Delgamuukw trial. In order to prevent Antgulilbix from singing her traditional 
dirge song as part of her oral evidence, Justice McEachern explained to the Gitxsan legal counsel that he had a 
“tin ear” incapable of hearing musical tones. See Trial Transcripts, Delgamuukw v. The Queen in the Supreme 
A Post-Delgamuukw Philosophical Feast:  
Feeding the Ancestral Desire for Peaceful Coexistence   
16 
Wiigyat responded to the Justices’ jeers by vomiting chunks of aboriginal title onto 
their burgundy carpet.16 With aboriginal title exposed as a crystallized mess, the Justices 
began to panic. They realized that with aboriginal title now northing more than smelly carpet 
stain, the Gitxsan could once again narrate and perform Delgamuukw as a story about 
actively feeding the ancestral desire for peaceful coexistence.  
1.1  Remembering Delgamuukw17  
In the gwooyim of 1987, our Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en Simgigyat gant Sigidim haanak’ 
gathered on Sim’oogit Gyolugyet’s laxyip where the Smithers township and the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia curiously happened to be situated.18 With our people united 
behind them, Delgamuukw (Ken Muldoe) and Gisdaywa (Alfred Joseph) raised their voices 
                                                                                                                                                       
Court of British Columbia, Action No. 0843, Smithers Registry, 671: “I have a tin ear, Mr. Grant, so it’s not 
going to do any good to sing it [Antgulilbix’s dirge song] to me.” Mr. Grant’s witty reply: “I have a similar 
problem, my Lord, but maybe after it is sung we may view it at that stage.” Justice McEachern eventually 
conceded and Antgulilbix raised her voice and shared her dirge song.  
 
16 Wiigyat’s vomiting up of the SCC’s concept of aboriginal title officially ushers in the period of Gitxsan 
decolonization. See Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 8: “In the period of decolonization the colonized masses 
thumb their noses at these very values [held by the colonizers], shower them with insults and vomit them up.” 
 
17 In addition to practicing the li’ligit protocol of am goosinsxw, I am building here on Linda Tuhiwai 
Smith’s conception of “remembering” as an indigenous project, see Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and 
Indigenous Peoples (New York, NY: Zed Books, 1999), 146. Smith argues “remembering” is not about 
idealizing a golden past but rather recalling a painful history and people’s responses to that historical pain. This 
form of remembering is painful because it involves not only remembering what colonization was about but what 
being dehumanized meant for Indigenous cultural practices. Both healing and transformation thus become 
crucial strategies in any approach which asks a community to remember what they may have decided 
unconsciously or consciously to forget. In asking the Gitxsan Nation to remember Delgamuukw, I am asking us 
to recall our ancestral desire and struggle for peaceful coexistence and the hunger pains that result from being 
denied justice in the colonial legal system. However, as much as our remembering will be painful it should also 
be empowering as we will rekindle what the Anishinaabe literary theorist Gerald Vizenor has called our 
“survivance.” See Gerald Vizenor, ed., Survivance: Narratives of Narrative Presence (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2008), 1: “The nature of survivance is unmistakable in native stories, natural reason, [and] 
remembrance. . .  The character of survivance creates a sense of native presence over absence, nihility, and 
victimry. . . survivance is the continuance of stories, not a mere reaction, however pertinent. Survivance is 
greater than the right of a survivable name.”  
 
18 The Delgamuukw trial began on May 11, 1987 in Smithers, British Columbia. The plaintiffs, 35 Gitxsan 
and 13 Wet’suwet’en Hereditary Chiefs, sued on their own behalf and on behalf of their house groups for full 
ownership and jurisdiction of their homelands (58,000 square kilometres located in northwestern British 
Columbia).  
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in the courthouse. “We do not seek a decision as to whether our system might continue or 
not. It will continue,” Delgamuukw confidently told the court. 19 “The purpose of this case,” 
he went on to explain, “is to find a process to place Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en ownership and 
jurisdiction within the context of Canada.”20 Gisdaywa followed by clarifying how this 
purpose could only be achieved through peaceful coexistence: “We are not here to chase 
anybody away. We are going to find out how we are going to be able to live amongst other 
people besides ourselves.”21 To feed the ancestral desire for peaceful coexistence expressed 
by Delgamuukw and Gisdaywa, over the next two years 19 Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en Chiefs 
took the stand and shared their adaawk and kungax with the court. By narrating their oral 
histories in the courthouse, a performative act historically located in the Feast Hall, the 
Chiefs slyly invited the agents of the state—from the provincial and federal government 
lawyers to Justice McEachern himself—to a gawagyanii, a feast to make peace between the 
Gitxsan-Wet’suwet’en Nations and Canada.22 
                                                 
19 Trial Transcripts, Delgamuukw v. The Queen in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Action No. 0843, 
Smithers Registry, 67.  
 
20 Ibid. One of the compromises the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en Chiefs were forced to make  by entering the 
colonial courthouse was to articulate their purpose in the European discourse of “ownership” and “jurisdiction” 
and seeking this form of legal recognition from the provincial and federal governments. For an analysis of the 
problematic nature of indigenous people continuing to use the discourse of “inherent jurisdiction” in their 
formal negotiations with the Canadian state in a post-Delgamuukw era, see the discussion paper prepared for the 
Chiefs of Ontario, authored by Taiaiake Alfred and Erin Michelle Tomkins, “The Politics of Recognition: A 
Colonial Groundhog Day,” 1-18, August, 25, 2010. Accessible at www.chiefs-of-ontario.org. For Alfred and 
Tomkins’ playful yet insightful method of using the SCC’s Delgamuukw decision as a legal literacy tool to 
measure First Nations politicians’ degree of assimilation as a result of their engagement in the colonial politics 
of recognition, see 15: “First Nations politicians must be well versed in Canadian law to be successful at their 
jobs. Ironically, it is more likely that an Indigenous person in Canada today can summarize the Delgamuukw 
decision than can speak their own language. Leaders understand the Indian Act and can recite the ‘constitutional 
rights’ accorded Indigenous peoples through the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but few and far 
between can demonstrate real knowledge about their sacred responsibilities to the land and those living on it.”  
 
21 Trial Transcripts, Delgamuukw v. The Queen, 69.  
 
22 For a scholar who explains how the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en Chiefs presented their case based on the 
structure and practice of the feast, and also develops a theoretical model of intercultural understanding based on 
the Gitxsan feast, see Natalie Oman, “Sharing Horizons: A Paradigm for Political Accomodation in Intercultural 
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 To rephrase Delgamuukw and Gisdaywa, how did the colonial courts—from the B.C. 
Supreme Court’s Justice McEachern to the Supreme Court of Canada’s Justice Lamer—deal 
with the truth that we are spiritually and legally rooted in our homelands?23 In Hobbesian 
terms, the colonial courts dealt with the truth in a nasty, brutish, and morally short manner. 
On March 8, 1991, Justice McEachern denied the truth on the colonial presumption that the 
“plaintiffs” were uncivilized others: 
It would not be accurate to assume that even pre-contact existence in the territory was in 
the least bit idyllic. The [Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en] plaintiff’s ancestors had no written 
language, no horses or wheeled vehicles, slavery and starvation was not uncommon, and 
there is no doubt, to quote Hobbs [sic], that aboriginal life in the territory was, at best, 
‘nasty, brutish, and short.’24 
 
While Justice McEachern’s denial rested on a Hobbesian liberal pretension, six years later on 
December 11, 1997 Justice Lamer dressed up his denial under the Hegelian liberal pretension 
of “recognizing” aboriginal title rights and encouraging good-faith negotiations.25 Although 
aboriginal title rights are the most robust form of aboriginal rights in Canada, they are not 
                                                                                                                                                       
Settings” (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University, 1997); and her shorter essay, “Paths to 
Intercultural Understanding: Feasting, Shared Horizons, and Unforced Consensus,” in Intercultural Dispute 
Resolution in Aboriginal Contexts eds. Catherine Bell and David Kahane (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2004), 
70-93. 
 
23 Ibid., 65-66: Delgamuukw states, “For us, the ownership of the territory is a marriage of the chief and the 
land. Each chief has an ancestor who encountered and acknowledged the life of the land. From such encounters 
comes power. The land, the plants, the animals and the people, all have spirit; they all must be shown respect. 
That is the basis of our law.” Gisdaywa follows with, “In our legal system, how will you deal with the idea that 
the Chiefs own the land? The attempts to quash our laws and extinguish our system have been unsuccessful. 
Gisdaywa has not been extinguished.”  
 
24 “Reasons for Judgements,” Delgamuukw v. Her Majesty the Queen, March 8, 1991, 13.  
 
25 I refer to Justice Lamer’s judicial recognition of aboriginal title rights as holding a “Hegelian” liberal 
pretension in light of the fact that the “liberal politics of recognition” has its philosophical roots in G.W.F 
Hegel’s political philosophy as persuasively shown by the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor in 
Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). While 
Justice McEachern denied land ownership rights, Justice Lamer “recognized” title rights. The Gitxsan-
Wet’suwet’en legal team is partly responsible for this judicial sleight-of-hand as they altered the Hereditary 
Chiefs’ original claim of ownership and jurisdiction to the weaker claims of “aboriginal title” and “self-
government” rights that were suggested to be sui generis by Justice Lambert in the BC Court of Appeal’s 1993 
decision.  
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capable of achieving peaceful coexistence on an equal nations-to-nation basis. For instance, 
while Justice Lamer ruled that aboriginal title rights derive exclusively from the 
“distinctiveness of Aboriginal peoples,” 26 they are not rooted in ayook, the Gitxsan legal 
order. Rather, aboriginal title rights have a mythic colonial origin, having purely 
“crystallized” on the Canadian state’s sovereignty.27 As the master settler storyteller, Justice 
Lamer, narrates:  
First, from a theoretical standpoint, aboriginal title arises out of prior occupation of the 
land by aboriginal peoples and out of the relationship between the common law and pre-
existing systems of aboriginal law. Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown’s underlying 
title. The Crown, however, did not gain this title until it asserted sovereignty and it makes 
no sense to speak of a burden on the underlying title before that title existed. Aboriginal 
title crystallized at the time sovereignty was asserted.28  
 
Not only do aboriginal title rights legitimize the Canadian state’s sovereignty by 
“crystallizing” on the Crown’s underlying title, they fix indigenous “claims” to the land in 
time and space to ensure their future extinguishment. According to Justice Lamer, when 
aboriginal title rights are not extinguished, they can be justifiably infringed to serve the 
interests of settler society:  
                                                 
26 I am indebted to James Tully for highlighting how Aboriginal title rights are based on “aboriginal 
distinctiveness.” See Public Philosophy in a New Key: Volume 1, 271: “The second defining characteristic of 
the Aboriginal rights that Indigenous people are recognised as having, only in virtue of being members of the 
Canadian society and subject to its sovereignty, is that they derive exclusively from the distinctiveness of 
Aboriginal peoples as Aboriginals. They do not derive from any universal principles, such as the freedom and 
equality of peoples, the sovereignty of long-standing, self-governing nations, or the jurisdiction of a people over 
the territory they have occupied and used to the exclusion and recognition of other peoples since time 
immemorial. The Court explicitly rejects any appeal to such universal general rights of the liberal 
Enlightenment as a ground of Aboriginal rights.”  
 
27 I am indebted to John Borrows for this insight. See his article, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of 
Delgamuukw v. The Queen,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal. 37 (1999): 537-596. For another indigenous legal 
scholar who critiques the SCC’s decision, see Gordon Christie, “Delgamuukw and the Protection of Aboriginal 
Land Interests,” University of Ottawa Law Review 32 (2000): 85-115. 
 
28 Stan Persky, Supreme Court of Canada Decision on Aboriginal Title (Vancouver, BC: Greystone Books, 
1997), 101.  
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Aboriginal rights recognized and afforded by s. 35(1), including aboriginal title, are not 
absolute. Those rights may be infringed, both by the federal (e.g. Sparrow) and provincial 
(e.g. Cote) governments. . . In the wake of Gladstone, the range of legislative objectives 
that justify the infringement of aboriginal title is fairly broad. . . In my opinion, the 
development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general 
economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment 
or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign 
populations to support those aims, are the kinds of objectives that are consistent with this 
purpose and, in principle, can justify the infringement of aboriginal title.29 
 
Given how aboriginal title rights can be conveniently infringed upon by settler society and its 
governments in tandem with transnational corporations, our indigenous allies in the academy 
have cautioned against consenting to title. Yellowknives Dene public philosopher Glen Sean 
Coulthard has rightly argued that the liberal “politics of recognition” discourse, as reflected 
in Justice Lamer’s decision, does not usher in an era of peaceful coexistence. Rather, it 
actually reproduces the “very configurations of colonial power that Indigenous demands for 
recognition have historically sought to transcend.”30 The Anishinabe public philosopher Dale 
Turner has likewise raised concerns: “Once the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en accept that they 
possess title over their territories, they consent to a particular type of political relationship 
[and]. . . unequivocally embed their political identity under the sovereignty of the Canadian 
state.”31 In other words, settling for aboriginal title involves unsettling Gitxsan Nationhood.  
Put another way, Justice Lamer’s politically correct decision has the same colonial 
effect as Justice McEachern’s unashamedly Eurocentric decision: the integration of the 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 108, 111.  
 
30 Glen Coulthard, “Subjects of Empire: Indigenous People and the ‘Politics of Recognition’ in Canada,” 
Contemporary Political Theory, 6 (2007): 437.  
 
31 Dale Turner, “Oral Traditions and the Politics of (Mis)Recognition,” in American Indian Thought: 
Critical Essays (Chicago, IL: Blackwell Publishers, 2004), 235.  
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Gitxsan people—whether as uncivilized Indian wards or tame aboriginal citizens32—into the 
Canadian colonial state.33 Justice Lamer’s decision is craftily designed to deceive rather than 
to demean. While the Gitxsan Nation rightly regards March 8, 1991 as “Black Friday” as a 
way to remember Justice McEachern’s decision, too many of us have been deceived into 
celebrating the SCC’s decision as a decolonizing achievement. “We didn’t have much time to 
do a detailed analysis of the decision before facing the media,” Gitxsan Negotiator ‘Maas 
Gaak (Don Ryan) recalls the legal team’s initial response to the decision, “but the immediate 
reaction in the room was: ‘It’s a victory.’”34 Likewise, the reaction of Sim’oogit Niis Noolh 
(Ray Jones) reveals how Justice Lamer’s ruling can be mistakenly regarded as a win when 
compared with Justice McEachern’s demoralizing decision:  
I have mixed emotions today. I am filled with joy and also with remembrance of people 
who have worked so hard. I remember our Elders who passed on with broken hearts and 
the words of [B.C.] Chief Justice McEachern in their ears. Today’s decision begins to 
heal the wounds. The Supreme Court of Canada has come out on the side of justice and 
humanity.35 
 
                                                 
32 The political scientist Dimitrios Panagos has shown how three relational paradigms of aboriginality were 
at play in the Delgamuukw case: 1) nation-to-nation (articulated by the Gitxsan-Wet’suwet’en), 2) ward-
colonial ruler (presupposed by Justice McEachern’s decision), and 3) citizen-state (implied by the SCC’s 
decision).  See “The Plurality of the Meanings Shouldered by the Term ‘Aboriginality’: An Analysis of the 
Delgamuukw Case,” Canadian Journal of Political Science (2007), 592. 
 
33 Will Kymlicka is the most influential Canadian philosopher advocating the integration of indigenous 
nations as “national minorities” into the Canadian welfare state. For the development of his indigenous form of 
liberal-mulitculturalism, see Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995) and Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). For an indigenous critique of Kymlicka’s brand of liberalism, see 
Turner, This Is Not a Peace Pipe, 57-70. For an Australian scholar who attempts to reinvent liberalism to 
integrate indigenous nations into the liberal democratic state, see Duncan Ivison, Postcolonial Liberalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
 
34 ‘Maas Gaak (Don Ryan), “Foreword,” Delgamuukw, iv.  
 
35 As quoted by Stan Persky, “Commentary,” Delgamuukw, 3.  
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After being processed for years in the colonial legal system, wearing down and misleading 
the Gitxsan Nation—from its official leaders to its grassroots people—the original purpose of 
Delgamuukw has been forgotten.36 Remember:  
We are not interested in asserting aboriginal rights. We are here to discuss territory 
and authority. When this case ends and the package has been unwrapped, it will have 
to be our ownership and jurisdiction under our law that is on the table.37 
 
The only thing that has been on the table since the Gitxsan Treaty Society (GTS) entered the 
BC Treaty Process in 1994 is the very aboriginal rights Delgamuukw strongly rejected on 
day one of the trial.38  
                                                 
36 The legal grand narrative of Delgamuukw is a classic example of how Empire displaces indigenous 
peoples from their historical location on their land and then re-writes their history as a function of imperial 
history. As Said puts it, speaking of nineteenth century imperial processes, this project “uses narrative to dispel 
contradictory memories and occlude violence – the exotic replaces the impress of power with the blandishments 
of curiosity – with the imperial presence so dominating as to make impossibly any effort to separate it from 
historical necessity.” See Edward Said, Culture and Empire (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1994), 131-132. 
What the colonial court’s Delgamuukw ruling shows is that this nineteenth century imperial process is an on-
going project.  
 
37 Trial Transcripts, Delgamuukw v. The Queen, 67.  
 
38 For a legal scholar who critiques the bureaucratic obstacles that prevent substantive negotiations between 
the GTS and the governments, see Val Napoleon, “Who Gets to Say What Happened? Reconciliation Issues for 
the Gitxsan,” 177-178 and 191-192. Napoleon has elsewhere critiqued the GTS as reproducing colonial power 
relations within the Gitxsan Nation, see Ayook: Gitksan Legal Order, Law, and Legal Theory (Unpublished 
PhD Dissertation, University of Victoria Faculty of Law, 2009), 332:  “[W]hile on the surface, the British 
Columbia treaty process might be considered to be ‘decolonizing,’ the fact that it has enabled the Gitksan 
Treaty Society to exercise power in order to limit member participation suggests that it is actually a form of 
recolonization (or neo-colonization). That is to say, the Gitksan Treaty Society has replicated the centralized 
role of the state and is continuing the colonization of the Gitksan.” For a critique of the GTS from one of the 
principle architects of the Delgamuukw case, see Neil Sterritt, “Guest View: What Is the Purpose of the GTS,” 
The Interior News, Smithers, B.C., January 19, 2012: 1. Sterritt argues that the GTS is “no longer credible, 
accountable or effective representative of the Gitxsan Nation. After 17 years it is badly in need of reform. 
However, given its stigma in the Gitxsan community, we probably need a new organization based on a new 
mandate agreed to by the Hereditary Chiefs and the Gitxsan people. . . Over a period of 17 years, the federal and 
provincial governments have ‘loaned’ the Gitxsan people about $20M to negotiate a treaty, and we have nothing 
to show for it.” For the recent negotiating position advanced by the Gitxsan Treaty Society, see Gitxsan Treaty 
Team, “Alternative Governance Model: ‘Gitxsan Reconciliation’,” Hazelton, BC, May 15, 2008. Perhaps one of 
the most obvious signs that the GTS has “sold out” is the fact that the organization has hired Gordon Gibson as 
an advisor to treaty negotiations. Gibson is one of the many right-wing policy analysts who initially protested 
the SCC’s decision on Delgamuukw for its recognition of title rights. For Gibson’s advocacy of the GTS’s treaty 
position, see “The Gitxsan Alternative,” Inroads 27 (Summer 2010): 38-51. In this article, Gibson frames the 
Gitxsan political situation as a choice between either remaining “Indians” or becoming “ordinary Canadians.” 
Gibson clarifies that he uses the term “Indian” rather than “First Nations” because the latter term “implies a 
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It is time for us to clear the table of red tape and feast again. Brushing aside the tape, I 
set the table anew to host a post-Delgamuukw philosophical feast that feeds ancestral desire 
for peaceful coexistence. Our feast will continue the Mohawk Longhouse-Gitxsan Feast Hall 
exchange that originally provoked us to remember Delgamuukw by inviting Taiaiake Alfred 
and Benedict Spinoza as philosophical guests to serve the purpose of gawagyanii. For all 
those tired of living in the “seat of unease,”39 I will make ample room for a boundary-
crossing union of Mohawk-Spinozistic-Gitxsan conceptions of peace that transforms the 
Feast Hall into an intellectual hybrid space where uncertain relations with the other are put at 
ease. 
1.2  Welcoming Our Philosophical Guests into the Feast Hall  
In the spirit of the aws litinsxwit, I practice linguistic hospitality by welcoming our 
philosophical guests, Taiaiake Alfred (1964- ) and Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677), into the 
intellectual space of our Feast Hall.40 Following li’ligit protocol, we acknowledge our guests’ 
laxsingigyat and the wams (names) they carry. Taiaiake’s laxsingigyat are Kanien’kehaka 
(Mohawk) from the Kahnawake community located on the east coast of Turtle Island. They 
are known as the people of the flint and have lived on their laxyip since time immemorial. In 
                                                                                                                                                       
particular political agenda of ‘nation-to-nation’ treaties to the exclusion of [less substantive] alternatives.”  
Hence, the GTS is clearly not in the business of defending Gitxsan Nationhood.  
 
39 This phrase is Audra Simpson’s as quoted in the above epigraph.  
 
40 The term “linguistic hospitality” has been coined by the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. See On 
Translation, trans. Eileen Brennan with (New York: Routledge, 2006), 10: “Linguistic hospitality, then, where 
the pleasure of dwelling in the other’s language is balanced by the pleasure of receiving the foreign word at 
home, in one’s own welcoming house.” Informed by Ricoeur’s notion of linguistic hospitality, I receive and 
translate Alfred’s three major texts—Heeding the Voices of our Ancestors; Peace, Power, Righteousness; and 
Wasáse written in the 1990s and 2000s—and Spinoza’s three mature works—Theological-Political Treatise; 
Political Treatise, and Ethica written in the 1660s and 1670s—as interdependent philosophical trilogies that 
coherently articulate historically different conceptions of peaceful coexistence that expand the space of the 
Feast Hall. Where appropriate, I also draw on Alfred’s scholarly articles and Spinoza’s scholarly letters to 
further supplement their ideas.  
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Kanienkeha, Taiaiake means “he is crossing over from the other side.”41 In the language of 
his ancestors, “Taiaiake” is not a static noun but a verb-based performative identity actively 
lived and practiced.42 Building on this linguistic insight, we can imagine Taiaiake crossing 
over from the other (east) side of Turtle Island, entering into the intellectual space of the 
Feast Hall as a Mohawk outsider intent on awakening us from our colonial slumbers. Across 
the pond from Alfred’s laxsingigyat and ancestral homeland, Spinoza’s laxsingigyat are 
Marrano Jews from Portugal who fled their Portuguese homelands during the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries to escape imperial persecution under the Catholic Inquisition. His parents 
eventually found refuge in the recently independent and relatively tolerant Netherlands where 
Spinoza was born. While given the Hebrew name “Baruch,” or “Bento” in the language of 
his Portuguese-Jewish family, Spinoza translated his name into Latin sometime after 
suffering ex-communication from the Sephardic Jewish community in Amsterdam and 
became known among his friends as “Benedict.”43 In the languages of his biblical ancestors, 
                                                 
41 Wasáse, 32.  
 
42 Ibid., 32-33. Alfred explains how his dynamic notion of identity has been influenced by the Palestinian 
Christian postcolonial theorist Edward W. Said. See Wasáse, 139: “The great Palestinian literary scholar 
Edward Said understood being part of a culture as participation in an ongoing dynamic process of change that 
revolves around people’s attempts to answer certain crucial questions about themselves in the public life of the 
community, questions as to how the central traditions of a people are held onto, what is considered as tradition, 
and how a people’s history is read. Like Said was of his own identity as a Palestinian, I am drawn to the idea of 
indigeneity as practice, a dynamic of reflection and dialogue. . . My sense is that the notion of people’s 
interactions with their history is the foundation, but a that a meaningful concept of Onkwehonwe identity, one 
that is consistent with Onkwehonwe teachings, must go beyond reflective practices to an actual political and 
social engagement with the world based on consensus arrived at through broad conversation among people who 
are part of that culture.” 
 
43 On July 27, 1656, at the young age of twenty-four, Spinoza found himself ex-communicated by the Jewish 
Rabbis. For an excerpt of the herem or ban recorded in the communal record book, see Yovel, Spinoza and 
Other Heretics, 3: “The Gentlemen of the Ma’amad [i.e. the Ruling Council] make known to you, that having 
for some time known the evil opinions and works of Baruch de Espinoza, they have endeavored by various 
ways and promises to draw him back from his evil ways; and not being able to remedy him, but on the contrary, 
receiving every day more news about the horrible heresies he practices and taught [to others], and the awful 
deeds he performed, and having of this many reliable testimonies, all given in the presence of the said Espinoza, 
which convinced them; and all this having been examined in the presence of the Gentlemen Hahamim [Rabbis], 
they resolved with the latter’s consent that the said Espinoza be put to the herem [ban] and banished from the 
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Portuguese-Jewish descendants, and his philosophy, Spinoza’s names—Baruch, Bento, 
Benedict—equally mean “blessed.”44 With this linguistic insight in mind, we can imagine 
Spinoza’s Hebrew-Portuguese-Latin forenames as signifying a hybrid identity. Neither 
purely biblical, nor diasporic, nor philosophical but something else besides: the non-imperial, 
self-consciously biblical, exiled Other of the Western philosophical canon, historically 
located in the seventeenth century in-between the margins of his Sephardic Jewish 
community in Amsterdam and Dutch society.45 In the Feast Hall, where all outsiders and 
exiles are welcome, we honour our guests and the ancestors and names they represent.  
                                                                                                                                                       
nation of Israel, as indeed they proclaim the following herem on him: ‘By decree of the Angels and the word of 
the Saints we ban, cut off, curse and anathemize Baruch de Espinoza…with all the curses written in the Torah 
[Ley]: Cursed be he by day and cursed by night, cursed in his lying down and cursed in his waking up, cursed in 
his going forth and cursed in his coming in; and may the L[ord] not want his pardon, and may the L[ord]’s 
wrath and zeal burn upon him. . . and ye that did cleave unto the L[ord] your God are all alive today. We warn 
that none may contact him orally or in writing, nor do him any favour, nor stay under the same roof with him, 
nor read any paper he made or wrote.’” There are several articles that examine the possible reasons for 
Spinoza’s excommunication. For a scholarly debate that focuses on the political dimension of Spinoza’s ex-
communication, see Lewis Feuer, “The Excommunication of Baruch Spinoza,” Spinoza and the Rise of 
Liberalism (Boston: Boston Beacon Press, 1958), 4-5;   Yirmiyahu Yovel, “Why Was Spinoza 
Excommunicated?” Commentary (November 1977): 46-52; and Steven Nadler “Trouble and Toleration in the 
‘Dutch Jerusalem’,” SHOFAR 19, no. 4 (Summer 2001): 40-52.  
 
44 “Spinoza, Benedict de,” Encyclopaedia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite (Chicago: Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 2013).  
 
45 My Gitxsan understanding of Spinoza’s hybrid identity is informed by Homi Bhabba’s postcolonial theory 
advanced in The Location of Culture. Imagining Spinoza’s forenames as signifying a hybrid identity highlights 
his sui generis status among the classical liberal philosophers of the seventeenth century. That is, unlike 
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, both of whom enjoyed British heritage and all its imperial privileges, Spinoza 
inherited from his Marrano ancestors a non-imperial, persecuted minority perspective. It is this perspective on 
the margins of modernity that makes Spinoza so appealing to radical minority figures of North America from 
Malcolm X to Taiaiake Alfred. To my knowledge, the only Spinoza scholar to explicitly relate Spinoza to 
postcolonial theory as I have done here is Michael Mack who briefly contrasts Spinoza’s peaceful concept of 
self-preservation with Jean-Paul Sartre’s call for violent action against colonial power in his “Foreword” to 
Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth. See Mack’s Spinoza and the Specters of Modernity: The Hidden 
Enlightenment of Diversity from Spinoza to Freud (New York: Continuum, 2010), 26-27: “Spinoza’s 
understanding of self-preservation discloses a critique of violence. The self that does violence to the other will 
be hit by violence whose force is equal to that perpetrated by the self in the first place. Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
questioning of colonial violence is pertinent here. Sartre refers to the image of the boomerang in order to 
illustrate the social and cultural repercussion of a presumptuous kind of self-preservation that is in actual fact 
nothing but self-destruction. . . Unlike Sartre, however, Spinoza does not maintain that ‘violence, like Achilles 
lance, can heal the wounds that it has inflicted.’ Spinoza argues that wounds can only be healed through the 
realization that self-preservation is tantamount to assisting rather than injuring the other.” For a book review 
that critiques Mack’s leftist portrayal of Spinoza, see Grant Havers, “Review of Spinoza and the Specters of 
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As thoughtful members of self-determining minorities historically disrupted by 
Empire, Alfred and Spinoza share a Saidian awareness of how imperial processes effectively 
make “all cultures. . . involved in one another,” leaving all traditions “hybrid, heterogeneous, 
extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic.”46 Responding to centuries of colonization, 
Alfred’s Kahnawake Mohawk community began to re-learn their Mohawk culture in the 
second half of the twentieth century. In the 1970s, the anthropologist Mary E. Fleming 
Mathur studied the political culture of the Kahnawake Mohawk community and found that 
members had skilfully “abstracted the essence of the Iroquois tradition and realized that 
essence in a very modern fashion.”47 The value of Mathur’s theory, Alfred writes, is that it 
offers an explanation of how “a society could reactivate in an authentic way elements of a 
tradition not present in immediately preceding generations.”48 In HVA, Alfred highlights the 
notion of cultural hybridity implicit in Mathur’s description of self-conscious traditionalism:  
Acknowledging that there is no direct and unbroken pattern of development, the self-
conscious traditionalist seeks to operationalize dormant values and principles located in 
the history and memory of his people. Traditionalism in this view is a process of re-
learning and exposing what has been subsumed with the culture. . . With Mathur’s theory, 
static representations of culture are abandoned in favour of an approach which sees 
culture as a dynamic process, and traditionalism as a constant referencing back and forth 
                                                                                                                                                       
Modernity: The Hidden Enlightenment of Diversity from Spinoza to Freud by Michael Mack,” The European 
Legacy: Toward New Paradigms 17, no. 7 (2012): 954-955. Finally, to my knowledge, the only indigenous 
scholar to relate Spinoza’s philosophy to contemporary indigenous issues in an in-depth, scholarly manner is 
Christopher Douglas Beeman. In his PhD Dissertation, Beeman provides a theoretical grounding of 
Anishinaabe ways of being in the world articulated by Anishinaabe Elders through the philosophical works of 
Spinoza and Heidegger related to being and place. See Christopher Douglas Beeman, Another Way of Knowing 
and Being: Opening Attentive Receptivity and Meander-Knowing through Reading Spinoza and Heidegger in 
the Company of Elders (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Faculty of Education, Queen’s University, June 2006).  
 
46 Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York, NY: Viking Press, 1993), xxv.  
 
47 Gerald R. Alfred, Heeding the Voices of Our Ancestors: Kahnawake Mohawk Politics and the Rise of 
Native Nationalism (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 1995), 75. Hereafter cited as HVA.  
 
48 Ibid. 
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between what is remembered of the past and what is demanded by the exigencies of the 
present.49  
 
Mathur’s anthropological description, as recounted here by Alfred, can equally be applied to 
Spinoza’s Sephardic Jewish community in Amsterdam. When Spinoza was born in 1632, the 
Jewish Amsterdam community had been alive for twenty-five years.50 Although Spinoza was 
a first generation Amsterdam Jew, he grew up with many Marranos. The Marrano 
community members were returning to their Jewish cultural roots after fleeing the Inquisition 
in Spain and Portugal where they and their descendants had been forced to either convert to 
Catholicism or burn at the stake. While some of these Marranos secretly practiced Judaism, 
many assimilated to Catholicism and, as succinctly described by Gebhardt, became 
“Catholics without faith and Jews without knowledge, albeit Jews by their will.”51 In light of 
this history of Catholic imperial persecution, the Amsterdam Jewish rabbis—the Elders and 
spiritual leaders of the community—remained steadfastly committed to revitalizing the extant 
Jewish culture, framing it in the Spanish and Portuguese languages, and reshaping the 
decultured lives of the newly arrived Jews living in the Netherlands. Perhaps reflecting on his 
youthful days in the Sephardic Jewish community, Spinoza would later write as a middle-
aged man that “Men are not born to be citizens, but are made so.”52 After centuries of 
persecution, the Amsterdam Jews found themselves invested in a communal process of 
relearning their biblical tradition in a new cultural milieu just as the Kahnawake Mohawks 
                                                 
49 Ibid. 
 
50 My brief description here of the history of the Marranos and the establishment of the Sephardic 
Amsterdam community, including the quote by Gebhardt, draws on the work of Yirmiyahu Yovel, Spinoza and 
Other Heretics: The Marrano of Reason (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 40-84.  
 
51 As cited in Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Marrano of Reason, 40. 
 
52 PT, 5.2. I am suggesting here that Spinoza is doing more than restating Hobbes’ remarks in De Cive I. 2, 
n.1.  
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found themselves relearning their indigenous heritage in the midst of newcomers after 
centuries of colonization.  
Having their people’s cultural practices disrupted and involved in the cultures and 
lifeways of foreign others through imperial processes further exposed Alfred and Spinoza to 
the way in which universal principles and values are revealed through different traditions. 
One of the important features of Alfred’s indigenous version of self-conscious traditionalism 
is its commitment to universal principles while respecting historical difference. “The notion 
of traditionalism that I am promoting demands cultural give and take with non-indigenous 
people—respect for what both sides have to contribute and share. . . within the broad 
framework of values we all share: freedom, justice, and peace.”53  Not only is there “no 
inherent conflict between basic indigenous and non-indigenous values,” Alfred maintains 
that these “basic values and higher principles are capable of promoting peaceful harmonious 
relationships.”54 It has only been the “historical practice of politics” and the 
“institutionalization” of these oppressive governance patterns that have infringed “the basic 
values of liberal-democratic and traditional indigenous philosophies alike.”55 For Alfred, 
then, history is a shared story of people either practicing or violating universal principles and 
values rooted in their ancestral traditions. That is to say, there are brilliant historical moments 
of people struggling to uphold universal principles in relation to others, and there are bleak 
                                                 
53 PPR, 16.  
 
54 Ibid., 168.  
 
55 Ibid. Atleo has provided an insightful commentary on this point, see Principles of Tsawalk, 103: “Western 
democracies have had little practice with the implementation of democratic ideals that apply not only to every 
person but also to every group. There has been plenty of practice in implementing democratic ideals within 
racial boundaries. Englishmen in the early days of Canada limited the application of democratic ideals to 
themselves. In fact, based on their immigration policies, there is reason to argue that, during the nineteenth 
century and for much of the twentieth century, the Western democracies, which included Britain, France, the 
United States, and Canada, were more concerned with maintaining their racial boundaries than they were with 
universal democratic ideals.”  
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historical moments of people producing and reproducing oppressive relations that conceal 
and contravene such principles. To encourage the creation of brilliant historical moments, 
Alfred invests himself in the complex work of “separating the good from the bad and of 
fashioning a coherent set of ideas out of. . . [indigenous] traditional culture to guide whatever 
forms of political and social development—including the good elements of Western forms— 
are appropriate to the contemporary reality.”56 In other words, Alfred’s indigenous form of 
self-conscious traditionalism is committed to a boundary-crossing cultural project of 
identifying the shared “principles that form the persistent core of a community’s culture” and 
applying these hybrid elements to political and economic realities in an effort to “build a 
better society” with non-indigenous others.57 
Spinoza radically takes up a similar cultural project in the intellectually repressive 
climate of seventeenth century Calvinist Holland where the orthodox biblical notion of 
“chosenness” made it heretical to even imply universal principles and values were “revealed” 
in all people’s traditions. In Holland’s repressive climate, Spinoza anonymously published 
TPT in 1670, a text accommodated to biblically-minded readers and promptly banned for its 
heretical views.58 In chapter 7 and 15 of TPT, Spinoza separates his “heretical” approach to 
the biblical tradition from the standard approaches articulated by two prominent Jewish 
                                                 
 
56 PPR, 52.  
 
57 Ibid., 168.  
 
58 While TPT was officially banned in the Dutch Republic under an edict of the Hof van Holland issued in 
July 1674, the text was almost immediately flagged for censorship at the municipal and district levels by the 
ecclesiastical (Calvinist) bodies. For example, within three months of its first publication in January 1670, the 
Reformed church consistory of Utrecht resolved on April 8, 1670 that the city’s burgemeesters take 
“appropriate preventive measures” against TPT. Outside of the Dutch Republic, TPT was placed on the Catholic 
Church’s Index of Prohibited Books along with Spinoza’s Ethica, PT, and his letters in 1679. For a full analysis 
of TPT’s publication and subsequent censorship, see Nadler, “The Onslaught”, A Book Forged in Hell: 
Spinoza’s Scandalous Treatise (Newbury-port, MA: University of North Texas, 2004), 215-240.  
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figures: Rabbi Judah Alfakhar and Maimonides.59 While Alfakhar endorsed a form of 
scepticism that denied the “certainty of reason” by teaching that reason must conform to 
scripture, Maimonides promoted a form of dogmatism by teaching that scripture must be 
accommodated to reason.60 Spinoza, by contrast, advocated a form of self-conscious biblical 
traditionalism that respected reason (the universal) and the Bible (tradition) as indwelling in 
their own realms “with the utmost harmony,” neither serving as “handmaid” to the other.61 In 
                                                 
59 For a Straussian scholar who argues Spinoza’s critique of Alfakhar and Maimonides is actually a coded 
critique of the Christian theologian Ludwig Meyer’s Philosophia S. Scripturae interpres, see J. Samuel Preus, 
“A Hidden Opponent in Spinoza’s ‘Tractatus’,” The Harvard Theological Review 88, No. 3 (July 1995), 361-
388.  
 
60 TPT, 169.  
 
61 TPT, 171. My representation of Spinoza as a self-conscious biblical traditionalist builds on the scholarship 
generated by Brayton Polka’s Canadian school of Spinoza scholars. Contrary to the mainstream (Straussian) 
portrayal of Spinoza as an assimilated, secular, Machiavellian philosophical elitist who conceals his true ideas 
from the vulgar, Polka and his students Nancy K. Levene and Grant Havers boldly cast Spinoza as a radically 
egalitarian modern biblical philosopher who genuinely means what he says. For their individual scholarly 
critiques of Strauss’ portrayal of Spinoza, see Brayton Polka, “Appendix 2: Strauss on the Bible, Philosophy, 
and Modernity,” Between Philosophy and Religion: Spinoza the Bible, and Modernity Volume 1 Hermeneutics 
and Ontology (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 251-264; Nancy Levene, “Ethics and Interpretation, or 
How to Study Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus Without Strauss,” The Journal of Jewish Thought and 
Philosophy, 10 (2000): 57-110; and Grant Havers “Romanticism and Universalism: The Case of Leo Strauss,” 
Dialogue and Universalism, 6-7 (2002): 155-167. There are, to be sure, internal differences between Polka’s 
Spinoza scholars. See, for example, Havers’ critique of Levene’s work, “Was Spinoza a Liberal?” The Political 
Science Reviewer (2007), 144: “While I agree with [Levene] that Spinoza values religion, I shall argue that [she 
is]…incorrect in assuming that his ideas fit easily with the anti-absolutism of liberalism as it stands today.” For 
Leo Strauss’ now hegemonic portrayal of Spinoza, see his seminal essay, “How to Study Spinoza’s Theologico-
Political Treatise,” Persecution and the Art of Writing (The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 142, 190: “The 
chief aim of the Treatise is to refute the claims which had been raised on behalf of revelation throughout the 
ages; and Spinoza succeeded, at least to the extent that his book has become the classic document of the 
‘rationalist’ or ‘secularist’ attack on the belief in revelation. . . The Treatise is addressed to Christians, not 
because Spinoza believed in the truth of Christianity or even in the superiority of Christianity over Judaism, but 
because ‘ad captum vulgi loqui’ means ‘ad captum hodierni vulgi’ or to accommodate oneself to the ruling 
opinions of one’s time…in other words, Spinoza desired to convert to philosophy ‘as many as possible’”; also 
see Strauss’ Preface to Spinoza’s Critique of Religion (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), 
20-21: “In providing for the liberal state, Spinoza provides for a Judaism that is liberal in the extreme. The 
‘assimilationist’ ‘solution to the Jewish problem’ which Spinoza may be said to have suggested was more 
important from his point of view than the ‘Zionist’ one which he likewise suggested.” For two American 
scholars prominent in contemporary debates who build on this Straussian depiction of Spinoza, see Steven B. 
Smith, Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Question of Jewish Identity (Chelsea, MI: Yale University Press, 1997), 
200: “Spinoza’s solution to the theologico-political problem can be summarized in a single word: assimilation. 
The assimilation he has in mind does not mean conversion to Christianity or any of the revealed faiths but 
assimilation to a secular society that is, formally, neither Christian nor Jewish but liberal.”; and Nadler, A Book 
Forged in Hell, 165: “Thus, from a biographical perspective, there is no reason to think that Spinoza was the 
first secular Jew, for he was not a secular Jew at all. If anything, he was the most prominent early modern model 
A Post-Delgamuukw Philosophical Feast:  
Feeding the Ancestral Desire for Peaceful Coexistence   
31 
other words, Spinoza equally respects the way in which tradition reveals the content of 
reason (the universals of love and justice) and, conversely, the way in which reason allows 
people to interpret, engage, and even critique tradition in order to keep it true to the universal 
principles of love and justice.62 In chapter 3 of TPT, Spinoza draws out the “heretical” 
implications of his self-conscious biblical traditionalism by famously arguing from biblical 
premises that God revealed “true virtue” in the form of the universal values of love and 
justice to all people, not just the chosen Hebrews. “Since it is accordingly true that God is 
equally gentle, merciful, etc. to all, and the duty of a Prophet was not to teach the laws 
peculiar to the fatherland so much as true virtue and to admonish human beings concerning 
it,” Spinoza boldly concludes that “there is no doubt that all nations had Prophets and that the 
Prophetic gift was not peculiar to the Jews.”63 For Spinoza, no one has an exclusive claim to 
universal ideals like love, justice, freedom, and democracy.64 Moreover, by arguing that the 
                                                                                                                                                       
of the secular individual, someone for whom religious affiliation or heritage played no role whatsoever in his 
self-identity.” For a critique of Nadler’s Straussian portrayal of Spinoza, see Grant Havers, “Review of A Book 
Forged in Hell: Spinoza’s Scandalous Treatise and the Birth of the Secular Age by Steven Nadler,” The 
European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms 19, no. 4 (2014): 507-508. For an Israeli scholar advancing the 
Straussian representation of Spinoza, see Yovel, “Epilogue Spinoza and His People: The First Secular Jew?” 
Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Marrano of Reason, 172-204, especially 201: “Spinoza fought for the 
secularization of individuals and of states, but he lacked the modern concept of a nonpoitical secular Jewish 
nation. . . While offering Western society a clear, positive doctrine of secularity, for his own people Spinoza had 
only a cry of protest.” For a Jewish American scholar who challenges the Straussian portrayal of Spinoza by 
arguing Spinoza “fathered multiple Jewish modernities” that do not fit easily into only one side of the modern 
dualism between the religious and secular, see the astute work of Daniel Schwartz, The First Modern Jew: 
Spinoza and the History of an Image (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), and the book review by 
Grant Havers, “Review of The First Modern Jew: Spinoza and the History of an Image by Daniel Schwartz,” in 
The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms, 19, no. 6 (2014): 798-799.  
 
62 Polka refers to Spinoza’s self-conscious (critical) approach to tradition as his “hermeneutical index of 
love.” See Between Philosophy and Religion: Volume 2: Politics and Ethics (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 
2007), 209: “Spinoza’s ‘hermeneutical index of love’ is the fact that the readers of Scripture do not simply 
accept the revealed word of prophecy uncritically, on the basis of mera fides (in the tradition of Alfakhar). 
Rather, readers possess the supreme right of thinking and judging freely what they read, consistent with the very 
spirit of charity and justice.”  
 
63 TPT, 36, italics mine.  
 
64 Levene has provided extended commentary on chapter 17 of TPT that elaborates on this point, see her 
Spinoza’s Revelation: Religion, Democracy and Reason (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
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work of a prophet—whether Gentile or Jew—is to teach “true virtue” (universal love and 
justice) revealed in his or her legal tradition, Spinoza tacitly articulates the paradox of the 
universal-traditional nexus.65 That is, the universal principles of love and justice can only be 
historically revealed in a given culture and tradition.66 In Ethica, a work posthumously 
published in 1677 and written to accommodate philosophical readers, Spinoza explains how 
this universal-traditional nexus psychologically hinders people from perceiving the universal 
in other people’s traditional models. “But after men began to form universal ideas, and devise 
models of houses, buildings, towers, and the like, and to prefer some models of things to 
others,” Spinoza explains, “it came about that each one called perfect what he saw agreed 
                                                                                                                                                       
215: “Justice and charity cannot be separated from how particular entities define and enact them, but neither can 
they be wholly reduced to one particular polity’s version of them.”  
 
65 I qualify my claim with the adverb “tacitly” in light the fact that, from Hegel to Polka, Spinoza has been 
criticized for failing to explicitly develop a coherent theory of history (i.e. how the universal and traditional 
relate). Although Hegel believed that to “be a follower of Spinoza is the essential commencement of all 
Philosophy,” he ultimately found Spinoza to be “philosophically inadequate” because he failed to develop a 
historical sense: “For Spinoza. . . there exists only absolute universal substance as the non-particularized, the 
truly real – all that is particular and individual, my subjectivity and spirituality. . . has. . . no absolute existence. . 
. As all differences and determination of things and consciousness simply go back into the substance, one may 
say that in the system of Spinoza all things are merely cast down into this abyss of annihilation. But from this 
abyss nothing comes out. . . This is what we find philosophically inadequate with Spinoza.” Hegel, History of 
Philosophy, vol. 3, 287-288 as cited in Smith, Spinoza, Liberalism and the Question of Jewish Identity, 84-85. 
See also Polka, Between Philosophy and Religion: Spinoza, The Bible, Modernity Volume 1: Hermeneutics and 
Ontology, 94-95: “To see that Spinoza’s concept of biblical interpretation, in separating philosophy from 
theology, implicitly bears a concept of history, as I indicated above, is to grasp the fact that the two notions of 
universality – learned and popular, natural and historical, philosophical and theological, rational and faithful – 
are to be separated from and not opposed to each other. But what Spinoza never directly descries or 
acknowledges, what no thinker will clearly articulate until Hegel. . . is that the universality of reason is not 
natural but historical…Yet there is nothing in the thought of Spinoza that is opposed to or cannot be 
accommodated to this concept of history (to this history of the concept, to understanding that concepts are 
eternally true only insofar as they are historically true).” Grant Havers makes a similar point in his article, 
“Hegel, Christianity, and the Modern Philosophical Revolution,” Fideles: A Journal of Redeemer Pacific 
College 4 (2009), 12: “Spinoza, however, lacks a proper concept of history, as he never explains how exactly 
democracy emerges historically from within the Christian tradition.”  
 
66 For this insight, I am indebted to Levene’s commentary. See Spinoza’s Revelation, 221: “The argument 
here is so delicate, yet so simple. Although the divine and human laws – reason and revelation – are eternally in 
conflict, one is never, except in theory, faced with a choice between the ‘neighbor’ – the universal other – and 
one’s clan, family, lover, friend. Choice is of particular others, desire of particular things (E II a3). It is all 
revelation, all theologico-political, one learns what choice is, and what it is to be chosen, whether by family, 
tribe, natio, or humanitas. One is only ever striving to love chosen others – friend, lover, parent, sister, brother, 
tribe natio – sub specie aeternitatis, i.e. through the lens of eternity. Man is God to man.”  
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with the universal idea he had formed of this kind of thing, and imperfect what he saw agreed 
less with the model he had conceived, even though its maker thought he had entirely finished 
it.”67 Spinoza suggests here that while the universal can only be expressed in particular 
constructions, it is not always recognized by those unfamiliar with the model. Additionally, 
what seems to be important to Spinoza is not the origin of the model but whether it achieves 
its intended function or end.68 In this way, Spinoza challenges his biblical and philosophical 
readers to expand their conceptions of the universal by respecting historical difference. 
Canadian Spinoza scholar Nancy Levene clarifies and draws out the implications of 
Spinoza’s universal-traditional nexus:  
The divine law [of love and justice] needn’t be conceived as an independently existing 
abstraction of which all particular polities are simply manifestations. This in itself is 
antithetical to Spinoza’s notion of valuation which is rooted in human desire. Rather, the 
desire for peace and security themselves give rise to a model of the divine law that 
particular polities can put before themselves. As with individuals, their success or failure 
will be dependent on the extent to which they can live up to these ideals, but the ideals 
themselves will be more or less useful (vis-à-vis fortune) depending on their inclusivity, 
depending, in other words, on the imagination of the content of the divine law.69 
 
On this reading of Spinoza, all people throughout their histories have given coherent 
expression to their shared desire for universal ideals in their traditional models. The 
legitimacy of all traditions depends on the degree to which each generation strives to feed the 
desire for universal ideals first expressed in their ancestral traditions. Moreover, all people 
                                                 
 
67 E IV pref.  
 
68 Although she does not make use of E IV pref as I do, Levene makes a similar origins/ends distinction in 
Spinoza’s thought, see Spinoza’s Revelation, 214: “The problem with looking backward is that, unlike ends, 
which are concrete and measurable, origins are concretely unidentifiable and undifferentiating, and thus 
precisely ripe for manipulation, precisely the site of the confusion of the human with the divine. Origins of the 
kind that would differentiate natio from natio or person from person are dead ends for Spinoza, because. . . they 
are only and always theoretical.”  
 
69 Ibid., 215.  
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have traditional terms for describing the phenomenological experience of failing to live up to 
these universal ideals. For instance, the Mohawk tradition refers to it as a state of 
kanikonraksa (“the bad mind” or “unreasonableness”)70; the biblical tradition brands it a state 
of “sin”71; the modern liberal tradition regards it as “illiberal practices” 72; and the Gitxsan 
know it as “trickster desire.”73 Hence, an important feature of Spinoza’s self-conscious 
biblical traditionalism, revolutionary in his time, appears to be its desire to expand people’s 
imaginations of the divine law by recognizing the way in which the universals of love and 
justice are “revealed” in diverse traditional models.  
As we will witness throughout our feast dialogues (cc. 2-5), our philosophical guests 
are public philosophers who self-consciously draw on their historically different traditions 
for cultural elements and use their particular intellectual skill sets to transform their societies. 
Public philosophers, Tully writes, see their work as a “discussion with their fellow citizens as 
equals.” 74 These intellectuals are sui generis in the midst of political philosophers and 
                                                 
70 For Alfred’s description of kanikonraksa see Wasáse, 198. 
 
71 For a Spinozistic understanding of “sin” as conatus, see Polka’s analysis of Spinoza’s interpretation on the 
biblical story of Adam, in Between Philosophy and Religion: Spinoza, The Bible, and Modernity Volume 2: 
Politics and Ethics, 80: “Although one is not born free, although one does not begin with knowledge of good 
and evil, this lack of freedom or knowledge involves, not Socratic ignorance but biblical desire, appetite 
conscious of itself as appetite. The paradox, as always, is that all men and women, in repeating the story of 
Adam and Eve, must learn to see that, in the beginning, they directly desire the good.”  
 
72 For a modern liberal who employs a hermeneutic of suspicion towards indigenous leaders’ use of rhetoric 
as a cover for promoting “illiberal traditionalism,” see Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys, 154: “On the one 
hand, we have many indigenous leaders who strongly affirm human rights values, although this may just be a 
rhetorical tool to hide a deeper commitment to cultural conservatism. On the other hand, we also have many 
indigenous leaders invoking a powerful rhetoric of traditionalism, although this may just be a rhetorical tool to 
justify projects of modernizing self-government. We need to look beyond the rhetoric to see what is actually 
happening on the ground, in the way indigenous peoples are exercising their rights and power, and the way 
political values are being shaped with these communities.”  
 
73 For my phenomenological description of Gitxsan trickster desire that draws on Spinoza’s philosophy of 
conatus like Polka does for his notion of biblical desire, see section 6.3 of the concluding chapter. 
 
74 Tully, Public Philosopher in a New Key: Volume 1, 8. 
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theorists who typically “enter into relationship with citizens under the horizon of a political 
theory that sets them above the situated civic discourses of the societies in which they live.”75 
In Wasáse, Alfred criticizes top-down theoretical approaches for failing to create meaningful 
change in indigenous communities, from native nationalism to traditionalism to 
aboriginalism. He explains that the problem with these approaches is that they are “conceived 
in ideological terms, imported from texts into Onkwehonwe lives, and are thought of as 
panacea.”76 As a result, they have created frustration, discouragement, and alienation among 
indigenous people and have turned many away from their cultures and communities in 
increasing numbers. “Life in our communities,” Alfred writes, “has come to be framed in 
ideological and political terms, ignoring the sustaining, the cultural, and the communal 
aspects that are the roots of our actual existences.”77 In contrast to these ideological positions, 
Alfred’s approach is dialogical, drawing on the insights of diverse indigenous citizens 
engaged in political struggles and movements aimed towards achieving peaceful 
coexistence.78 Similarly, Spinoza criticizes political philosophers—from ancient times to his 
                                                 
75 Ibid.  
 
76 Ibid., 224.  
 
77 Ibid., 224-225.  
 
78 Ibid., 22. Alfred’s philosophical trilogy becomes progressively more dialogical in method and content. In 
HVA, he includes dialogues with three Mohawk chiefs who respectively served the Kahnawake community in 
the 1960s, 1970s, and the 1980s (107-128). In PPR, Alfred includes extended dialogues with four indigenous 
activists and scholars: a 33-year-old Ka’kwa’ka’wakw women actively engaged in various Native political 
organizations (31-44); Mohawk anthropologist Audra Simpson (89-90); Lakota scholar Vine Deloria Jr. (90-93; 
157-167); and the Kanien’kehaka activist and United Nations worker Atsenhaienton (125-138). Finally, in 
Wasáse, Alfred interviews a total of nineteen indigenous people actively engaged in cultural and political 
resurgences: Mi’kmaq scholar and activist Sakej (67-75); Nuu-Chah-Nulth youth activist David Dennis (90-96); 
Nuu-Chah-Nulth activist Tahehsoomca (114-119); an anonymous woman from a West Coast First Nation on 
Vancouver Island expressing concerns about political corruption in her community (123-125); Zapoteca 
doctoral student Isabel Altamirano (140-143); Mohawk anthropologist Audra Simpson (159-162); Ditidaht 
artist Tsaqwuasupp (165-175); Okanagan politicians Joan and Stewart Phillip (181-186); Nuxalk activist 
Sximina (189-196); Oneida businessman Ray Halbritter (213-221); Onondaga Elder and Faithkeeper Oren 
Lyons (237-244); two Elders and Clan Mothers from the Six Nations reserve in Ontario, Kawinehta and 
Gaigohwakohn, (251-254); a group of high school and college students, including 17-year-old Mika Settee 
A Post-Delgamuukw Philosophical Feast:  
Feeding the Ancestral Desire for Peaceful Coexistence   
36 
own generation—for never working “out a political theory that can have practical 
application” because these philosophers “conceive men not as they are, but as they would 
like them to be.”79 Since political philosophers have entered into relationship with citizens 
under the horizon of fantastic and utopian political theories, Spinoza concludes that “while 
theory is believed to be at variance with practice in all practical sciences, this is particularly 
so in the case of political theory, and no men are as less fit for governing a state than 
theoreticians or philosophers.”80 In contrast with these theoreticians, Spinoza shares how his 
own approach regards citizens as equals with “considerable intelligence” and who are already 
intimately aware of the practices of governance and freedom available in their societies.81 In 
our feast dialogues, we will witness how Spinoza is committed to liberating the multitudo 
(the people) of Dutch society from political and religious hierarchical relations maintained by 
the dominant Calvinism of his time, and how Alfred is equally invested in liberating the 
Onkwehonwe (indigenous people) from oppressive relations maintained by Canadian 
colonialism. In other words, we will witness how Alfred and Spinoza are consummate public 
philosophers on the side of the oppressed.82  
                                                                                                                                                       
(Metis), 17-year-old Chris Standing (Dakota), 18-year-old  J. Brandon Monture (Cree/Mohawk), 24-year-old 
Shana Laframbroise (Métis), 30-year-old Marilyn Atsis (Taku River Tlingit) (259-264); and the Kanien’kehaka 
activist couple Teyowisonte and Konwatsi’tsa:wi (270-278).  
 
79 PT, 1.1. 
 
80 Ibid.  
 
81 PT, 1.3-1.4.  
 
82 It is important to note that to be a public philosopher does not necessitate one be a public professor. While 
Alfred shares in his Preface to PPR that he left his prestigious position as a senior advisor on land and 
governance in his Kahnawake community to accept a professorship at the University of Victoria as a way to 
freely express his radical ideas, Spinoza turned down a professorship offered by the University of Heidelberg in 
1673 on the grounds that he felt he would be restricted in expressing his radical ideas in a public setting. For 
Spinoza’s explanation to Mr. J. Louis Fabritius, Professor in the University of Heidelberg and Councillor to the 
Elector Palatine, see Ep48: “But since I have never intended to engage in public teaching, I cannot induce 
myself to embrace this excellent opportunity, although I have given long consideration to the matter. For, first, I 
reflect that if I am to find time to instruct young students, I must give up my further progress in philosophy. 
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Inviting Alfred and Spinoza into the intellectual space of the Feast Hall to serve the 
purpose of gawagyanii symbolizes the historical truth that indigenous people and settlers 
have been interacting and conversing for over three-centuries on Turtle Island. While Tully 
notes that there is neither a Habbermasian “ideal speech situation” nor a universal language 
for indigenous-settler relations, he also reminds us that there have been a “multiplicity of 
paths and ways [indigenous] and [non-indigenous] people have walked together over their 
long history in peace and friendship with good intentions and mutual respect.”83 One among 
many historical examples we can learn from is the Two Row Wampum friendship treaty 
made between Alfred’s Mohawk ancestors and Spinoza’s Dutch people in the early 
seventeenth century. The Two-Row Wampum demonstrates how the universal principles of 
equality, respect, and peace are revealed in the Mohawk tradition. It is therefore worth 
quoting in full Alfred’s description of this brilliant historical moment in indigenous-settler 
relations:84  
                                                                                                                                                       
Secondly, I do not know within what limits the freedom to philosophise must be confined if I am to avoid 
appearing to disturb the publicly established religion. . . So you see, most Honourable Sir, that my reluctance is 
not due to the hope of some better fortune, but to my love of peace, which I believe I can enjoy in some measure 
if I refrain from lecturing in public.” For a portrayal of Spinoza as a “private thinker” see the French scholar 
Gilles Deleuze’s Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), 
11: “The professorship of philosophy at Heidelberg, which the Elector Palatine offers him in 1673, does not 
tempt him: Spinoza belongs to that line of ‘private thinkers’ who overturn values and construct their philosophy 
with hammer blows; he is not one of the ‘public professors’ (who, according to Leibniz’s approving words, do 
not disturb the established sentiments, the order of Morality and Police).”    
 
83 Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key: Volume 1, 240-241.  
 
84 Although Spinoza makes no mention of the Two-Row Wampum treaty made between the Dutch and the 
Mohawk, his philosophical defence of the Dutch East India Company’s foreign treaty relations with the 
Japanese suggests he would likewise endorse respecting the terms and conditions of the Two-Row Wampum. 
For Spinoza’s philosophical defence of the Dutch-Japanese treaty alliance, see TPT, 61: “Indeed, one who lives 
in an imperium where the Christian religion is forbidden is bound to abstain from these ceremonies, and 
nevertheless will be able to live blessedly. An example of this matter is found in the kingdom of the Japanese, 
where the Christian religion is forbidden and the Dutch who dwell there are bound to abstain from all outward 
worship on the basis of a command of the East India Company.” Also see TPT, 189-190: “For, for their greater 
security, those who obtain a Christian imperium have no doubts about making treaties with Turks and Heathens, 
and bidding their subjects who do dwell there not to assume more freedom to practice anything, human or 
divine, than they have expressly contracted for or than that imperium grants. As is obvious from the contract of 
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The Kanien’kehaka Kaswentha (Two-Row Wampum) principle embodies this notion of 
power in the context of relations between nations. Instead of subjugating one to the other, 
the Kanien’kehaka who opened their territory to Dutch traders in the early seventeenth 
century negotiated an original and lasting peace based on coexistence of power in a 
context of respect for the autonomy and distinctive nature of each partner. The metaphor 
for this relationship – two vessels, each possessing its own integrity, travelling the river 
of time together – was conveyed visually on a wampum belt of two parallel purple lines 
(representing power) on a background of white beads (representing peace). In this 
respectful (co-equal) friendship and alliance, any interference with the other partner’s 
autonomy, freedom, or powers was expressly forbidden. So long as these principles were 
respected, the relationship would be peaceful, harmonious, and just.85 
 
As Two-Row Wampum treaty friends, Alfred and Spinoza have travelled the “river of time” 
together to arrive inside the intellectual space of the Feast Hall. They will offer us a historical 
and philosophical orientation that sees indigenous and Western experiences as belonging 
together.86 In the Feast Hall, however, the “river of time” does not flow in one transitional 
direction. In the Feast Hall of the Gitxsan—the diverse people belonging to the misty river—
time is thought and lived otherwise. The feast dialogues that flow through the following 
chapters are swift currents of cultural translation, a whirlpool of entangled times akin to what 
                                                                                                                                                       
the Dutch with the Japanese, about which we have already spoken above.” Notice that while Spinoza here 
employs the Christian/Heathen binary division, he does so in a sly way that effectively destabilizes the binary 
by privileging the political authority of the “Heathen” other rather than the Christian Empire. Furthermore, what 
Spinoza says about building friendships in Ethica suggests he would have not only endorsed the Two-Row 
Wampum as some sort of  “aspirational document” but as a treaty to be fully implemented, see E IV App.XII: 
“It is especially useful to men to form associations, to bind themselves by those bonds most apt to make one 
people of them, and absolutely, to do those things which serve to strengthen friendships.”  
 
85 PPR, 52, italics mine. In his later work, Wasáse, 288, Alfred refers to the Two Row Wampum as Tekani 
Teioha:te which is the Kanienkeha word meaning “two roads.” The Two Row Wampum treaty model has 
shaped Indigenous-Settler relations in a variety of contexts. For a legal interpretation of the Royal Proclamation 
of 1763 as a document contextualized by the Two-Row Wampum treaty made between the Crown and 
Indigenous Nations at Niagara in 1764, see John Borrows, “Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, 
Canadian Legal History, and Self-Government,” in Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, 
Equity, and Respect for Difference, ed. Michael Asch (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 1997), 155-172. 
 
86 I am reconceptualizing here the “contrapuntal” or integrative reading of history and literature articulated 
by Said that sees Western and non-Western experiences as belonging together. See Culture and Imperialism, 
274.  
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the Bengali Marxist historian Dipesh Chakrabarty has called a “timeknot.”87 By travelling in 
circles, engaging the Gitxsan-Wet’suwet’en Chiefs’ teachings from the twentieth century, 
Spinozistic ideas from the seventeenth century, Mohawk ideas from the twenty-first century, 
and trickster blunders from time immemorial, each feast dialogue partially discloses the 
“plurality that inheres in the ‘now,’ the lack of totality, the constant fragmentariness, that 
                                                 
87 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 243. Also see chapter 3, “Translating Life-Worlds into Labor and 
History,” in Provincial zing Europe, 72-96. As a Marxist scholar invested in narrating the history of work in 
South Asia where Indian human activity is associated with the presence and agency of gods or spirits in the very 
process of labour, Chakrabarty is acutely aware of the way in which the metanarrative of Marxism adopts the 
“secular code of historical and humanist time—that is, a time bereft gods and spirits. . . [and how] claims about 
agency on behalf of the religious, the supernatural, the divine, and the ghostly have to mediated in terms of this 
universal” (76). To justly render the enchanted lifeworld of Indian labour into the disenchanted prose of Marxist 
historicism, Chakrabarty employs a mode of translation that does not uncritically adopt a mediating universal 
like the secular Marxist concept of labour, a concept conventionally understood by Marxists to remain 
unaffected by non-Western, historical differences. Rather, with the help of Derrida’s concept of the “trace,” 
Chakrabarty re-works the Marxist concept of commodity (as understood to be constituted by a permanent 
tension between Marx’s distinction between “real” and “abstract” labour and the force constantly needed to 
close it) so that the concept’s “built-in openness to difference” is foregrounded when translating and producing 
South Asian lifeworlds of work that are charged with “supernatural” agency yet remain a part of the universal 
history of labour in the capitalist mode of production (90-91). That is to say, Chakrabarty is able to translate 
enchanted Indian lifeworlds of work into the historical narrative of commodity production “as a Derridean trace 
of that which cannot be enclosed, an element that constantly challenges from within captial’s and 
commodity’s—and by implication, history’s—claims to unity and universality” (93). Consequently, while 
subaltern (South Asian) studies of the past occur within the time horizon of capital, the history of South Asian 
labour nevertheless disrupts the unity of that time horizon (95). This is what Chakrabarty means by a 
“timeknot”—a form of temporality that is neither before, after, or “outside” of capital, but something else 
besides: “a border zone of temporality, that conforms to the temporal code within which capital comes into 
being even as it violates that code, something we are able to see only because we can think/theorize capital, but 
that also always reminds us that other temporalities, other forms of worlding, coexist and are possible” (95). As 
a Gitxsan scholar invested in narrating the history of Delgamuukw and the philosophical relation between 
Alfred and Spinoza, Chakrabarty’s timeknot enables me to justly render the disruptive “pre-modern” agency of 
our “supernatural” Big Man, Wiigyat, into the modern historical Delgamuukw narrative as well as bridge three-
centuries by dialogically engaging the Alfred and Spinoza’s ideas on achieving peaceful coexistence with the 
state, the church, the self, and the other as understood in their different temporalities. Of course, Marxism is not 
the first or only modern philosophy to adopt the “secular code of historical and humanist time.” For Spinoza’s 
personal struggle to understand the epistemic status of stories about ghosts and spirits, see his exchange of 
letters with Hugo Boxel in September 1674 (Ep51 to Ep56). Rather than entirely dismissing the value of 
personal accounts of ghosts and spirits, Spinoza expresses doubt about the evidential merits of such narratives. 
See, for example, Ep55: “As regards the stories, I have already said in my first letter that I do not altogether 
deny them, but only the conclusion [viz., that ghosts and spectres exist in the spatio-temporal order] drawn from 
them. I may add that I do not consider them so trustworthy as not to doubt many of the circumstantial details, 
which are often added for adornment rather than to render more plausible the truth of the story or the inference 
to be drawn therefrom.”  It is with regard to Spinoza’s difficulty to understand the place of personal accounts of 
stories and ghosts within his early modern philosophical worldview that I agree with Hegel that Spinoza lacked 
a theory of history, at least one which, like Chakrabarty’s, is capable of conceiving the peaceful coexistence of 
multiple forms of temporality (from the enchanted to the disenchanted) on an equal horizon of truth.  
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constitutes. . . [the] present.”88 These rapid currents of cultural translation are set in motion 
with the end of putting everyone in attendance at ease in the presence of Mohawk-
Spinozistic-Gitxsan hybridity.89 Let us, then, in the self-conscious Gitxsan tradition of 
philosophical feasting, continue the three-century-old conversation that transcends the dry 
valleys of colonialism and historicism alike. 
                                                 
88 Ibid. In addition to Chakrabarty’s theory of the timeknot, my conceptualization of Gitxsan Feast Hall 
temporality is also informed by Bhabba’s interpretation of Fanon’s essay “On National Culture.” See The 
Location of Culture, 218: “The present of the people’s history, then, is a practice that destroys the constant 
principles of the national culture that attempt to hark back to a ‘true’ national past, which is often represented in 
the reified forms of realism and stereotype. Such pedagogical knowledges and continuist national narratives 
miss the ‘zone of occult instability where the people dwell’ (Fanon’s phrase). It is from this instability of 
cultural signification that the national culture comes to be articulated as a dialectic of various temporalities – 
modern, colonial, postcolonial, ‘native’ – that cannot be a knowledge that is stabilized in its enunciation.”  
 
89 I am extending the idea of “living in translation” articulated by the intellectual duo of Métis activist Joe 
Desjarlais and the Canadian historian Bruce Shelvey. These authors argue that the goal of translation is to put 
‘others’ (whether governments, societies, or cultures) at ease in the presence of Métis hybridity. See Bruce 
Shelvey and Joe Desjarlais, “The Promise and Possibility of Being Métis in Canada: Practicing Proximity and 
Living in Translation,” Published on-line by the British Columbia Métis Federation, 7 June 2013. 
http://bcmetis.com/2013/06/metis-identity-paper/ 
A Post-Delgamuukw Philosophical Feast:  
Feeding the Ancestral Desire for Peaceful Coexistence   
41 
CHAPTER 2: 
 
GAWAGAANI DI DAXGYAT 
 
Indigenous peoples do not seek to destroy the state, but to make it more just and 
to improve their relations with the mainstream society. The principles embedded 
in cultural ideals such as the Kaswentha [the Two-Row Wampum treaty] are in 
fact consistent with some Western principles that have been nearly forgotten in 
the construction of the modern hegemonic state—among them, the original 
principle of federalism. Indigenous empowerment involves achieving a 
relationship between peoples founded on the principle of autonomy and 
interdependence. To accommodate indigenous notions of nationhood, the state 
need only refer to the federal principle.  
 –Taiaiake Alfred1 
 
The Dutch thought that to maintain their freedom it was enough for them to 
abandon their count and to cut off the head from the body of the state. The 
thought of reorganizing it in a different form has never entered their minds; they 
have left all its limbs as they had previously been, so that Holland has remained 
a county without a count, like a headless body, and the state without a name. So 
it is not surprising that most of its subjects have not known where its 
sovereignty lay. 
–Benedict Spinoza2 
 
Gawagaani di daxgyat announces the topic of our first feast dialogue: making peace 
with the State. To be sure, there is no word for “state” in the European sense in the 
Gitxsanimx language. The Gitxsan Nation is a non-statist, inter-societal 
organization constituted by over 60 matrilineal kinship networks known as the 
huwilp of the land. The closest word we have to denote “state sovereignty” or 
“sovereign power” is “daxgyat” which signifies the authority or power held by the 
hereditary chiefs of each wilp/kinship network. However, far from signifying the 
coercive power historically exercised by the sovereign Canadian colonial state over 
indigenous peoples, the power or daxgyat held by the chiefs is constituted by the 
land-based, collective decision-making practices of his or her wilp network. The 
                                                 
1 PPR, 77.  
 
2 PT, 9.14. 
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daxgyat of each house chief has been historically performed in the Feast Hall and 
validated by the democratic consensus of the witnessing house chiefs since time 
immemorial.3 Given the historical differences between European and Gitxsan 
notions of political power and authority, making peace with the power of the 
sovereign state constructed in the European imagination poses complications for 
both Gitxsan cultural translation and peacemaking efforts. Fortunately, we are not 
alone in the struggle to live in peaceful coexistence with the state. In response to the 
topic of our initial feast dialogue, our philosophical guests identify a similar 
complication in their people’s efforts to transform the colonial and monarchical 
nation-states of their times. As we will witness, for Alfred and Spinoza, and equally 
so for the Gitxsan, the problem is one of transforming and relocating sovereignty 
from its concentrated form in the state to its constitutive form in the people. 
Between the Gitxsan, Mohawk, and Dutch political experiences with the state, the 
issues of sovereignty and democratic federalism will be of central focus in our first 
feast dialogue.  
Following the li’ligit protocol of am goosinsxw, we open our feast dialogue 
by remembering Gyolugyet and the way she affirmed her daxgyat in response to the 
coercive power exercised by the colonial agents of the state during cross-
examination. In the spirit of k’otsgesxw, we will then receive our philosophical 
guests’ ideas as conceptual toolkits for deconstructing the coercive power 
                                                 
3 For Delgamuukw’s description of daxgyat, see Trial Transcripts, Delgamuukw v. The Queen in 
the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Action No. 0843, Smithers Registry, 66: “My power is 
carried in my House’s histories, songs, dances and the crests. It is recreated at the feast when the 
histories are told, the songs and the dances performed and the crests displayed. With the wealth that 
comes from respectful use of the territory, the House feeds the name of the Chief in the feast hall. In 
this way, the law, the Chief, the territory and the feast become one. The unity of the Chief’s 
authority and his House’s ownership of its territory are witnessed and thus affirmed by other Chiefs 
at the feast.”  
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underlying state sovereignty, creating space for Alfred and Spinoza’s alternative 
notions of power invested in a free and self-affirming people. We will then 
critically compare the way in which our guests draw on their traditions for 
constructive tools capable of achieving peace with the nation-states in their 
historically different locations. Intellectually filled by Gyolugyet’s gawagaani 
teaching and the ideas of our philosophical guests, I conclude by serving up wo’os 
in the form of a story of Wiigyat and His Wooden Slave. In this story of resurgence, 
a sly wooden slave brings the ideas of our feast dialogue to life by creatively 
contesting and subverting Wiigyat’s coercive power in the democratic space of the 
Feast Hall.   
2.1 Remembering Gyolugyet 
On May 25, 1987, Gyolugyet (Mary McKenzie) of the lax gibuu clan from 
the eastern village of Gitanmaax was sworn in as the first sim’oogit to take the 
stand and share her adaawk with the court on behalf of her wilp and wil’naa’t’ahl. 
Under cross-examination, Gyolugyet answered questions raised by Mr. Plant, the 
legal counsel for the province of British Columbia. In response to questions 
regarding how she learned the history of her house’s adaawk, Gyolugyet related 
how she went to Delgamuukw (the late Albert Tait) with questions about the “old 
times” and the territory of her house. She explained how she had written 
Delgamuukw’s answers in a book she was still working on, a book with notes from 
all her feastings, a book that not even her own children had a chance to read yet. A 
feast book of this cherished nature, of course, peaked Mr. Plant’s colonial interest:  
Mr. Plant: Do you have that book at home in Gitanmaax?  
Gyolugyet: Yes.  
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Mr. Plant: Would you bring it with you tomorrow please to court so that I could 
have a look at it? 
Gyolugyet: No, I’m afraid not.  
Mr. Plant: Well, I’ll make sure that you get it back. 
Gyolugyet: No.  
Mr. Plant: It’s not permitted that I have it? 
Gyolugyet: No. No. If my children can’t read it, I don’t think I’ll let anybody read 
it. 
Mr. Plant: Why is that?                
   Gyolugyet: Because it’s just the way I feel. 
   Mr. Plant: So it’s a diary. 
   Gyolugyet: Just about a diary.4 
 
Disgruntled by Gyolugyet’s unwillingness to allow him to gaze through her private 
feast diary, Mr. Plant called for a break and asked legal counsel for the Gitxsan, Mr. 
Grant, if he could speak with Gyolugyet about the production of her book. When 
the proceedings reconvened, Mr. Plant, hoping that Gyolugyet would be persuaded 
by her own counsel to relinquish her feast diary, received a strong reply:  
Mr. Plant: Mrs. McKenzie, I’ll ask you again if you will be producing the book 
that you described this morning for my inspection tomorrow. Will you be 
making that book – I ask you to make that book available to me? 
Gyolugyet: Right now I’ll say to you I will not produce it. It’s my personal 
property and it – it doesn’t only – its got nothing to do with this court case 
because it’s a family – like the funerals of my family, weddings of my family, 
people that ask me to write little notes, that’s my – all my personal property, so 
I say firmly I will not produce it.5  
 
Rather than practicing the principle of hlo’omsxw (respect) and accepting her 
decision as li’ligit protocol would require, Mr. Plant applied for a court order that 
the diary be produced for his inspection without the consent of Gyolugyet. 
Ultimately, Justice McEachern ruled in Mr. Plant’s favour, emphasizing his judicial 
power in the courthouse:  
                                                 
4 Trial Transcripts, Delgamuukw v. The Queen in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Action 
No. 0843, Smithers Registry, 521.  
 
5 Ibid., 523.  
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I think this is a convenient place to mention that when parties bring an action of 
this kind invoking the jurisdiction of the court, it goes without saying that they 
must comply with the rules of the court. . . And as Mrs. McKenzie asked me to 
respect her position as a chief, she having made this statement in court, she has 
to respect my position as a Justice. I have to apply the law and I don’t think that 
the position she takes is one that leaves me any alternative but to make the order 
that I’ve made.6 
 
The power struggle between Gyolugyet and the agents of the Canadian colonial 
state over her feast diary is a microcosm of Gitxsan-Canadian state relations. 
Whether it is a Gitxsan feast diary or the Gitxsan homelands, the Canadian colonial 
state will take it without consent and justify doing so by appealing to its colonial 
laws. It is a coercive act of sovereign power that regards the Gitxsan as subjects of 
empire rather than equal partners in a confederal relationship where the daxgyat of 
the chiefs is equally exercised and respected. In the face of such disrespect and 
misrecognition, Gyolugyet practices the gawagaani teaching of self-affirming 
power by thinking and acting as a Gitxsan Sigidim hanak’ in defence of her diary 
and her people.  
2.2  Deconstructive Tools for State Sovereignty  
 Following the li’ligit protocol of k’otsgesxw, we will now dialogically 
engage and receive our philosophical guests’ conceptual contributions on the topic 
of making peace with the state. Peaceful coexistence between the wilp-centric 
Gitxsan Nation and the Eurocentric Canadian colonial state is not possible so long 
as the state continues to exercise coercive sovereign power over the Gitxsan Chiefs. 
Conversely, peaceful coexistence cannot be achieved so long as the Gitxsan Chiefs 
continue to invest their energies in reactively contesting the Canadian colonial state 
in spaces where state power is deemed legitimate. What the exchange between 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 558.  
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Gyolugyet and Mr. Plant illustrates is that when the Gitxsan Nation contests within 
the state’s framework (e.g. its judicial system), it inevitably find itself under the 
power of colonial sovereignty. Our guests’ ideas will help us break this vicious 
cycle of contestation/co-optation and demonstrate that peaceful coexistence can 
only be achieved through the constitutive power of the grassroots Gitxsan people. 
Rather than destroying the state itself, Alfred and Spinoza’s ideas will only 
deconstruct the coercive power underlying state sovereignty. For, as Spinoza has 
already shared with us, cutting off the head of the state is ultimately a futile act that 
leaves people blind to the meaning and location of sovereignty. Alfred and 
Spinoza’s ideas will therefore not only serve to critique the conventional 
understanding of sovereign state power but will further envision alternative and 
equally liberating notions of sovereign power located in the free and self-affirming 
people.7 
                                                 
7 Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt have argued that postcolonial theorists such as Homi Bhabba 
have focused so much attention on seeking liberation from past forms of colonial rule and their 
legacies in the present that they fail to adequately conceptualize and critique the new form of Empire 
organized around corporate capital and the world market system. The only value Hardt and Negri 
assign to postcolonial theories is that they are discourses that trace the expansion of the world market 
and the passage from modern to postmodern forms of sovereignty, but with “no awareness of the 
paradigmatic leap that this passage constitutes.” I mention Hardt and Negri’s work as the focus of 
this section is the critique of the modern/colonial form of sovereignty of the past and its legacy in the 
present as experienced by the Gitxsan at the Delgamuukw trial. In response to Hardt and Negri’s 
criticism, I would argue that indigenous peoples like the Gitxsan need to first challenge and 
transform the first form of modern/colonial sovereignty before they can effectively contest the new 
form of postmodern imperial sovereignty organized around the global market as it is the Canadian 
nation-state that mediates between the Gitxsan peoples and the global world order. Secondly, what is 
unique about this section’s “postcolonial” critique of state sovereignty is that by drawing on Spinoza 
it recognizes what Hardt and Negri call the “first tradition” that constituted modernity, viz. the 
revolution of Renaissance humanism, from Duns Scotus to Spinoza, which discovered the “place of 
immanence and the celebration of singularity and difference.” Hardt and Negri argue that an 
additional weakness of postmodern/postcolonial theory is that it neglects this first tradition by 
exclusively focusing on critiquing the “second tradition” of modern sovereignty which sought to 
control the “utopian forces” of the first tradition. The presence of Spinoza as a guest at our post-
Delgamuukw philosophical feast helps us to avoid this weakness of postcolonial theory. For Hardt 
and Negri’s full analysis of postmodern and postcolonial theories in relation to their own neo-
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To deconstruct the coercive power underlying state sovereignty, Alfred and 
Spinoza highlight the critical importance of first recognizing the socially 
constructed nature of state sovereignty itself. In the West, state sovereignty has now 
become a naturalized part of political life. For instance, Alfred highlights the way in 
which the media legitimizes American and Canadian sovereignty. “The inherent 
meaning and symbolic power of the existing consensus on the ‘sovereignty’ of the 
state (the United States, Canada, etc.) is embedded in people’s minds through media 
saturated and government propaganda,” Alfred writes in Wasáse. “People know 
there is a problem with this idea [of sovereignty], but it is difficult to mobilize them 
to move away from it, even with knowledge firmly established in their minds.”8 To 
mobilize his readers to think otherwise about state sovereignty, Alfred emphasizes 
in PPR that sovereignty is not a “natural phenomenon but a social creation—the 
result of choices made by men and women located in a particular social and 
political order.”9 Alfred maintains that the unquestioned acceptance of state 
sovereignty as a framework for contemporary politics merely reflects “the triumph 
of a particular set of ideas over others—and is no more natural to the world than 
any other human-made object.”10 In other words, the falsely contrived 
naturalization of state sovereignty is the imperial triumph of Euroamerican ideas 
over indigenous ones.  
                                                                                                                                        
Marxist vision of the new imperial world order, see Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. 
2000), 114-136, 137-159. For Alfred’s view on the second wave of globalization, see Wasase, 234.  
 
8 Wasáse, 209.  
 
9 PPR, 86.  
 
10 Ibid.  
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Spinoza likewise expresses a critical attitude towards the notion of 
monarchical state sovereignty dominant in his time.11 In his letter to Jarig Jelles 
dated 2 June 1674, four years after the publication of TPT, Spinoza clarifies his 
anti-Hobbesian contribution to the social creation of state sovereignty:  
With regard to political theory, the difference between Hobbes and myself, 
which is the subject of your inquiry, consists in this, that I always preserve the 
natural right in its entirety, and I hold that the sovereign power in a State has 
right over a subject only in proportion to the excess of its power over that of a 
subject. This is always the case in a state of nature.12 
 
Unlike Hobbes’s social creation of a monarchical form of absolutist sovereignty, 
Spinoza explains to Jelles that he never obliges citizens to surrender their natural 
right to the sovereign state. More importantly, Spinoza’s distinction between his 
theory and Hobbes’ illustrates his deep awareness of the socially constructed nature 
of state sovereignty. In fact, just as Alfred problematizes the naturalized acceptance 
of American and Canadian sovereignty amongst North Americans, Spinoza 
problematizes the naturalization of monarchical state sovereignty among his fellow 
Dutch citizens. While achieving independence from Spanish monarchy in 1539, 
over a century later in the 1670s Spinoza laments how the Dutch have failed to re-
imagine their state. “The thought of reorganizing. . . [their independent state] in a 
                                                 
11 The American Spinoza scholar Steven Smith notes that the establishment of the “centralized 
territorial state as the single locus of sovereign power is without doubt the most important fact in the 
history of early modern Europe.” He goes on to list the many myths generated by the emergence of 
the centralized territorial state in the seventeenth century: “Legal and philosophical fictions like the 
state of nature, the social contract, and the sovereign were invented to represent the view that only a 
central unitary state could create order, prevent chaos, and maintain the individual in a condition of 
peace and security. For Smith’s full treatment see, Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Question of Jewish 
Identity, 14. 
 
12 Ep50.  
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different form [other than monarchy] has never entered their minds.”13 Without the 
Dutch questioning the socially constructed nature of monarchy, Spinoza concludes 
that “it is not surprising that most of its subjects have not known where its 
sovereignty lay.”14 Thus, similar to how Alfred understands state sovereignty to be 
a Euroamerican idea dominating the indigenous political imagination, Spinoza 
understands the unquestioned acceptance of the monarchical idea of state 
sovereignty to be a case of a foreign idea dominating the Dutch political 
imagination.15  
Our philosophical guests equally highlight how the people’s failure to 
produce and practice alternatives to the hegemonic forms of absolute state 
sovereignty of their times allows political elites to employ the discourse of 
sovereignty in anti-democratic ways.16 In PPR, Alfred criticizes indigenous political 
leaders who act on the principles of Machiavellian political realism and employ the 
                                                 
13 PT, 9.14 
 
14 Ibid.  
 
15 In TPT, Spinoza portrays Holland as devoid of a monarchical political history, see 217: “As for 
what pertains to the Orders of Holland, these have never, that we know of, had Kings, but counts, to 
whom the right of the imperium has never been transferred.”  
 
16 For an alternative, anti-absolutist, and post-imperial description of sovereignty in the context 
of contemporary constitutional legal theory, see James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism 
in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 195: “It does not 
follow from the demise of the absolute sense of sovereignty that ‘the end of sovereignty’ is near, as 
some scholars have hastily concluded. Rather, a concept of sovereignty remains which incorporates 
these three limits and is appropriate to the contemporary age. Sovereignty in this non-absolute sense 
means the authority of a culturally diverse people or association of peoples to govern themselves by 
their own laws and ways free from external subordination. It is a concept of sovereignty that accords 
with the overlapping and interdependent terrain of constitutionalism we have discovered in the 
previous chapters. . . This concept of sovereignty is not alien to Aboriginal constitutionalism, for it is 
the concept of sovereignty embodied in the treaty system.” For a scholar who builds on Tully’s 
concept of diverse federalism to describe the post-imperial, global significance of the Iroquois 
Confederacy model, see Iris Marion Young, “Hybrid Democracy: Iroquois Federalism and the 
Postcolonial Project,” Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ed. Duncan Ivison et 
al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 237-258.  
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discourse of sovereignty to advance their self-interested agendas of land and self-
government rights.17 The indigenous “power-wielders” Alfred has in mind are those 
who engage in politics as a zero-sum game of power and simply use the notion of 
“sovereignty” as a bargaining chip within the state’s constitutional framework. 
Alfred draws out the implications of this realist-style of indigenous politics:  
In making a claim to sovereignty—even if they don’t really mean it—
[Indigenous political leaders] are making a choice to accept the state as their 
model and to allow indigenous political goals to be framed and evaluated 
according to a ‘statist’ pattern. Thus, the common criteria of statehood—
coercive force, control of territory, population numbers, international 
recognition—come to dominate discussion of indigenous peoples’ political 
goals as well.18 
 
Not only does the discourse of state sovereignty force indigenous politics into a 
statist pattern, agents of the Canadian colonial state capitalize on the theoretical 
inconsistencies of indigenous claims to sovereignty by highlighting the fact that 
indigenous people neither have the cultural framework nor the institutional capacity 
to sustain sovereignty.19 The employment of the sovereignty discourse within a 
constitutional (statist) framework is therefore nothing more than a political contest 
between co-opted indigenous leaders and government representatives. That is, it is a 
contest between elites that exclude the democratic participation of the grassroots 
indigenous people and their alternative understandings and practices of power. 
Rejecting the intellectual framework of Machiavellian realism, Alfred challenges 
                                                 
17 PPR, 79. Alfred credits Machiavelli’s texts as inspiring the intellectual tradition of political 
realism. He argues the realist style of politics operates on three principles: 1) human affairs are 
always contingent, 2) the ends justify the means, and 3) deception is necessary. For Alfred, political 
realism “breeds a special type of political actor for whom calculations of power as control take on an 
almost spiritual meaning.” See PPR, 170-174.  
 
18 Ibid., 80.  
 
19 Ibid., 81.  
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his indigenous readers to re-think sovereignty. “We need to create a meaning for 
sovereignty that respects the understanding of power in indigenous cultures,” Alfred 
argues in PPR, “one that reflects more of the sense embodied in such Western 
notions as ‘personal sovereignty’ and ‘popular sovereignty.’ Until then, sovereignty 
can never be part of the language of liberation.”20 
Just as Alfred critiques co-opted indigenous leaders as power-wielding 
political actors following in the Machiavellian realist tradition, Spinoza provides an 
analysis of the futility of tyrants who suppress the constitutive power of the 
multitudo (the people). Although the term “Machiavellian” has taken on a 
pejorative meaning in history, Spinoza regards Machiavelli himself as a critic of 
undemocratic power. In PT, Spinoza writes that with regard to a ruler “whose sole 
motive is lust for power, the means he must employ to strengthen and preserve his 
state have been described at some length by that keen observer, Machiavelli.”21 
While Spinoza acknowledges it is unclear what Machiavelli’s own motives were for 
studying tyranny, he maintains that Machiavelli was a “wise statesman” and an 
“advocate of freedom” who “wished to show how wary a free people should be of 
entrusting its welfare absolutely to one man.”22 Building on Machiavelli’s analysis, 
Spinoza makes a critical distinction between two forms of power. He employs the 
Latin term potestas to signify state power based on coercion or force and potentia to 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 79. For Alfred’s extended discussion on the discourse of sovereignty as it bears on 
indigenous politics, see his article “From Sovereignty to Freedom: Towards an Indigenous Political 
Discourse,” Indigenous Affairs 3, no. 1 (2001): 22-34.  
 
21 PT, 6.3.  
 
22 Ibid.  
 
A Post-Delgamuukw Philosophical Feast:  
Feeding the Ancestral Desire for Peaceful Coexistence   
52 
signify the constitutive power of the people.23 In PT, he progressively demonstrates 
that sovereign power (potestas) is legitimately determined by the constitutive power 
(potentia) of the multitudo.24 Beginning with monarchy, Spinoza maintains that “a 
people can preserve quite a considerable degree of freedom under a king, provided 
that it ensures that the king’s power [potestas] is determined only by the people’s 
power [potentia] and depends on the people for its maintenance.”25 In other words, 
monarchical power is only legitimate when it is determined by the people to serve 
their well-being (salus), not the king’s interests. Shifting his analysis to aristocracy, 
where the state is in the hands not of one man but a certain number of men, Spinoza 
ambiguously states that “the sovereignty conferred on a council of sufficient size is 
                                                 
23 Antonio Negri is one of the first scholars to study Spinoza’s distinction between potestas and 
potentia as signifying two forms of political power, a distinction that is generally treated by scholars 
as merely a philological distinction. See Michael Hardt, “Translators Foreword: The Anatomy of 
Power,” in The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics, trans. Michael 
Hardt (Minnesota, MI: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), xxii: “In Spinoza studies this problem 
is often posed as a purely philological issue that involves investigating the consistency of Spinoza’s 
usage of potestas and potentia to verify the necessity of making a distinction between the two in his 
texts; this question has received considerable critical attention, but it remains largely unresolved. 
Negri, however, does not enter directly into this discussion. He takes the philological distinction for 
granted and considers the problem instead as a philosophical and political issue, inviting us to 
address a different set of questions.  First of all, how does recognizing a distinction between potestas 
and potentia afford us a new perspective on Spinoza’s work and enable us to better his 
comprehensive philosophical and political project?”  
 
24 While James Tully identifies Hardt and Negri as contemporary scholars who have developed 
the distinction between these two forms of power, he tentatively identifies J.J. Rousseau, not 
Spinoza, as among the first modern political philosophers to have made this distinction. See Public 
Philosophy in a New Key: Volume II, 200-201: “This modern concept of unformed constituent 
power is of course the condition of possibility of the modern idea of popular sovereignty and, more 
radically, the ‘multitude’: that the ‘people’ or the multitude could stand back from any constitutional 
form of organization of themselves as a specific people and bring their form of constitutional 
organisation into being in some founding moment or process of deliberation. . .  Perhaps Rousseau 
was among the first to explore this paradoxical idea, and Hardt and Negri among the most recent.” 
Interestingly, Tully goes on to argue that indigenous people have a “different idea of constituent 
power. For them the constituent powers of humans (and non-humans) are always already immanent 
in the specific forms of transposable habitus they take in the countless normative relationships of 
interaction (non-formal customary laws) that humans and non-humans both bear and transform as 
they go.” Tully cites John Borrows and Val Napoleon as indigenous legal theorists who articulate 
these indigenous forms of constituent power as they relate to the law, see 201 n. 10.   
 
25 PT, 7.31.  
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absolute, or comes closest to being absolute.”26 He clarifies that “if there is such a 
thing as absolute sovereignty, it is really that which is held by people as a whole.”27 
That is, it is neither monarchy nor aristocracy that represents the absolute state but 
something else besides. “I pass on at length to the third kind of state,” Spinoza 
writes in his unfinished chapter on democracy, “the completely absolute state which 
we call democracy.”28 Spinoza identifies democracy alone, where men “hold their 
rights in common” and are guided “by one mind,” as “absolute” because it is fully 
constituted by the “power of a people” (potentia multitudinis).29 Hence, just as 
Alfred concludes in PPR that indigenous people can only be empowered and 
liberated by a concept of popular sovereignty, Spinoza logically progresses to the 
same conclusion at the end of his unfinished PT. 30  
 In place of sovereign state power, Alfred and Spinoza equally communicate 
a radically democratic and consensus-based form of collective power rooted in their 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 8.3.  
 
27 Ibid.  
 
28 PT, 11.1, italics mine.  
 
29 PT, 2.16-2.17.  
 
30 Polka insightfully draws out the implications of Spinoza’s logical progression of sovereign 
power in its monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic forms. See Between Philosophy and Religion: 
Spinoza, The Bible, and Modernity Volume 2: Politics and Ethics, 173: “While Spinoza does not 
specifically identify the multitudo with absolute, democratic sovereignty in the unfinished Political 
Treatise, as we have it, it is clear that the entire argumentation of the work both presupposes that 
identity and anticipates it as its outcome.” Negri and Hardt arrive at a similar conclusion. See Hardt, 
“Translators Foreword: The Anatomy of Power”, The Savage Anomaly, xvi: Democracy is to be the 
absolute, unlimited form of government, because in it the supreme Power [potestas] is fully 
constituted by the power of the multitude: Spinoza’s democracy is to be animated by a constituent 
Power, a dynamic form of popular authority. . . If the Ethics reduces the distinction and subordinates 
Power to power in the idealistic terms of its utopian vision, the Political Treatise poses the real 
tendency toward a future reduction of the distinction, when a democratic Power would be 
completely constituted by the power of the multitude. In this image of democracy Spinoza’s vision is 
at least as alive today as it was in his own time. Here we can see the tendency he describes as our 
own future.”  
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shared understanding of nature constituted by different human and non-human 
modes whose essence is a striving towards self-preservation.31 In Wasáse, Alfred 
contrasts indigenous philosophies with Gandhi’s Satyagraha philosophy. He notes 
the important difference that “while the relations among all the elements of creation 
are honoured [in both Satyagraha and indigenous philosophies], there is a general 
philosophical acceptance [among indigenous peoples] of the imperative for all 
creatures, including humans, to strive to preserve their existence.”32 Spinoza 
likewise makes this imperative the centre of his philosophy. In Ethica, he defines 
conatus, a Latin word translated into English as “striving,”33 as the essence of all 
modes of existence. “Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to 
persevere in its being” and “increase their power of acting.”34 In TPT, Spinoza 
                                                 
31 It is due to their radically democratic conceptions of freedom that Alfred and Spinoza’s 
political theories have both been loosely associated with anarchism. For Alfred’s description of the 
family resemblances between his theory of indigenous liberation and anarchism, see Wasase, 45-46: 
“The two elements that come to my mind are indigenous, evoking cultural and spiritual rootedness in 
this land and the Onkwehonwe struggle for justice and freedom, and the political philosophy and 
movement that is fundamentally anti-institutional, radically democratic, and committed to taking 
action to force change: anarchism. . . There are philosophical connections between indigenous and 
some strains of anarchist thought on the spirit of freedom and the ideals of a good society. . . but 
something that may be called anarcho-indigenism has yet to develop into a coherent philosophy.” 
For Negri’s description of Spinoza’s theory of freedom as “anarchic” in spirit see, The Savage 
Anomaly, 220: “Some have spoke of a liberal Spinoza, and others of a democratic Spinoza. By the 
same standard one could also speak of an aristocratic Spinoza or a monarchical Spinoza – and it has 
been done. Perhaps also an anarchic Spinoza? No one has ever said that. And yet this field of 
attributing the various labels from the theory of the forms of government and the State to the form of 
Spinoza’s politics is so inane that one might eve say an ‘anarchic’ Spinoza!. . .  But this is senseless. 
The problem is not, in fact, the form of government but the form of liberation. . . Every definition of 
the forms of government must square accounts with the thematic of the power of being.” 
 
32 Wasáse, 206.  
 
33 Polka problematizes the English translation of conatus as striving. See Between Philosophy 
and Religion: Volume 2, 131, n. 4: “Conatus, together with its related terms, also, like affectus, has 
not made it into modern, standard English. Although conatus is often translated as ‘striving’ (trying), 
when possible I avoid ‘striving’ with its connotations of unachieved (unrealized) accomplishment. I 
think it is more effectively rendered by such terms as endeavour, effort, and work.” 
 
34 E III p6 and 12. Richard Schacht points out that Spinoza fails to demonstrate his geometric 
propositional statements about conatus. See “The Spinoza-Nietzsche Problem,” in Desire and Affect: 
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famously gives the example of fish as conative beings that are determined for 
swimming and “large ones for eating smaller ones” by the “highest natural right.”35 
Accordingly, Alfred and Spinoza make explicit statements of recognition in their 
philosophies for how different human and non-human modes strive to preserve in 
their own being.36 
By conceptualizing the people as a collective conatus striving for self-
preservation, Alfred and Spinoza re-conceive sovereignty as a relational form of 
power generated within the community rather than concentrated in the state.37 
                                                                                                                                        
Spinoza as Psychologist, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel (New York: Little Room Press, 1999), 226: “[O]ne 
ought to at least acknowledge it to be a problem that Spinoza gives no real argument at all for his 
famous and critical EIII p6. . . He does indeed supply a proof for it; but it comes down to nothing 
more than the question-begging assertion that everything ‘is opposed to all that could take away its 
existence’ (EIII p6d).” I am indebted to Professor Havers for the suggestive insight that Spinoza 
does not intend in Ethica to provide a geometrical proof for conatus so much as he boldly articulates 
a (rational) leap of faith regarding the conatus. That is to say, Spinoza has faith that any rational (and 
loving) person wants to preserve, cultivate, and enrich his life.  
 
35 TPT, 179.  
 
36 Although Alfred and Spinoza equally recognize the conatus of non-human natures, it is 
important to note their different degrees of respect expressed for the conatus of non-human natures. 
While Alfred expresses a profound ethical reverence for non-human natures (e.g. see his 
Thanksgiving Addresses at the beginning of PPR and Wasáse), this deep level of respect is not 
present in Spinoza. See, for example, E IV p37s1: “It is clear that the law against killing animals is 
based more on empty superstition and unmanly compassion than sound reason. The rational 
principle of seeking our own advantage teaches us to establish a bond with men, but not with the 
lower animals, or with things whose nature is different from human nature. . . Indeed, because the 
right of each one is defined by his virtue, or power, men have a far greater right against the lower 
animals than they have against men. Not that I deny that the lower animals have sensations [as 
Descartes did]. But I do deny that we are therefore not permitted to consider our own advantage, use 
them at our pleasure, and treat them as is most convenient for us. For they do not agree in nature 
with us, and their affects are different in nature from human affects.” The reader is further invited to 
compare Spinoza’s views about animals in E IV p37s1 with the indigenous legal theorist Val 
Napoleon’s views about salmon as distinct “peoples” whose lifeways have positively shaped and 
disclose the Gitxsan legal order (see c. 4, n. 119). For helping me to understand this distinction, I am 
indebted to Dr. James Tully and the question he posed to me on this issue during my oral 
examination on September 26, 2015. 
 
37 To my knowledge, the only scholar to relate Spinoza’s concept of sovereignty to Canadian 
politics and law is Brayton Polka. See “The Supremacy and the Rule of Law in the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Theologico-Political Analysis,” McGill Law Journal 32 (1987): 
854-863. In this chapter, the key difference between Polka and my own treatment of Spinoza’s 
concept of sovereignty in relation to Canadian/indigenous politics is that while Polka defines 
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Alfred explains that an indigenous approach to empowerment does not primarily 
focus on opposing external statist power. Since exclusive focus on contention only 
leaves indigenous people vulnerable to being physically and intellectually co-opted 
into the statist system, the primary focus is on actualizing indigenous people’s own 
power and “preserving their intellectual independence.”38 In PPR, Alfred explains 
the key differences between this indigenous view of relational power and the 
coercive statist version: 
This is an indigenous approach to empowerment. Unlike the statist version, this 
conception of power is not predicated on force. It does not involve coercing or 
inducing other beings to fulfill imperatives external to their own nature; thus, it 
is not inherently conflictual. Nor does it require a contractual surrender of 
power, leading to continuous tension between the individual and the state. . . In 
other words, the traditional indigenous view of power and justice has nothing to 
do with competition or status vis-à-vis others. It focuses on whether or not 
power is used in a way that contributes to the creation and maintenance of 
balance and peaceful coexistence in a web of relationships.39 
 
Like Alfred, Spinoza’s alternative notion of sovereign power located in the 
multitudo is focused on maintaining relational balance and peaceful coexistence. 
Spinoza includes in his concept of conatus all the “strivings of human nature that 
we signify by the name of appetite, will, desire, or impulse.”40 The conatus 
                                                                                                                                        
Spinoza’s concept of sovereignty in metaphysical terms as the “cause of itself” (causa sui) (taken 
from Part I of Ethica), I define it in political terms as the power of the people or multitudo (taken 
from PT). Our divergent definitions of Spinoza’s concept of sovereignty is due to our cross-
purposes, viz., Polka applies Spinoza’s concept of sovereignty to analyze the independent yet 
interrelated sovereignty of the two principles of the Charter–the Supremacy of God and Rule of 
Law–while I apply Spinoza’s concept of sovereignty to analyze alternative notions of sovereign 
power located in the people. I draw on Polka’s article in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis as the article 
relates to my discussions of imperial Christianity and colonial legal supremacy (sections 3.2 and 
4.2).  
 
38 PPR, 73.  
 
39 Ibid. italics mine.  
 
40 E III Def.Aff  I.  
 
A Post-Delgamuukw Philosophical Feast:  
Feeding the Ancestral Desire for Peaceful Coexistence   
57 
expresses itself either in passive affects (e.g., sadness, hatred, fear, etc.) that 
translate into enmity between peoples, or in active affects of joy (e.g., love, 
tenacity, nobility) that spring from “the dictates of reason.”41 The sovereign power 
of the multitudo is generated by channelling conatus into active affects of joy that 
spring from the dictates of reason. In PT, Spinoza describes how the principle of 
conatus or “natural right” necessitates mutual assistance within human 
communities:  
Furthermore, it is scarcely possible for men to support life and cultivate their 
minds without mutual assistance. We therefore conclude that the natural right 
specific to human beings can scarcely be conceived except where men have 
their rights in common and can together successfully defend the territories, 
which they can inhabit and cultivate, protect themselves, repel all force, and live 
in accordance with the judgement of the entire community.42 
 
Since democratic governance is based on conatus, Spinoza celebrates democracy as 
seemingly the “most natural and to go along most with the freedom that nature 
grants to each.”43 For both our philosophical guests, then, the basis of democratic 
                                                 
41 E III p58s. For the distinction between affects being expressed either contradictorily or 
paradoxically, see Polka. See Between Philosophy and Religion: Spinoza, the Bible, and Modernity. 
Volume 2: Politics and Ethics (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 304-305: “The difference 
between the democratic civil state and the passive (irrational) affects is precisely that between 
paradox (truth as its own standard) and contradiction…Paradox is, as we have seen, the recognition 
not only that I am contradictory but also, more significantly, what my contradiction is. Why my 
contradiction is—what that is by which I am contradicted and by which I contradict (or am contrary 
to) others—is that I evade making love of God and neighbour the standard of truth for all human 
beings, including myself. . . The change that brings contradictory or contrary actions both to light 
and to an end is the love of God and neighbour. The paradox, then, is that I can overcome the 
contradictions of singular individuals, who are naturally contrary and opposed to each other, who 
naturally hate each other, who are natural enemies—in the natural state (of the Greeks and Romans) 
—solely by loving singular others as myself.”  
 
42 PT, 2.15. 
 
43 TPT, 185. Here I am drawing on Polka’s commentary, see Between Philosophy and Religion: 
Volume 2, 157-158: “What we find, therefore, in the Political Treatise, is that Spinoza, on the basis 
of his deductions from what he calls common human nature, has demonstrated the foundation of the 
democratic civil state without saying so explicitly. The paradox, as always, is that Spinoza starts 
with what is common, the ignorant yet conscious dependence of all human beings on their 
contradictory affects, on their appetite or conatus as complexly frustrated by its vain attempts to 
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governance is the people’s collective conatus channelled towards maintaining 
peaceful relations through a form of mutual assistance based on the active affects of 
joy and love.   
 A focal aspect of Alfred and Spinoza’s alternative conceptions of popular 
sovereignty is their presentation of self-affirming love as the primary means of 
empowering the people. In Wasáse, Alfred makes love central to his conception of 
resurgent indigenous power. “Survival demands that we act on the love we have for 
this land and our people. This is the counter-impulse to empire. Our power is a 
courageous love. Our fight is to recognize, to expose, and to ultimately overcome 
the corrupt, colonized identities and irrational fears that have been bred into us.”44 
While Alfred identifies the need to overcome colonized identities and irrational 
fears, he directs resurgent indigenous power towards self-transformation rather than 
against the colonial state. At the beginning of Wasáse, Alfred explicitly identifies 
the dangers of defining the indigenous struggle exclusively in terms of colonization: 
 Take the word, “colonization,” which is actually a way of seeing and 
explaining what has happened to us. We cannot allow that word to be the story 
of our lives, because it is a narrative that in its use privileges the colonizer’s 
power and inherently limits our freedom, logically and mentally imposing a 
perpetual colonized victim way of life and view on the world.45 
 
                                                                                                                                        
attain its utile in the natural state. But what he demonstrates in the end is that the affects can be 
constituted as truly one and common to all only when they are understood to be determined from 
themselves alone (as active affects), when they are shown to be in possession of their own right (sui 
juris), and so, when, under the guidance of reason, they constitute their utile as the supreme good of 
all human beings.” Also see, 158-175 for Polka’s extended commentary on the “The Civil State and 
the Natural State.”  
 
44 Wasáse, 36.  
 
45 Ibid., 25.  
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To break free from this colonized victim way of life Alfred collapses the distinction 
between means/ends in indigenous political movements.46 “Personal and collective 
transformation is not instrumental to the surging against state power,” Alfred 
explains, “it is the very means of our struggle.”47  
Spinoza likewise identifies love and self-affirmation as the driving forces 
underlying the transformative power of the people. In Ethica, Spinoza defines love 
as an “active affect of joy that increases man’s power,” and similarly defines self-
esteem as a “joy born of the fact that a man considers himself and his own power of 
acting.”48Just as Alfred collapses a means/ends distinction to foreground self-
affirming love in indigenous struggles for peaceful coexistence, Spinoza makes a 
critical distinction between empty and genuine self-esteem to ensure the people 
properly empower themselves in their efforts to free themselves from oppressive 
passions and superstitions. While empty self-esteem is totally dependent on being 
recognized by others and makes an individual “anxious daily” to preserve his 
reputation, Spinoza explains that genuine self-esteem is “joy accompanied by the 
idea of an internal cause.”49 Unlike empty self-esteem that wholly relies on others, 
genuine self-esteem can be renewed as “often as a man considers his virtues or his 
                                                 
46 I am indebted here to Glen Sean Coulthard’s insightful analysis of Alfred’s theoretical work, 
see Red Faces, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (Minnesota, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 158-159.  
 
47 Wasáse, 28.  
 
48 E III Def.VI XXV.  
 
49 E III p30s; IV p58s.  
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power of acting.”50 For Spinoza, and equally so for Alfred, power is best 
characterized as a will to self-affirming love.51  
Spinoza’s distinction between empty and genuine self-esteem uncannily 
resembles the distinction made between a liberal politics of recognition and an 
indigenous resurgent politics of recognition.52 The liberal politics of recognition is 
based on “official” recognition of indigenous peoples and their rights, whether by 
governments or courts, and functions to co-opt indigenous people into the state’s 
legal and political framework. Not only is the liberal politics of recognition an 
                                                 
50 E III p55. For a scholar who identifies Spinoza’s genuine self-esteem as the first virtue of the 
“new democratic individual,” see Steven B. Smith, Spinoza’s Book of Life: Freedom and 
Redemption in the Ethics (New Haven: Yale University Pres, 2003), 201.  
 
51 I am here alluding to Nietzsche’s famous “will to power” concept. For Spinoza, minds are not 
conquered by arms (i.e. brute force, power), but “by love and nobility” (E IV Def.App XI). For two 
scholars who compare Spinoza’s concept of conatus with Nietzsche’s will to power concept but who 
ultimately overlook Spinoza’s understanding of power as a will to love, see Schacht, “The Spinoza-
Nietzsche Problem,” in Desire and Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist, 225: “The notion of ‘power’ 
figures in Spinoza’s conception of his conatus, as well as in the Nietzsche’s concept of the ‘will to 
power.’ In the latter case, however, it would appear to stand as the object of this fundamental 
disposition and impulse, whereas for Spinoza it is introduced in a seemingly different way, as the 
‘power of activity in the body’. . . , and as the ‘power of thought in the mind’. . . that subserves the 
power of bodily activity (E II p11 and EIII p12). The enhancement of these powers is indeed held to 
be something always sought, but only derivatively and in a limited way – namely, with a view to 
self-preservation. . . that, and not the extension or wider expression of the power of a thing in 
relation to other things, is for Spinoza the actual objective of the fundamental conatus of which he 
speaks”; and Yirmiyahu Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretic: Adventures in Immanence, 112: “[T]he 
only coherent way to construe Spinoza’s theory is to see the one goal as subservient to the other. In 
having the power of existence and of action is desirable because it increases the processes of self-
preservation. In Nietzsche, however, power is not an instrument of life but defines and encompasses 
it. We do not first exist and then seek to prolong our existence by augmenting its power; rather, we 
exist from the start as will to power, that is, as the dynamic projection of our being and as the built-in 
thirst to enhance and expand it, for which life as merely given may sometimes be jeopardized.”  
 
52 For a definitive statement on the liberal politics of recognition, see the Canadian political 
philosopher Charles Taylor’s seminal essay in Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). For a distinction between the liberal politics of 
recognition and an indigenous resurgent politics of recognition, see Coulthard, Red Faces, White 
Masks, 23-24: “[T]he liberal recognition-based approach to Indigenous self-determination in Canada 
that began to consolidate itself after the demise of the 1969 White Paper has not only failed, but now 
serves to reproduce the very forms of colonial power which our original demands for recognition 
sought to transcend. . . I suggest that this conclusion demands that we begin to collectively redirect 
our struggles away from a politics that seeks to attain a conciliatory form of settler-state recognition 
for Indigenous nations toward a resurgent politics of recognition of cultural practices that are 
attentive to the subjective and structural composition of settler-colonial power.” 
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empty form of self-esteem in Spinozistic terms since it is wholly contingent on the 
state’s discretion, it is a form of self-esteem that turns indigenous people into slaves 
of sovereign state power. Spinoza defines a slave as “one who is bound to obey the 
commands of a master, which only have to do with the utility of the one 
commanding.”53 In the same manner, Alfred understands “aboriginal” identity, like 
his critique of the concept of state sovereignty, as a “legal and social construction of 
the state.”54 Borrowing from Hardt and Negri, he describes the “aboriginal” identity 
as a “mimetic euroself instrumentally constructed to serve the state” and an “agenda 
of silent surrender.” 55 Rejecting the liberal recognition of aboriginal identities and 
rights created by and for the state, Alfred casts a resurgent politics of recognition 
and power as a process of “recreating freedom and aiming to end the humiliation of 
living [aboriginal] identities that were created to serve others.”56 The 
liberal/resurgent politics of recognition distinction takes on new significance in the 
context of Spinoza’s claim that peace can only be achieved by a free people, not by 
a subjugated people: 
For a free people is led more by hope than by fear, while a subjugated people is 
led more by fear than by hope; the former seeks to engage in living, the latter 
simply to avoid death. The former, I say, seeks to live for itself, the latter is 
forced to belong to a conqueror; hence we say that the latter is a slave, the 
former is free. So the aim of a state that has been acquired by right of war is to 
dominate and to have slaves rather than subjects. And although, if we have 
regard to their right in a general way, there is no essential difference between a 
                                                 
53 TPT, 184.  
 
54 Wasáse, 23. I provide a comparative discussion of the “aboriginal” identity with the “Marrano” 
identity constructed by the state in Spinoza’s time in section 5.2, “Deconstructive Tools for the 
Imaginary Uncivilized Other.”  
 
55 Ibid., 128, 23.  
 
56 Ibid, 201. 
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state created by a free people and one acquired by right of war, their aims, as we 
have just shown, are very different, and so too are the means by which each 
must be preserved. 57 
 
For Alfred, indigenous people who accept aboriginal identities are led by fear and 
become subjugated, enslaved, and are ultimately forced to belong to the conquering 
Canadian colonial state. By contrast, the indigenous people who affirm their 
culturally rooted identities within their communities remain hopeful and seek to live 
for themselves, independent of colonial state recognition. While Alfred admits that 
many indigenous leaders have wilfully chosen to cooperate with the colonial state 
and settle for aboriginal identities and rights, he also reminds his readers that not all 
have been conquered.58 “There are still strong indigenous people who persevere in 
their struggle for an authentic existence,” Alfred writes in Wasáse, “and who are 
capable of redefining, regenerating, and reimagining our collective existences.”59 
For these empowered indigenous people, peace is more than “the lack of violent 
conflict or rioting in the streets.” Rather, peace is “hopeful, visionary, and forward-
looking,” and invested in the self-affirming process of indigenous people 
“recreating [them]selves in a holistic sense.”60  
For both our philosophical guests, then, state sovereignty is a socially 
constructed concept that constrains the way in which the people think about 
themselves and their collective conatus or resurgent power. It is only through 
problematizing the falsely contrived naturalization of state sovereignty and rejecting 
                                                 
57 PT, 5.6.  
 
58 Wasáse, 43-44.  
 
59 Ibid., 45.  
 
60 Ibid., 28. 
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the liberal politics of recognition that sovereign power can be properly located in 
the people’s hands. In the aftermath of deconstructing the coercive and enslaving 
power of state sovereignty, Alfred and Spinoza equip us with conceptual tools that 
empower us to think and act otherwise with courageous, self-affirming love.  
2.3 Constructive Tools for Diverse Democratic Federalism    
Our philosophical guests are not content with locating sovereignty in the 
people’s collective conatus or resurgent power. They further desire to stir their 
people to radical action against the oppressive nation-states dominant in their 
historically different locations. To this end, Alfred and Spinoza draw on their 
traditions to re-imagine and restructure governmental relations based on the 
principle of diverse democratic federalism. 61 We will witness how Alfred adopts a 
democratic federalist model from his Iroquois tradition that accommodates nation-
to-nation relations between indigenous peoples and a culturally and linguistically 
diverse settler society. Similarly, we will see how Spinoza draws on his biblical 
tradition for a federalist model that serves to democratize the Dutch Republic and 
prevent it from returning to a monarchical regime. Whether it is the Iroquois 
Confederacy or the Hebrew Commonwealth, Alfred and Spinoza reconstruct these 
                                                 
61  For the concept of diverse democratic federalism, I am drawing on Tully’s defeasible sketch 
of various forms of “compact” or “diverse” federalism in Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in 
an Age of Diversity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 140-141: “Diverse 
federalism is a means of conciliation because it enables peoples mutually to recognise and reach 
agreement on how to assemble or federate the legal and political differences they wish to continue 
into the association. . . The discontinuity and uniformity school interprets [Canadian] confederation 
as the subordination of the provinces to the sovereign federal government and the creation of 
uniform provinces. The continuity and diversity school interprets it as the creation of a federal 
government by the delegation of some provincial powers and the continuity and co-ordinate 
sovereignty of the diverse provinces.” In this section, I place Alfred and Spinoza in the continuity 
and diversity school of interpretation with respect to their ancestral (Mohawk, Hebrew) forms of 
democratic federalist governance systems. For Tully’s full investigation into various historical 
formations of diverse federalism, see Strange Multiplicity, 140-182.  
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ancestral governance models in a way that democratizes the concept of democracy 
and inspires their people to transform and achieve peaceful coexistence with the 
State.  
 By recognizing how their ancestors established democratic federalist 
systems of governance, our philosophical guests equally subvert the claim that 
democracy originated in the West. In HVA, Alfred shares how the five nations of 
the Iroquois—the Mohawk, Seneca, Onondaga, Oneida, and Cayuga—established 
the Iroquois Confederacy in the fourteenth century.62 Drawing on oral traditions, he 
explains that after a long period of internecine wars the Iroquois nations were 
brought together by a Peacemaker who shared a federalist message of “power-
sharing, compromise, and unified purpose.”63 This federalist message was 
positively received by the Iroquois as a “solution to the problem of incessant 
competition and hostility” between their nations.64 Alfred describes a post-
                                                 
62 The Iroquois Confederacy has garnered significant scholarly attention. For a general historical 
treatment, see William Fenton, The Great Law and the Longhouse: A Political History of the 
Iroquois Confederacy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988). For scholars who argue that 
the founders of the political institutions of the United States were influenced by the Iroquois 
Confederacy, see Jack Weatherford, Indian Givers: How the Indians of the Americas Transformed 
the World (New York: Crown Publishers, 1988); Robert. W. Venables, “American Indian Influences 
on the America of the Founding Fathers, ed. O. Lyons et al., Exiled in the Land of the Free: 
Democracy, Indian Nations, and the US Constitution (Santa Fe: Clear Light Publishers, 1992), 73-
124; Jose Barriero, ed., Indian Roots of American Democracy (Ithaca: Akewkon/Cornell University 
Press, 1988); and Donald A. Grinde and Bruce E. Johansen, Exemplar of Liberty: Native America 
and the Evolution of Democracy (Los Angeles: UCLA American Indian Studies and UC Press, 
1991). For scholars who contest the claim the Iroquois Confederacy influenced the American 
founders, see Elizabeth Tooker, “The United States Constitution and the Iroquois League,” in The 
Imaginary Indian: Cultural Fictions and Government Policy, ed. James Clifton (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Transactions Publishers, 1996), 108; P.A. Levy, “Exemplars of Taking Liberties: The Iroquois 
Influence Thesis and the Problem of Evidence,” William and Mary Quarterly 51, no. 3 (1996): 588-
620; and S.B. Payne Jr., “The Iroquois League, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution,” 
William and Mary Quarterly 53, no. 3 (1996): 605-20.  
 
63 HVA, 78 
 
64 Ibid.  
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Confederate Iroquois society as “matrilineal and organized into sub-tribal units 
called clans” with “social and political functions centred around the clans at the 
local level, and around nations at the League [i.e. Confederate] level.”65 The clan 
mothers of each nation selected chiefs based on their moral character to represent 
their kinship network at the Confederacy.66 Alfred summarizes the Iroquois 
Confederacy’s democratic governance structure under the Kanienerekowa, or the 
Great Law of Peace:  
The Kanienerekowa was specific regarding the operation of the Confederacy’s 
federal system. Complex strictures of proportional representation of nations, 
veto powers, rules of order, and precedence in debate were interwoven with. . .  
symbolism. Iroquois society was characterized by an extensive democracy. The 
central concern of the federal system was to ensure the perpetuation of this 
popular sovereignty, and the entire mechanism was organized so that chiefs 
directly represent the will of their people. The Iroquois system was truly 
democratic in that all legitimacy flowed directly from the people.67  
 
Alfred explains that the Iroquois Confederacy functioned on the core belief that 
self-determination and national autonomy were the only “guarantees of peaceful co-
existence.”68 Each Iroquois nation was therefore allowed to “determine its own 
separate existence in harmony with different but equally valid existences of the 
other ‘nations.’”69 Given the presence of democratic federalism in the Iroquois 
tradition, Alfred criticizes the Canadian government’s current policy objectives on 
                                                 
65 Ibid., 79.  
 
66 Ibid. 
 
67 Ibid., 78.  
 
68 Ibid., 81.  
 
69 Ibid.  
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treaty negotiations that purport to ensure that “processes are fair and democratic.”70 
This policy position highlights for Alfred how “Canada forgets indigenous peoples 
have practiced democracy since time immemorial.”71 By drawing on his Iroquois 
oral tradition for a democratic model, Alfred effectively decentres the notion that 
democracy is exclusively a Canadian affair on Turtle Island.  
Just as Alfred venerates his Iroquois ancestors on Turtle Island for their 
formal democratic relations, Spinoza likewise celebrates his Hebrew ancestors for 
their democratic governance structures. In chapter 17 of TPT, Spinoza contests the 
conventional notion that the Hebrews first founded a theocracy:  
In this [Hebrew] imperium, therefore, civil right and Religion––which, as we 
have shown, consists solely in obedience toward God–– were one and the same. 
. . And because of this, this imperium could be called a Theocracy since its 
citizens were not bound by any right unless revealed by God. Be that as it may, 
all these things were established more in opinion than in reality. . . Inasmuch as 
the Hebrews did not transfer their right to anyone else, but everyone yielded his 
right equally, as in a Democracy, and shouted with one mouth, Whatever God 
will speak (no mediator being expressed), we will do, hence it follows that 
everyone by his compact remained quite equal, and the right to consult God and 
to receive and interpret the laws was equal for everyone, and everyone held all 
the admiration of the imperium absolutely equally.72 
 
Spinoza goes on to explain that it was only after the Hebrews became 
“thunderstruck” at hearing God directly speak to them that they abolished their 
original democratic state, transferred their right to Moses, and officially became a 
theocracy.73 While nominally a theocracy, Spinoza describes the organization and 
function of the Hebrew government as though it were a democratic federalist 
                                                 
70 PPR, 149. 
 
71 Ibid.  
 
72 TPT, 196.  
 
73 Ibid., 196-197.  
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system. For example, Spinoza explains how, after the Hebrews conquered the 
Canaanites, “twelve princes were chosen, one out of each tribe, to whom, together 
with Joshua and the high pontiff Eleazar, the right was given to divide the lands into 
twelve equal parts and distribute by lot.”74 With his Dutch readers in mind, Spinoza 
draws a comparison between the Hebrew and Dutch systems of confederacy. “With 
respect to God and the Religion, they [the different Hebrew tribes] had to be 
regarded as fellow citizens. But with respect to the right that one tribe had over 
another, they were nothing but allies—in almost the same mode (if you take away 
the common temple) as the Sovereign Confederate Orders of the Netherlands.”75 In 
the same way that Alfred highlights how the Iroquois Confederacy respects the 
autonomy of each of the five nations, Spinoza stresses how the “division of a 
commonwealth into parts is nothing else but that each now owns his part alone and 
the rest yield the right they had over that part.”76 Although drawing a parallel with 
the Dutch confederate system, Spinoza clarifies that the Hebrews did not have a 
state-like internal framework. Rather, similar to how Alfred describes the internal 
organization of the post-Confederacy Iroquois society as constituted by kinship 
networks, Spinoza conjectures that “each tribe had been divided into families whose 
heads were chosen from the family’s elders, whoever was the eldest among these 
succeeded by right to the place of the prince.”77 By regarding the Hebrews, a nation 
constituted by kinship networks, as initially a democracy and then a theocracy 
                                                 
74 TPT, 198.  
 
75 Ibid., 200.  
 
76 Ibid. 
 
77 Ibid., 201.  
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functioning as a democratic federalist system, Spinoza lends new cultural 
significance to democracy, a notion conventionally associated in his time with the 
Greek city-state of Athens.78 Not only does Spinoza select the Hebrew 
Commonwealth as the site of his historical analysis of democracy in TPT, he makes 
no mention of Athenian democracy in either of his two political treatises.79 “The 
authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates carries little weight with me,” Spinoza 
wrote to Hugo Boxel in a letter dated September 1674.80 Hence, just as Alfred 
subverts Canada’s exclusive claim to democracy by drawing on his Iroquois oral 
tradition for a democratic model, Spinoza undermines the ancient Greek claim to 
democracy by drawing on the Bible for his model.  
 In order to challenge their readers to think otherwise about the dominant 
nation-states of their times, Alfred and Spinoza interpret these state structures 
through the hermeneutic of their ancestral governance models. In HVA, Alfred 
suggests the Iroquois federalist model challenges the conventional notion of 
Canada. “Conceptually, Canada may be a nation, or it may be a political framework 
                                                 
78 For Polka’s commentary on this point, see Between Philosophy and Religion: Volume 2, 307: 
“[I]t is important, first, to return to the failure on the part of scholars and thinkers to see that 
democracy, in its modernity, is based, not on Greek (and Roman) but on biblical ontology. . . it is 
patent that Greek ‘democracy,’ as the rule of the some, shares with the rule of the few (aristocracy) 
and the rule of one (kingship), consistent with the history of the Roman res publica, the natural 
opposition between ruler and ruled (as between the one and the many). Rule (authority) in the 
ancient civil state always involves the ‘natural’ rule of some, few, or one over others (even as one 
people is freed and another people enslaved and as a slave is freed and a free man enslaved). The 
Greeks (together with the Romans) have no concept of the (democratic, modern, biblical) rule of all 
over all. They have no concept of the sovereign authority (of the freedom and equality) of all.”  
 
79 I am indebted to Grant Havers for highlighting this point in his article, “Was Spinoza a 
Liberal?,” in The Political Science Reviewer (2007), 165: “It is significant that Spinoza never seeks a 
return to pagan teleology or history when he defends democracy and freedom (and is silent on 
Socrates). Spinoza sees nothing admirable in the pagan rulers Alexander the Great or Caesar 
Augustus who persuaded the ignorant masses of spurious claims about their ancestral divinity (TPT, 
194). In discussing democracy, Spinoza omits any mention of Periclean Athens.”  
 
80 Ep56.  
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for cooperation between nations. For most Canadians it is both. For most Mohawks 
it is at best only the latter.”81 It is not that Canada is completely at odds with the 
democratic federalism revealed in the Iroquois tradition. In PPR, Alfred identifies a 
family resemblance between the federalist principle of the Iroquois Confederacy 
and the “the original [Western] principle of federalism” that has been “nearly 
forgotten in the construction of the modern hegemonic state.”82 Since “indigenous 
empowerment involves achieving a relationship between peoples founded on the 
principle of autonomy and interdependence,” Alfred suggests “the state need only 
refer to the federal principle” in order to accommodate indigenous nationhood. 83 
Similarly, Spinoza draws on the historical narrative of the Hebrew Commonwealth 
as both a cautionary biblical tale of monarchy and as an alterative model for 
democratic governance. In seventeenth century Holland, the Calvinist clerics 
                                                 
81 HVA, 104.  
 
82 PPR, 107.  
 
83 Ibid., 76-77. For legal commentary on the feasibility of Alfred’s nation-to-nation position, see 
Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, 76: “Haudeosaunee [Iroquois] law seems to maintain 
an independence from other legal traditions that prevents its assimilation or integration. As a result 
of this stance towards other nations, the Haudenosaunee are the least likely of any Indigenous group 
to support or embrace the application of their laws as part of the Canadian legal system [As an 
example, Borrows cites Alfred’s three major texts, see p. 324, n. 61]. .  . The Haudenosaunee 
generally see themselves as more independent in an international sense than many other First 
Nations. They tend to regard themselves as allies of Canada, rather than citizens of the Canadian 
nation state. . . As a result, this book’s conclusions about the nature of Canadian multi-juridicalism 
will likely be rejected by many people of the longhouse. They would not want to see their legal 
traditions as part of Canada’s Constitution, unless they consented to such an arrangement through a 
treaty with their confederacy, which is unlikely in the present circumstances.” While Borrows 
regards Alfred’s position as untenable at the present time, he also references Alfred’s critique of 
current configurations of colonial power. See 219: “I have been building the case that the recognition 
and expansion of Indigenous legal traditions within Canada should not require submissions to the 
current configuration of power that presently exists within the country. Indigenous peoples should 
not be forced to accept and integrate into institutions that are designed to conform to the current 
structures of the colonial state [After each of these two sentences Borrows cites Alfred’s Wasáse, 
Broadview Press 2005 print, 127. See 386, n. 1-2]. Borrows comments about the current structures 
of the colonial state suggest that even his own more moderate position for “recognition” of 
indigenous legal traditions is untenable in the present circumstances. 
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interpreted the Old Testament as a revolutionary text to support their political cause 
of overthrowing John de Witt’s Republican government and reinstating a 
monarchical government under the House of Orange.84 In tacit response to this 
Calvinist version of the biblical narrative, Spinoza shares in chapter 18 of TPT how 
the Hebrews fell into civil war and discord only after deciding to be ruled by kings 
under a monarchical form of government. “[I]t is also worthy of being noted that, so 
long as the [Hebrew] populace held the kingdom, they had only one civil war, 
which yet was absolutely extinguished. . . Yet after the populace—who were very 
little accustomed to kings—changed the first form of the imperium into a 
monarchy, there was almost no end to the civil wars.”85 With his Dutch audience in 
mind, Spinoza concludes with the moral lesson that “we see how fatal it is for a 
populace who are not accustomed to living under kings and who already have laws 
set down, to choose a Monarch.”86 The message Spinoza is conveying to his Dutch 
readers is clear: the importance of being content with republican laws under 
DeWitt’s government rather than risk returning to an Orangist monarchy. As a self-
conscious biblical storyteller, Spinoza presents democracy as the original ideal state 
and exposes monarchy as the root cause of governmental instability and an obstacle 
to achieving civil peace.  
                                                 
84 See, for example, Lewis Feuer, Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism (Boston, MA: Beacon 
Press, 1958), 99: “The Calvinist agitators of the seventeenth century, in England and Holland, were 
imbued with Old Testament fervour. They looked upon themselves as the modern successors of the 
Hebrew prophets, and they proclaimed that ‘prophets could, in virtue of their mission, choose a new 
king, and give absolution for regicide. . . ’ The Old Testament, in the seventeenth century, had 
become a revolutionary tract for the times.” 
 
85 TPT, 213.  
 
86 Ibid.  
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While drawing on their ancestral governance models to challenge 
conventional readings of modern state formations, neither Alfred nor Spinoza think 
a return to pre-modern origins is tenable in light of contemporary political and 
economic realities. In Wasáse, for example, Alfred acknowledges that the majority 
of indigenous peoples have been “disconnected from their natural environments on 
reserves or raised in the city and lack the knowledge and fortitude to live the kinds 
of lives their ancestors did.” Therefore, Alfred bluntly concludes, “going ‘back to 
the land’ is simply not a compelling call for our people any more.”87 Just as Alfred 
does not romantically advise indigenous peoples to go “back to the land,” Spinoza 
thinks that the Hebrew Commonwealth cannot be imitated by the people “nor is it 
even advisable” because of the modern economic realities facing Dutch society.88 
Spinoza argues the Hebrew Commonwealth is so outmoded that Spinoza writes it 
would only be useful “for those who wanted to live alone to themselves, without 
outside commerce, and enclose themselves within their own limits and segregate 
themselves from the rest of the globe, and hardly for those for whom it is necessary 
to have commerce with others.”89  
Far from endorsing a romanticized return to pre-modern origins, Alfred and 
Spinoza apply their ancestral governance models to transform the social, political, 
and economic realities of their times. For example, Alfred recognizes how recent 
immigration trends in Canada have resulted in a “culturally and linguistically 
                                                 
87 Wasáse, 211.  
 
88 TPT, 252.  
 
89 Ibid.  
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diverse Settler society” and that a nation-to-nation relationship must therefore 
evolve between a multicultural settler society and “linguistically and culturally 
distinct [indigenous] communities.”90 In this regard, an Iroquois federalist model 
challenges standard policies of multiculturalism. In place of the current policy 
objective of “bilingual monoculture assimilation,” Alfred idealistically envisions 
“mutilingual bicultured coexistence” between indigenous peoples and settler 
society.91 “We must move from colonial-imperialist relations to pluralist 
multinational associations of autonomous peoples and territories that respect the 
basic imperatives of indigenous cultures as well as preserve the stability and benefit 
of cooperative confederal relations between indigenous nations and other 
governments.”92 To create the confederal preconditions for a lasting peaceful 
coexistence, he identifies three basic and practical changes needed in modern 
colonial states. First, colonial states need to reform their state constitutions to reflect 
the principle of indigenous nationhood and bring into effect a nation-to-nation 
relationship between indigenous peoples and settler society. Additionally, colonial 
states need to return unceded indigenous lands and make restitution.93 Only when 
these actions are taken, Alfred maintains, will indigenous peoples be able to fully 
                                                 
90 Wasáse, 248.  
 
91 Ibid.  
 
92 Ibid., 266-267.  
 
93 Ibid., 268. Alfred recognizes that these basic institutional changes are open to interpretation. 
For instance, he acknowledges there are various approaches to the practical implementation of the 
nation-to-nation concept that underlies all indigenous ideas of coexistence. He also clarifies that the 
return of unceded lands and restitution does not imply irredentism: “When we say ‘Give it back,’ 
we’re talking about Settlers demonstrating respect for what we share—the land and its resources—
and making things right by offering us the dignity and freedom we are due and returning our power 
and land enough for us to be self-sufficient.” See, Wasáse, 153.  
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express their nationhood by governing their homelands, upholding the cultural 
norms of their territories, and controlling their natural resources and development 
sharing agreements with the state.94  
Just as Alfred provides a radically democratic vision of confederal relations 
between indigenous nations and Canada inspired by the Iroquois Confederacy, 
Spinoza likewise sketches a radically democratic vision of the Dutch Republic 
inspired by the Hebrew Commonwealth. In contrast with a monarchical state where 
Dutch citizens are undemocratically governed by one man, Spinoza characterizes 
the democratic sovereign state as one grounded in the common consent of its 
citizens as revealed by his Hebrews ancestors:  
And therefore, for a Prophetically revealed religion to have the force of right 
among the Hebrews as well, it was necessary for each of them to yield his 
natural right beforehand, and for all to state by common consent that they would 
obey only what was revealed to them Prophetically from God, in exactly the 
same mode as we have shown to come about in a democratic imperium, where 
everyone resolves by common consent to live solely by the dictate of reason.95 
 
Spinoza smoothly transitions from a democratic reading of Hebrew political history 
to an analysis of the religious and political realities of the Dutch Republic. In fact, 
just as Alfred idealizes the confederal possibilities between indigenous people and a 
                                                 
94 Ibid., 157. For a scholar who theorizes how local self-determination in the form of indigenous 
nationhood practices can contribute to a post-sovereignty democratic global governance system, see 
Iris Marion Young, “Hybrid Democracy: Iroquois Federalism and the Postcolonial Project,” 
Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ed. Duncan Ivison et al. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 253: “To conclude, I sketch a vision of global governance with 
local self-determination that I call, in accordance with its major principles, decentred diverse 
democratic federalism. This vision should not be construed as the proposal for concrete institutional 
design, but rather as a set of principles that social movements and policy makers should keep in 
mind in their work. In articulating the vision I draw on the work of Gerald Frug, David Held and 
James Tully, among others.”  
 
95 TPT, 221.  
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multicultural settler society, Spinoza idealizes the democratic possibilities in the 
city of Amsterdam:  
. . . The city of Amsterdam, which to its considerable enhancement and with the 
admiration of all nations, experienced the fruits of this freedom. For in this most 
flourishing Republic and most outstanding city, all human beings of whatever 
nation and sect live with the utmost harmony; and for them to trust their goods 
to someone they care to know only whether he is rich or poor and whether he 
usually acts in good faith or by a ruse. Otherwise Religion or sect does not 
move them at all, since it does not help at all in winning or loving a cause 
before a judge. 96   
 
To be sure, Spinoza does not privilege the city of Amsterdam over other Dutch 
cities. Rather, similar to how he describes the Hebrew “theocracy” as functioning as 
a democratic federalist system, Spinoza describes the aristocratic confederacy of the 
Dutch Republic as approximating a democratic federalist system.97 In PT, Spinoza 
expresses a preference for an aristocratic governance model where “sovereignty is 
                                                 
96 TPT, 235. Nadler expresses surprise that Spinoza characterizes the Dutch Republic as a free 
and tolerant state in light of the fact that one of Spinoza’s close friends, Adriaan Koerbagh, had just 
died in prison, “condemned by the city of Amsterdam – in a brutal act of intolerance at the 
instigation of the Calvinist consistory – for [his] philosophical and religious ideas.” See A Book 
Forged in Hell, 213. 
 
97 Given the democratic aspects of the aristocratic confederalist system of the Dutch Republic 
under DeWitt’s government, it not surprising that Spinoza described the aristocracy as coming 
“closest to being absolute”, that is, democratic (TP 8.31). For a scholar who argues Spinoza 
accommodated his notion of democracy to fit with DeWitt’s aristocracy, see Feuer, Spinoza and the 
Rise of Liberalism, 101-108, especially 104-105: “Amsterdam was an oligarchy, yet it was the home 
of freedom. Spinoza’s question in political theory was the same which De Witt faced in action: 
Should he advocate an extension of the franchise, an enlargement of the electorate to include the 
multitude? From this step he desisted. But in that case, how could Spinoza call Amsterdam a 
‘democracy’? Was there, then, another sense in which Amsterdam, despite its lack of majority rule, 
was still a democracy, a sense of ‘democracy’ more philosophical perhaps than the purely numerical 
significance? Unwilling to become a revolutionary democrat, he would have to if he had espoused 
the rule of the majority, Spinoza tampered with the meaning of ‘democracy.’ He redefined the term 
so that Amsterdam, an oligarchy, could still be called a ‘democracy.’ Thus, at the inception of its 
theory, democracy was born with those ambiguities which are too well known today….And Spinoza, 
in the seventeenth century, trying to defend the Liberal Republican party of John de Witt, the party 
of scientific statesmanship, unwittingly embarked upon similar devices of ideological 
rationalization.” Feuer elaborates upon his suggestion that Spinoza was an anti-revolutionary 
democrat in his essay, “Spinoza’s Political Philosophy: The Lessons and Problems of a Conservative 
Democrat”, The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, ed. Richard Kennington (Washington, D.C: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1980), 133-154.  
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held by several cities” as it is in the province of Holland.98 Spinoza argues that this 
form of governance is “better organised than the state which takes its name from 
one city only” as it creates a federalist-like check and balances mechanism. “The 
patricians of each city. . . will be anxious to maintain, and if possible extend, their 
right both in the city and the senate. They will therefore endeavour as best they can 
to win popularity with the people, governing by kindness rather than by fear.”99 In 
this kind of state, Spinoza maintains “freedom is shared by more of its members; for 
when one city has sole rule, regard is paid to the good of others only as far as it 
suits the ruling city.”100Additionally, Spinoza argues Holland clearly demonstrates 
that this form of governance fosters innovative democratic deliberation. “The fact is 
that men’s wits are too obtuse to get straight to the heart of every question,” 
Spinoza explains, “but by discussing, listening to others, and debating, their wits are 
sharpened, and by exploring every avenue they eventually discover what they are 
seeking, something that meets with general approval and that no one had previously 
thought of.”101 Consistent with his democratic reading of the Hebrew 
Commonwealth, Spinoza invites his readers to value and re-build the democratic 
aspects of the Dutch Republic as it was governed by John DeWitt rather than 
continuing under a monarchical regime.102  
                                                 
98 PT, 9.1.  
 
99 Ibid., 9.14.  
 
100 Ibid., 9.15. 
 
101 Ibid., 9.14.  
 
102 The DeWitt brothers were lynched by the mob in 1672, reinstating the monarchical 
government under the House of Orange party. Spinoza wrote the unfinished PT under monarchical 
rule.  
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In order to actualize their respective modern visions of confederate 
democratic relations, Alfred and Spinoza ultimately call on the people to actively 
engage in a psychological and political process of delegitimizing oppressive state 
structures and practices. At the end of PPR, Alfred informs his indigenous readers 
that it is not enough to imagine a better and more just future:  
Without a commitment to action, we will continue to suffer. What corrupt ruler 
has ever turned over a new leaf? What oppressive regime has ever smiled 
benevolently and handed back power to the oppressed? When has justice 
prevailed without sacrifice? And when has change taken place without friction? 
We cannot expect a better future in the absence of commitment to take 
action”103 
 
In Wasáse, Alfred identifies the state’s legitimacy as the “keystone” to a regime’s 
survival and delegitimizing the colonial state as the most “fundamentally radical act 
one can perform.”104 The problem identified by Alfred is that the colonial state’s 
manufactured legitimacy makes the indigenous struggle for peaceful coexistence 
appear naturally illegitimate from the standpoint of the “mainstream of Settler 
society.”105 Alfred therefore frames a politics of contention as a mind game. “The 
battlefield for the struggle,” Alfred writes, “is the public’s consciousness, shaped 
and manipulated through the media and through publicized [indigenous] 
contentious actions” that obstruct the “routine of Settler society.”106 It is not only by 
thinking but acting otherwise that indigenous-state relations can be fundamentally 
altered. Spinoza likewise identifies the state’s manufactured legitimacy to pose an 
                                                                                                                                        
 
103 PPR, 180.  
 
104 Wasáse, 203.  
 
105 Ibid., 66.  
 
106 Ibid., 230-231.  
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obstacle to democratizing citizen-state relations. In chapter 20 of TPT, Spinoza 
reflects on the moral issues raised by the various means by which a state 
manufactures consent:  
[T]he highest majesty seems to do wrong to subjects and usurp their right when 
it wants to prescribe to each what to embrace as true and reject as false. . . I 
confess that judgement can be predisposed in many, almost unbelievable modes, 
so that, although it is not directly under another’s imperium, it still so depends 
on the mouth of another that, to that extent, it can deservedly be said to be under 
his jurisdiction. But, whatever is technically possible, in this matter, it still has 
never come about that human beings fail to experience that each is full of his 
own sense of things.107  
 
Despite the various techniques manipulating public consciousness to obey state 
authority, in the end Spinoza trusts in the people’s ability to rekindle their full 
“sense of things” and contest oppressive state structures. He therefore proceeds to 
explain the way in which state power can be shaped and held accountable by the 
people’s critical political engagement:  
However much the highest powers [the sovereign state] are believed to have the 
right to everything and be the interpreters of right and piety. . .  they still can 
never make human beings not pass judgement on any matters on the basis of 
their own mental cast, and not be affected to that extent by this or that emotion. 
It is true that, by right, they [the highest powers] can consider as an enemy 
everyone who does not absolutely think as they do in everything; but we are not 
disputing now about their right, but about what is useful. For I grant that by 
right they can rule repressively and lead citizens to the slaughter for the 
flimsiest of causes; but everyone will deny that this can come about in keeping 
with the judgement of sound reason. Indeed, since they are unable to do these 
things without great danger to the whole imperium, we can also deny that they 
have the absolute power to do these and similar things, and consequently the 
absolute right as well. For we have shown that the right of the highest powers is 
determined by their power.108 
 
                                                 
107 TPT, 229, italics mine.  
 
108 Ibid., 230, italics mine. For scholars who provide divergent readings of this passage and 
contrasting views on the reconcilability of Spinoza’s “liberal democratic” and “authoritarian” 
passages in TPT, see Feuer, Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism, at 107; and  Douglas Den Uyl, 
Power, State and Freedom: An Interpretation of Spinoza’s Political Philosophy (Van Gorcum: The 
Netherlands, 1983), 96-121.  
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For Spinoza, sovereign power is not only capable of being shaped by the critical 
participation of the people, sovereign power needs to be formed by the people’s 
rational engagement in order to prevent tyranny and open up the possibility for a 
legitimate democratic state. Thus, for both of our philosophical guests, it is the 
people’s critical consciousness and political action alone that can effectively 
democratize oppressive practices and structures of governance over time. That is to 
say, Alfred and Spinoza’s constructive tools for democratic governance go hand-in-
hand with the collective conatus and resurgent power they rightly located in the 
people.   
2.4  Serving Wo’os: Wiigyat and His Wooden Slave 
Our first feast dialogue has been a productive sharing of ideas. We first 
witnessed Gyolugyet exercise her daxgyat by contentiously withholding her feast 
diary from Mr. Plant. In the face of Justice McEachern’s coercive ruling, we 
witnessed how Gyolugyet maintained her self-affirming power as a hereditary chief. 
We then turned to a dialogical engagement with our philosophical guests’ ideas 
which served to deconstruct the coercive power underlying state sovereignty. Alfred 
and Spinoza not only highlighted the socially constructed nature of state 
sovereignty, they also articulated alternative understandings of constitutive power 
located in the people. We then critically compared the way in which our 
philosophical guests engaged their traditions as a modern practice of freedom aimed 
at achieving peaceful coexistence with the dominant nation-states of their time, 
from the present-day colonial state located on Turtle Island to the seventeenth 
century monarchical state of Calvinist Holland. Through the lens of their ancestral 
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governance models, Alfred and Spinoza re-imagined radically democratic nation-to-
nation and citizen-state relations and ultimately placed the responsibility to 
delegitimize oppressive state structures and relations in the hands of the people.  
Intellectually filled with Gyolugyet’s gawagaani teaching and the ideas of 
our philosophical guests, I now serve up wo’os, a tasty treat in trickster narrative 
form for all invested in our dialogue to consume. In Wiigyat and His Wooden 
Slave, the political and philosophical themes of our feast dialogue are unified into a 
hybrid vision of peaceful coexistence between the Gitxsan Nation and Canada:109  
Wandering through the land, Wiigyat saw a big village at the top of a hill.  
   ‘A-ha,’ he thought. ‘This will be my first stop. I must make an impressive 
entrance.’ He decided to dress himself as a great chief, complete with slave.  
   First he gathered odd bits of wood and moss and hastily produced a wooden 
slave. Then using all of his ingenuity he fashioned an impressive costume for 
himself. As a final touch he gathered fish bones, cedar tassels and bits of moss 
and fitted these odd bits into an awe-inspiring chief’s headdress.  
   Pleased with himself and his attire, Wiigyat approached the wooden slave to 
complete his invention. Leaning over the wooden man he breathed on him, one, 
two, three, four times, saying ‘You will walk, you will talk, you will obey me.’  
   This was the first slave Wiigyat had ever contrived and he blew great breaths 
to emphasize his words.  
   ‘Walk!’ Wiigyat commanded. The slave walked.  
   ‘Speak!’ Wiigyat ordered. The slave spoke.  
   Wiigyat did a little dance of pleasure and anticipation. ‘Now I must teach my 
slave obedience,” Wiigyat thought.  
 
                                                 
109 In serving wo’os in the form of Wiigyat trickster stories, I follow Gitxsan Elder, education 
scholar, and language teacher Xsiwis’ Gitxsan storytelling methodology. See Xsiwis (Dr. M. Jane 
Smith), Placing Gitxsan Stories in Text: Returning the Feathers. Guuxs Mak’am Mik’aax 
(Unpublished Doctoral Thesis. Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia, 2004), 49: 
“Storytelling has become an essential part of Indigenous methodology. Equipped with this 
knowledge I have taken the Gitxsan stories and developed a Gitxsan/Indigenous story based 
curriculum. In addition, I have used the method of the Gitxsan storytellers in that the storytellers 
sometimes interrupt the story to give guidance, make a statement or connect with an ancient 
teaching. . .  I interrupt the telling of my stories and connect them to the outside forces such as 
residential schools and the irrelevant curriculum that have moved in on the Gitxsan and threaten 
silence the stories.” For an application of Xsiwis’ Gitxsan storytelling methodology to understanding 
the lives of two women impacted by the Indian Residential School system, see Maryam Moayeri and 
Dr. Jane Smith, “The Unfinished Stories of Two First Nations Mothers,” Journal of Adolescent and 
Adult Literacy 53, no. 5 (February 2010): 408-417.  
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Breathing into his slave, Wiigyat reveals that both “master’ and “slave” share the 
same nature, they are equals in truth. While Wiigyat fashions himself as a Gitxsan 
chief he does not possess a desire for democratic governance. Rather, Wiigyat has a 
tyrannical desire, shared by colonialists and monarchists alike, of turning living 
people into wooden slaves. While Spinoza appreciated there were many modes of 
manufacturing consent, he did not entertain Wiigyat’s trickster mode of 
psychological control:  
    Strutting before the slave, he began his instruction. ‘I am a great chief. I wear 
the robes and headdress of a great chief. I walk and speak with the manners of a 
great chief!’ and he walked up and down strutting and preening before the 
watchful slave. 
   ‘Now, slave,’ Wiigyat said, ‘What do you see?’ 
   The slave studied him.  
    ‘I see a big man dressed in moss and cedar with fish bones on his head,’ he 
replied.  
    ‘That is not what I told you!’ he yelled. ‘I am a great chief. I wear the robes 
and headdress to prove it! Now say what I wish you to say. At once!’ 
    But Wiigyat had erred in his hasty construction of the slave. In his desire for 
obedience he had blown his breath too hard into the wooden man. Part of 
Wiigyat’s nature had slipped in with the breath and he now faced a counterpart 
of himself.  
    ‘Once again the disobedient slave chanted the words, ‘I see a big man dressed 
in moss and cedar with fish bones on his head.’  
    Over and over Wiigyat shouted his instructions only to confront the cold eye 
and calm voice of the slave who repeated what he beheld exactly as he saw it.  
    Wiigyat became furious. Rushing at the slave he bashed it about until it fell 
apart at his feet.  
 
Frustrated by their inability to coerce and control, tyrants react with violence at 
the rebellious truth. Like monarchs and colonialists, Wiigyat pursues an empty 
form of self-esteem and teaches us that it is not the slave who needs to be 
recognized by the master but the master who depends on the slave’s recognition 
and obedience. In his blind desire for obedience, the trickster hastily ignores the 
truth that a free people cannot uncritically accept dressed-up claims and demands 
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that only serve the powerful. Nevertheless, Wiigyat refuses to give up his futile 
efforts to enslave.  
     Hurrying to the forest Wiigyat found different wood and moss and this time 
took great care as he assembled a new slave. Then using his powers he bent 
over his creation and breathed lightly, one, two, three, four times on it; trying 
desperately not to allow any part of himself to escape with his breaths as he 
instructed the slave.  
    ‘Walk,’ he commanded. The slave walked.  
    ‘Speak,’ he ordered. The slave spoke.  
    ‘I am a great chief,’ Wiigyat began, eyeing the slave as he strutted up and 
down. ‘I walk and speak with the manners of a great chief. I wear the robes and 
headdress of a great chief.’  
    The slave watched him.  
    ‘Now, slave, what do you see?’ 
    Lowering his eyes, the slave replied: ‘I see a great chief dressed in fine robes 
wearing a handsome headdress.’ Wiigyat was delighted at the slave’s answer. 
Now he could commence his grand entrance into the village.  
 
Wiigyat’s second wooden slave teaches us how the master’s power and control 
always depends on the slave’s acceptance of his wooden identity and his “right” to 
obey. It is the slave mentality that legitimizes the power relation and allows tyranny 
to commence and extend into the village of the free people.  
    ‘Slave,’ he said, ‘I command you to enter this village. Go to the center of the 
houses and sit down. Wait until the people come, then rise and make this 
proclamation in a loud voice. ‘A great chief is about to enter your village. He 
walks on the trail below. I caution you to welcome him appropriately!’ 
   All this the slave did and the people flew about preparing a magnificent feast. 
At last, satisfied with his appearance, Wiigyat stalked out of the trees and 
climbed the trail to the village. The villages stood in awe at the sight of the big 
man draped in the robes of a mighty chief. They led Wiigyat to the feast. 
Bending low one spoke quietly to the slave, ‘What does your master prefer to 
eat?’  
   Now this slave, too, was the mischievous creation of a wily and devious 
creator. Like Wiigyat he found it difficult to speak the truth.  
   ‘Oh,’ he said with great humility, ‘My master is a simple man. He will accept 
only that which is left after everyone else has had their fill.’ 
    The host chief was so impressed by this request that he rose and proclaimed 
Wiigyat’s virtues to all of his people. The astounded Wiigyat could scarcely 
believe his ears! He turned to question his wooden slave but the slave sat with 
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his eyes respectfully lowered to the ground and the frantic Wiigyat could not 
alter the proclamation in any way.  
 
The seemingly obedient and docile wooden slave subversively bends the li’ligit 
protocols to serve his own self-conscious appetite, his conatus, his resurgent power. 
The sly slave’s strategy is a mindgame. He silently rejects his fabricated wooden 
identity and courageously practices genuine self-esteem by affirming his power of 
acting. He feigns deference by acting within the rules of the master Wiigyat’s game 
until the opportune time presents itself for engaging in creative and non-violent 
contention that undermines the master’s power and interests. It is a strategic 
manoeuvre deserving of a big feast indeed!  
    So the food passed by him—bowls of berries, steaming boiled meat, 
succulent baked salmon, beautiful wild rice, mounds of beaten berries—none 
were offered to the visiting Chief. Only the mischievous slave feasted on the 
bountiful array. The people marvelled at his capacity, he seemed to be a 
bottomless pit! 
   Poor Wiigyat sat hopelessly trapped through the long meal, sweltering under 
his regalia, faint with hunger, and trembling with anger at the trickery of his 
wooden slave. 
  As each heaping dish passed by him, he would reach over and scratch at the 
wooden back of his tormentor. First in anger, then in pleading tones he begged 
for a morsel before it was all gone. The wooden slave paid no attention and ate 
on. As the hours passed, Wiigyat’s frantic scratches left a mound of tiny 
shavings to pile up behind the slave who was far too busy to notice.  
   At last there was nothing left for the host chief to offer Wiigyat.  
 
Food, like sovereign power, is always in the hands of the hosting village. The sly 
slave puts this knowledge to use and effectively weakens the trickster tyrant, 
temporarily halting his ability to exercise power. In the Feast Hall, where the free 
people bear witness, Wiigyat must restrain his use of force or else be exposed as the 
deceitful trickster he is. The sly slave harnesses the democratic power of the Feast 
Hall!  
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   The people watched in admiration and respect as Wiigyat and his slave rose 
with dignity and slowly departed from the village. As soon as they were out of 
eyeshot distance, Wiigyat flung off his fake robes. With loud and descriptive 
oaths he attacked the wooden slave. Boxing it about, he kicked it soundly until 
it burst open spilling the feast leftovers over the clean moss.  
   Chief’s crown askew, tattered tassels in every direction, the ravenous Wiigyat 
dove in with hands and feet to gobble the unsavoury array. No longer a proud 
chief, Wiigyat scrambled about eating every morsel.  
   Then he ruefully went on his way alone. Meanwhile the villagers had 
discovered the heap of wood shavings. They suspected a ruse and set off in hot 
pursuit of their charming guest. When they found the remains of the wooden 
slave and Wiigyat’s robes, they paused. Now they knew they had entertained 
Wiigyat, the Big Man.110 
 
The free people—the Onkwehonwe, the multitudo, the Gitxsan—are gifted with a 
critical consciousness capable of recognizing the traces of deception and brute force 
left behind by the legacy of tyranny. Creative contention always places the 
oppressive ruler in a precarious and desperate situation. By resorting to 
unashamedly gobbling up the leftovers in the wooden slave’s innards, Wiigyat puts 
himself in the class of vulgar rulers Spinoza described as running “drunk or naked 
with harlots through the streets.”111 Such rulers openly violate and bring into 
contempt their own established rules and make it impossible to “preserve the 
dignity of sovereignty.”112 What Gyolugyet, our philosophical guests, and Wiigyat 
hand us at the end of our first feast dialogue are the tools of resurgent self-affirming 
power, genuine self-esteem, creative contention, and the authority of democratic 
governance constituted by the people. In the dignified pursuit of peaceful 
                                                 
110 K’san Book Builders, “We-gyet and His Wooden Slave,” in We-gyet Wanders On, 38-41. I 
have interrupted and made minor modifications to parts of this story for style and content.  
 
111 PT, 4.4.  
 
112 Ibid.  
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coexistence, these are the tools that can adequately equip a wilp-centric Gitxsan 
Nation in its constructive work of transforming an undignified colonial sovereignty. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
GAWAGAANI DI WILP AMA DAL GAAS XW 
[I]t would be even more discouraging if monotheism had to be completely 
defeated for freedom to emerge. But it is the institutions of society that created 
this reading of the myth and prophets of the peoples’ heritage, and they are the 
proper foci of our efforts. The recent and growing trend of American-based 
Protestant fundamentalist churches proselytizing in Onkwehonwe communities 
is the most evident of these institutional enemies. Our born-again Christian 
relatives, who love their people and are otherwise caring, are swept up in a 
mission to wipe out the remnants of indigenous spirituality in themselves and 
their communities, some going so far as labelling Onkwehonwe spiritual 
practices as “satanic.” 
–Taiaiake Alfred1  
 
But I return to your letter, in which first of all you lament that I allow myself to 
be ensnared by the prince of evil spirits. . . But suppose that all the arguments 
that you offer tell in favour only of the Roman Church. Do you think that by 
these arguments you can prove with mathematical certainty the authority of that 
same Church? Since this is far from being so, why do you want me to believe 
that my demonstrations are inspired by the Prince of wicked spirits, and yours 
by God? Especially as I see, and your letter clearly shows, that you have 
become the slave of this Church not so much through love of God as fear of 
Hell, which is the single cause of superstition. 
 
–Benedict Spinoza, Letter to Alfred Burgh dated December 16752 
 
Gawagaani di wilp ama dal gaas xw communicates the topic of our second feast 
dialogue: making peace with the church.3 Having overheard our change of topic, 
                                                 
1 Wasáse, 108.  
 
2 Ep76.  
 
3 The Gitxsan Nation has historically exercised its spiritual agency in innovative ways to shape a 
complex relationship with the various Christian denominations that have settled on Gitxsan 
homelands. In his opening remarks at trial, the legal counsel for the Gitxsan, Mr. Grant, elaborates 
upon the Gitxsan Nation’s spiritual agency: “The theme of the continuity and change will also be 
reflected in the evidence you will hear regarding the incorporation of Christianity into Gitksan and 
Wet’suwet’en spiritual systems. This evidence will also demonstrate something else – the 
determination of Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en to maintain their central institutions and laws in the face 
of a concerted effort to stamp them out. You will hear evidence that many Gitksan and 
Wet’suwet’en are members of Christian churches. You will hear also these witnesses describe the 
continuing significance of their spiritual beliefs centred on their relationships with animals and the 
spirit world. How can these beliefs exist side by side with Christianity? Is not the assumption of the 
mantle of Christianity the assumption of the benefits of a progressive civilization and the inevitable 
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our philosophical guests turn their attention from transforming colonial and 
monarchical states to transforming ecclesiastical institutions—from the American-
based Protestant fundamentalist churches to the Roman Catholic Church—that 
erroneously cast indigenous spirituality as satanic and Spinoza’s philosophy as 
inspired by the Prince of wicked spirits.4 These superstitious interpretations of 
Christianity, propagated for centuries in Europe and on Turtle Island, are not 
confined to ecclesiastical institutions. As we will see, a superstitious imperial 
reading of Christianity made an appearance in the B.C. Supreme Courthouse during 
the Delgamuukw trial.  
 To begin our feast dialogue on achieving peaceful relations with the church, 
we continue with the li’ligit protocol of am goosinsxw by remembering Antgulilbix 
and her gawagaani teaching in response to Mr. Goldie’s imperial interpretation of 
the presence of the United Church in her village. We will then practice the li’ligit 
protocol of k’otsgesxw by witnessing how Alfred and Spinoza identify and 
deconstruct five dogmas of imperial Christianity and offer up alternative non-
                                                                                                                                        
withering of ‘paganism’? You will hear evidence that over the past century and a half, the Gitksan 
and Wet’suwet’en have integrated aspects of Christianity into their systems and maintained both 
absolutely. They are participants in Anglican, Catholic, Pentacostal [sic] and Salvation Army 
churches; at the same time, songs, dreams, spirit power and reincarnation continue to keep them in 
personal contact with the spiritual forces that have always animated their lives and which inform 
their practice of Christianity.” See Trial Transcripts, Delgamuukw v. The Queen in the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia, Action No. 0843, Smithers Registry, 99-100. 
 
4 It is worth noting that despite their respective critiques of the church, as young men Alfred and 
Spinoza were mentored by Catholic Jesuits in their scholarly pursuits. In an interview with Vine 
Deloria Jr., Alfred light-heartedly reflects on his Jesuit high school education, see Peace, Power, 
Righteousness, 158: “I went to a Jesuit high school in Montreal, where they encouraged us in the 
critical thinking path, and they allowed us [to] read what we wanted to read. Anything except the 
Bible, actually. [laughter] Hey. . . Jesuits! So, I picked Custer Died for Your Sins [by Vine Deloria 
Jr.], and it really opened up my eyes.” Likewise, Spinoza learned Latin under the tutelage of 
Franciscus van den Enden, a former Jesuit and political radical who tutored from his home. Van den 
Enden also likely introduced Spinoza to Cartesian philosophy. See Nadler, A Book Forged in Hell, 
6-7.  
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imperial interpretations of biblical monotheism. In the aftermath of defeating 
imperial Christianity, we will turn to a critical comparison of the way in which our 
philosophical guests self-consciously engage their ancestral traditions to promote 
democratic spiritual praxis among their people in the face of church-created 
divisions and discord. Mentally nourished by Antgulilbix’s gawagaani teaching and 
the ideas of our philosophical guests, I conclude our dialogue by serving up another 
sweet trickster treat. In Wiigyat and His Wooden Jaw, the trickster recovers his 
mouthpiece to add a new hybrid voice to our dialogue centred on making peace 
between the Gitxsan Nation and the church.  
3.1   Remembering Antgulilbix 
Antgulilbix (Mary Johnson) of the gisk’ahaast clan from the eastern village 
of Ansbahyaxw was the second sim’oogit to share her adaawk with the court on 
behalf of her wilp and wil’naa’t’ahl . On May 29, 1987, under cross-examination by 
Mr. Goldie, the chief legal counsel for the province of British Columbia, 
Antgulilbix reviews a photograph of her village:  
Mr. Goldie: Mrs. Johnson, over on the right-hand side there seems to be a 
building with a – it looks like a steeple?  
Antgulilbix: Yeah, that’s United Church way over there.  
. . .  
Mr. Goldie: Is that where the people of the village worship?  
Antgulilbix: Yeah.  
Mr. Goldie: And where burial ceremonies are held? 
Antgulilbix: Yeah. Yeah. . . 5 
 
By having Antgulilbix admit that the Gitxsan worship and host burial ceremonies in 
the church, Mr. Plant intends for Antgulilbix’s testimony to support the province’s 
position that the Gitxsan have willingly submitted to Euro-Canadian culture by 
                                                 
5 Trial Transcripts, Delgamuukw v. The Queen in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Action 
No. 0843, Smithers Registry, 832. 
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adopting its religion. According to Mr. Goldie’s colonial mentality, with the 
acceptance of Christianity the Gitxsan no longer have a “traditional” claim to the 
territory. Thus, Mr. Goldie goes on to have Antgulilbix establish the historical date 
of the United Church’s presence:  
Mr. Goldie: Is the – is the church that you have identified, the United Church, 
is it still standing or is it –  
Antgulilbix: The reason is that first church with a tall steeple burned down and 
they built another one and it has a steeple too. Maybe that’s the old church 
that’s standing on there.  
Mr. Goldie: Do you recall when the old one burnt down? 
Antgulilbix: I think it’s – I remember when late Robert Wilson was still alive 
and he felt really bad when the church burnt down, and he died not long after 
that.  
Mr. Goldie: And when do you think Robert Wilson died? 
Antgulilbix: His family might know. After Robert Wilson died then late Jonathan 
Johnson took over. That’s a long time – and after Jonathan Johnson died then late 
George Wilson took over. And after he died again then Art Wilson. See how 
many chiefs? 
Mr. Goldie: Yes.  
Antgulilbix: Yeah, so I know it a long time when the church burnt down.6 
 
Antgulilbix does not simply draw on her own memory; she refers Mr. Goldie to the 
collective memory of an entire Gitxsan wilp network. In doing so, she slyly reveals 
the way in which the United Church is an object of democratic interpretation for 
each wilp network that makes up the Gitxsan Nation. Mr. Goldie completely 
overlooks this hermeneutic intersubjectivity, concerned as he is with fixing a date 
for the United Church and its Christianizing presence in Ansbahyaxw. Surprisingly, 
Justice McEachern interrupts the cross-examination to ask Antgulilbix about her list 
of chiefs.  
Justice McEachern: Mrs. Johnson, these chiefs you mentioned, I think you 
started with Robert Wilson, and then Jonathan Johnson and then George Wilson 
then Art Wilson, chiefs of what, please? 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
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Antgulilbix: They were from Klii yem lax haa’s House. They were wolves. 
Justice McEachern: Thank you.7 
 
By identifying the succession of chiefs in Klii yem lax haa’s House, Antgulilbix 
discloses how each wilp network has an intergenerational responsibility for 
interpreting its relationship with the church. Additionally, she conveys the 
persistent continuation of the Gitxsan governance system which further undermines 
Mr. Goldie’s strategy of using the presence of the church as a marker for 
assimilation. Mr. Goldie’s failed strategy nevertheless highlights the way in which 
Christianity has been politically co-opted by the Canadian colonial state to serve its 
agenda of extinguishment. Antgulilbix’s response to Mr Goldie’s imperial version 
of Christianity ultimately teaches the way in which a strong Gitxsan spirituality and 
governance system can peacefully coexist with a church desperately in need of 
rebuilding.8 
 
 
                                                 
7 Ibid. In his re-examination, Mr. Grant asks Antgulilbix to identify the specific hereditary chief 
name held by the men she recounted. The name she provides is Wii’mogulsxw, a wing chief title 
currently held by my grand-uncle Art Wilson (also spelt as ‘Wii Muk’ Willixw). See Trial 
Transcripts, Delgamuukw v. The Queen, 986. 
 
8 To appreciate the United Church’s rebuilding process in relation to the Gitxsan Nation, see 
Paulette Yvonne Lynette Regan, “An Apology Feast in Hazelton: A Settler’s ‘Unsettling’ 
Experience,” in Unsettling the Settler Within: Canada’s Peacemaker Myth, Reconciliation, and 
Transformative Pathways to Decolonization (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Victoria 
Faculty of Indigenous Governance, 2006), 244-265. Along with other representatives of the federal 
government and United Church, Regan co-hosted a Gitxsan feast on March 20, 2004 at the 
Gitanmaax Community Hall, in Hazelton, BC to formally and publicly apologize to the Gitxsan for 
the internment of Gitxsan children at Indian Residential Schools. With the theme of Hla Guxhs Bekg 
Um (“Welcome Home”), the feast paid special focus on 25 Gitxsan survivors of the Edmonton 
Residential School who piloted an alternative dispute resolution program between the Gitxsan, 
Canada, and the United Church. Gitxsan Hereditary Chief Wii Elast (Jim Angus) served as the 
speaker and Gitxsan Elder Matilda Daniels served as the coordinator of a feast that invited over 400 
guests including dignitaries from Canada and United Church, as well as VIPs from Gitxsan extended 
families, local bands, and local Gitxsan organization. On behalf of the United Church, Dr. Marion 
Best formally apologized to the Gitxsan in attendance for failing to respect the rich culture of the 
Gitxsan and committed to working towards spiritual coexistence with the Gitxsan Nation.  
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3.2  Deconstructive Tools for Imperial Christianity  
Continuing with the li’ligit protocol of k’otsgesxw, we will now dialogically 
engage and receive Alfred and Spinoza’s conceptual contributions on the theme of 
making peace with the church The adversarial interaction between Antgulilbix and 
Mr. Goldie demonstrates that peaceful coexistence between the Gitxsan Nation and 
the church cannot be achieved so long as settler institutions continue to reproduce 
imperial forms of Christianity as a justificatory tool for the colonization of the 
Gitxsan homelands. Conversely, as Alfred’s critique of American-based 
fundamentalist Protestant churches makes clear, peaceful coexistence cannot be 
achieved if members of the Gitxsan Nation embrace imperial forms of Christianity 
that cast Gitxsan spiritual practices as satanic.9 To begin to help us break free of 
imperial Christianity and recognize it as violating the original vision for the church, 
our philosophical guests equally highlight the non-imperial nature of Jesus’ 
message and ministry. In Wasáse, Alfred reminds his readers that Jesus was a 
heterodox figure who challenged the religious and political authorities of his time. 
“It is mostly forgotten by monotheists today,” Alfred observes, “that Jesus himself 
was a radical who challenged accepted wisdom and the power of established Jewish 
and [Roman] imperial institutions.”10 Similarly, Spinoza regards Christ as a moral 
teacher who, unlike Moses, was not “sent to preserve the imperium and institute 
                                                 
9 This is not to say that the Gitxsan do not discern between life-affirming and life-destroying uses 
of Gitxsan culture and spirituality. In Gitxsanimx, the term “Haldowgit” signifies the spiritual 
practice of witchcraft. What Alfred rightly denounces here are imperial forms of Christianity that 
cast all indigenous spiritualities as intrinsically evil or “satanic.”  
 
10 Wasáse, 108.  
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laws, but solely to teach the universal law [of love].”11 If Jesus’ message and 
ministry both challenged and transcended imperial powers, how then did his 
message transmutate into imperial Christianity?12 Our philosophical guests will 
trace the historical emergence of imperial Christianity, deconstruct five of its 
dogmas, and create space for non-imperial alternative interpretations of biblical 
monotheism that support peaceful indigenous-church relations based on mutual 
respect and equality.  
Alfred and Spinoza perceptively observe how Jesus’ radical and moral 
teachings were historically corrupted by ecclesiastical and political elites in their 
respective societies and link this corruption to global Empire. In HVA, Alfred 
describes how early Mohawk conversions to Catholicism in the seventeenth century 
were strongly influenced by politics:   
The attraction of the Catholic rituals, the Jesuits’ medical utility as healing 
shamans, and the evident power of the French war gods all played important 
roles in convincing Mohawks to become Christians. But most important was the 
partnership between leading Mohawk chiefs who initially sponsored the 
missionaries to gain prestige and material benefits, and the Jesuits who 
recognized the value of recruiting key Mohawk players to the French side. . . 
With the injection of prestige and material benefit into the conversion process, 
the missionaries came to symbolize not only a religious difference among 
individuals, but also real political cleavages among various leaders and the 
factions they represented.13 
 
Writing in the same century that the Mohawks were first becoming Catholics, 
Spinoza expresses confusion about Christians in Europe who profess “love, 
                                                 
11 TPT, 56.  
 
12 According to Alfred, this colonial transmutation of biblical monotheism is embedded in the 
liberal tradition as a justification for colonialism. See Wasase, 54: “The proscriptive orders of Judeo-
Christianity. . .  is embedded within the liberal tradition so central to justifying colonialism.” 
 
13 HVA, 42-43.  
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gladness, peace, continence, and faith toward all” yet practice the “bitterest hatred 
toward one another daily.”14 Similar to how Alfred accounts for Mohawk 
conversions to Catholicism, Spinoza explains the duplicity among European 
Christians to be the result of the competition for prestige and material benefit within 
the ecclesiastical establishment:  
Seeking the cause of this evil, therefore, I did not doubt that it had arisen in that, 
for the vulgar, regarding the Church’s ministries as entitlements and its duties as 
benefices, and holding pastors in the highest honour, were part of religion. For 
as soon as this abuse began the Church, right away there started in each of the 
worst of them an immense lust to administer the sacred duties; and the love 
propagating divine religion degenerated into sordid greed and ambition, and 
likewise the temple itself into a Theatre where, not Church teachers, but orators 
were heard, none of whom was bound by a desire for teaching the populace, but 
for carrying them off in admiration for himself and picking not dissidents 
publicly and teaching only what was new and unusual and what the vulgar 
admired most. Hence, in fact, there had to arise great conflicts, envy, and a 
hatred that could not be calmed by any age.15  
 
Alfred and Spinoza link the corrupt ecclesiastical institutions present in their own 
societies to global Empire’s historical co-optation of Christianity. In TPT, Spinoza 
argues that Christ, foreseeing that his apostles would be “dispersed through the 
whole globe,” taught them to “treat absolutely everyone with piety.”16 Following 
Christ’s direction, the apostles then “spread right away” the sum of the things 
accomplished by Christ and his passion “through the whole Roman Empire.”17 
Spinoza highlights how the apostolic evangelization process was fraught with 
theological and political problems. For example, in their efforts to accommodate 
                                                 
14 TPT, xviii.  
 
15 Ibid., xix.  
 
16 Ibid., 224.  
 
17 Ibid., 154.  
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“the newness of [Christ’s] teaching” to the mental cast of the human beings of their 
own time,” Spinoza argues that the apostles planted the seeds for “many quarrels 
and schisms” to vex the church “for eternity.”18 Moreover, Spinoza argues that the 
spread of the apostle’s message beyond the Roman Empire clearly illustrates how 
religion “has always been accommodated to the utility of the republic.”19 In the 
same way as Spinoza, Alfred connects Christianity to global imperial processes. 
“Jesus’ message was co-opted over time by authorities and patterned for a singular 
truth: theological and political,” Alfred writes in Wasáse. “Christianity became the 
state religion of the Roman Empire and thence the spiritual font and justification of 
imperial dominion worldwide in the British and American empires.”20 By locating 
corrupt ecclesiastical institutions in the context of global Empire, Alfred and 
Spinoza show how Jesus’ radical anti-imperial vision transmutated into imperial 
Christianity.  
Consistent with their keen awareness of the church’s role in global imperial 
processes, our philosophical guests critically evaluate biblical monotheism in terms 
of its social and political consequences in the world. In Spinoza’s view, the only 
way to resolve the quarrels and schisms vexing the church is to deconstruct the 
alien ideologies that have been superimposed on biblical monotheism and reduce 
biblical faith “to the very few and very simple dogmas that Christ taught as his 
own.”21 With Christ’s life and teaching as his point of reference, Spinoza maintains 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 145.  
 
19 Ibid., 224.  
 
20 Wasáse, 108.  
 
21 TPT, 145.  
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that instead of judging dogmas in terms of their “truth or falsity,” dogmas should be 
“judged by works alone.”22 Based on this action-oriented evaluation of dogmas, 
Spinoza argues Christians who “persecute honourable men who love Justice” 
simply because they hold different beliefs than they do are “really the Antichrists”23 
Alfred likewise critiques contemporary church-oriented political activists for 
overlooking how “Christian and Jewish colonizers” have used biblical monotheism 
to construct and justify “regimes of destruction and hatred all over the world.”24 
Specifically, Alfred identifies five dogmas of imperial Christianity that have been 
used to naturalize global imperial processes: 
The [biblical] monotheistic belief system and worldview is ideally suited to be 
the justification for [imperial] subjugation and genocide. [1] It trumpets one 
right way; singularity; [2] judgement and condemnation; [3] the righteousness 
of believers, who are chosen people by birth or through conversion; [4] the 
doctrine of suffering in the here and now for heavenly reward in the afterlife; 
and [5] strictures against questioning authority. Empire, the root and source of 
the world system confronting us today, needed a doctrine, and in the 
xenophobic, retributive, monotheist tradition, it found its perfect match.25 
 
As honourable men and public philosophers, Alfred and Spinoza deconstruct and 
reinterpret each of these five dogmas with their respective biblical criticisms based 
on the universal principles of love and justice.26  
                                                                                                                                        
 
22 Ibid., 164.  
 
23 Ibid. Grant Havers has perceptively argued that Spinoza was so intent on protecting the Bible 
from being used as a pretext for terrorism and hatred that he proposed restrictions on freedom of 
expression rights. See Grant Havers, “Was Spinoza a Liberal?,” The Political Science Reviewer 
(2007): 143-174.  
 
24 Wasáse, 109.  
 
25 Ibid., 108-109.  
 
26 While there is a general scholarly consensus that Spinoza is the founder of biblical criticism 
there are subtle differences of opinion on what grounds he can be called its founder. Leo Strauss, for 
example, argues Spinoza’s historical approach and the themes and goals of his study of the Bible 
A Post-Delgamuukw Philosophical Feast:  
Feeding the Ancestral Desire for Peaceful Coexistence   
95 
In response to the first dogma of singularity, our philosophical guests reject 
imperial Christianity’s pretentious claim to be the “one right way” and alternatively 
promote religious pluralism. Maintaining that the dogma of singularity has justified 
the imposition of Euroamerican structures on indigenous people as the one right 
political way, Alfred argues overcoming this dogma involves a “self-conscious 
intellectual process of deconstructing the religious and philosophical justifications 
for imperialism.”27 One way to transcend the mentality of the “one right way,” 
according to Alfred, is to recognize that “there is no wisdom that is detached from 
nature in all of its diversity and complexity.” 28 To prevent against interpretations of 
nature that justify oppressive practices, Alfred interprets the underlying force of the 
universe to be love.29 Through Alfred’s ecological hermeneutic, the variety in 
nature discloses the way in which the universal force of love is revealed to 
indigenous peoples in diverse ways. Similar to Alfred’s pluralist interpretation of 
nature as teaching universal love, Spinoza develops a method of interpreting the 
Bible that “scarcely differs from the method of interpreting nature, but agrees with 
                                                                                                                                        
alone make him the rightful founder of biblical criticism. See Spinoza’s Critique of Religion 
(Chicago, IL: The University Press of Chicago, 1965), 137. In comparison, Nadler argues that it is 
not so much the historical approach or the themes and goals of his study of the Bible so much as it is 
the extent to which Spinoza pushed the envelope in his historical approach. See A Book Forged in 
Hell, 107. In contrast with Strauss and Nadler, Yirmiyahu Yovel argues Spinoza is a co-founder of 
biblical criticism on the merits of his more radical methodological approach to the Bible which 
effectively de-deified the text. See Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Adventures of Immanence 
(Princeton, New Jersey, 1989), 19. In agreement with Levene, I will argue that Spinoza’s action-
oriented concept of the sacred is what makes his biblical criticism valuable for contemporary 
scholarship.  
 
27 Wasáse, 109.  
 
28 Ibid.   
 
29 Ibid., 249.  
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it completely” in terms of foregrounding love.30 To promote the practice of love, 
Spinoza establishes his method of interpretation on an action-oriented conception of 
the sacred:  
A thing is called sacred and divine which is designated for exercising piety and 
religion; and it will be sacred only so long as human beings use it religiously. 
For if they were to stop being pious, at the same time it would stop being sacred 
as well. And if they were to dedicate it to perpetrating impious things, then the 
same things that was sacred before would be rendered unclean and profane.31 
 
Spinoza’s action-oriented notion of the sacred is premised on the belief that 
“nothing absolutely outside the mind is sacred or profane or impure except with 
respect to the mind itself.”32 Spinoza’s definition of the sacred is not relativistic. As 
Nancy Levene insightfully observes, Spinoza is not saying that nothing is truly 
sacred but that “sacrality can never be singular.”33 This means that the Bible is only 
sacred in relation to readers who understand the Bible as a text that promotes love 
and justice and who translate this understanding into ethical-spiritual action. On this 
reading, imperial Christianity profanes the biblical text to the degree it violates the 
universal principles of love and justice. More significantly, Spinoza’s definition of 
                                                 
30 TPT, 84. I am indebted to Levene’s commentary of chapter 7 which illustrates how Spinoza 
can be read as indirectly interpreting nature as revealing the universal of love. See Levene, Spinoza’s 
Revelation, 116, 129: “What is more striking is the fact that they [the Bible and nature] are to be 
linked through interpretation –  we are to interpret one the way we interpret the other, and this 
cannot be simply about reading Scripture as a scientific entity, because nature, for Spinoza, is not 
simply a scientific entity. . . In the case of Scripture, the notion of the most universal refers to those 
actions that are commended to all people universally, i.e., universal maxims, which Spinoza sums up 
here as the worship of God and the love of the neighbour. What Spinoza doesn’t say here, but which 
enables us to see yet a further connection between Scripture and nature, is that motion and rest, 
cause and effect, are not, for human beings, the most universal feature of nature. For human beings, 
the most universal feature of nature – the feature that ‘is in almost everyone’s mouth’ – is man is 
God to man.”  
 
31 TPT, 148.  
 
32 Ibid., 149.  
 
33 Levene, Spinoza’s Revelation, 130.  
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the sacred implies that “if the Bible must in some sense be interpreted like all other 
books, then all other books must be interpreted like the Bible.”34 In the context of 
contemporary indigenous-church relations, Spinoza’s mind-dependent, action-
oriented notion of the sacred acknowledges the sacredness of nature and indigenous 
spiritual practices insofar as these “texts” equally elicit acts of love and justice. In 
place of imperial Christianity’s dogma of singularity, then, Alfred and Spinoza offer 
a non-imperial, eco-biblical alternative hermeneutic which recognizes the diverse 
ways love and justice are revealed.  
 Our philosophical guests critique the second dogma of imperial 
Christianity—“judgement and condemnation”—as a superstitious belief that 
controls people with fear and oppresses the freedom to philosophize promoted by 
their ancestral traditions. In Wasáse, Alfred reflects on the way an “authoritarian” 
reading of the Bible has historically created paralyzing fear amongst indigenous 
peoples.35 For example, he highlights how the Kariwiio, a nineteenth-century 
political text authored by the Prophet Handsome Lake who drew partly from the 
Mohawk Nation’s Great Law of Peace for his ideas, has been given an authoritarian 
reading by Christianized Mohawks:  
                                                 
34 Levene attributes this felicitous phrase to Brayton Polka. For Levene’s commentary that 
builds on Polka’s phrase, see, Spinoza’s Revelation, 131: “Reading the Bible shows us what 
reading any thing – text, person, God – involves. This, however is not to secularize the Bible any 
more than it is to sacralize other texts. . . This notion of the sacred is grounded in Spinoza’s 
reading of the Bible. That is, the Bible is the book that claims that sacrality is about piety above 
all. But for Spinoza, this connection of piety and interpretation is also true of other texts (and 
things like God, human beings, nations).” Compare with Polka Philosophy and Religion, Volume 
1, 104: “There is no word, no text, no ritual etc. that cannot be rendered sacred (as the Bible is 
sacred) insofar. . . as it expresses and fosters loving commitment to existence, to human respect 
and dignity.” 
 
35 Wasáse, 145.  
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We think more like our Christian-influenced conservative colonizers than like 
the free-thinking philosophical warriors our ancestors were. By solidifying the 
moralistic aspects of the Kariwiio into a formal code to judge and control social 
behaviours within our communities, our way of being Rotinohshonni. . . has 
turned Handsome Lake’s teachings into an actual religion akin to and 
supplementing the controlling Christianity brought to our people by 
missionaries. Kanikonriio, reasonableness, has been replaced with 
Kanikonraksa, unreasonableness, in our minds and in our culture because of the 
controlling power of superstition and the patterns of moral sanctions that are so 
much a part of what the Handsome Lake code has become to our people.36 
 
To liberate the Kariwiio from an authoritarian reading that emphasizes judgement 
and condemnation, Alfred draws on Mohawk scholar Thohahoken’s indigenous re-
reading of the Kariwiio as a political text. “Viewed through a political rather than 
moral lens, Kariwiio points not to internal witch hunts, but to resurgence and 
survival.”37 Alfred’s reinterpretation of the Kariwiio does not imply an oppositional 
attitude towards Christianity as a whole. While Alfred condemns colonial versions 
of Christianity that promote “authoritarian” readings, he respects “indigenized 
forms of Christianity” for providing “moral bearing” to older generations and 
foundational teachings for sobriety from alcohol and drugs.38 Alfred’s positive 
remarks about Christianity suggest he does not endorse an oppositional relation 
between Christianity and indigenous spirituality and traditions. Rather, it is in the 
non-oppositional separation of Christianity and indigenous traditions that the 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 198.  
 
37 Ibid.  
 
38 See Wasáse, 145: “The role of Christianity, as distinct from the institution of the church, 
among our people has always been and remains complex: indigenized forms of Christianity practised 
in Onkwehowe communities have provided moral bearing for many of our people, especially in 
previous generations. And because of the strong affiliation between alcohol and drug treatment 
programs and Christian teachings, Christianity has become in effect the foundation for sobriety for 
many people. Who can argue against these things being on the whole positive for our people?” 
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Mohawk people can philosophize in the spirit of their free-thinking warrior 
ancestors. 
Similar to Alfred’s separation of Christianity and the Code of Handsome 
Lake, Spinoza argues that the freedom to philosophize is best secured through the 
non-oppositional separation of theology and philosophy. Like Alfred, Spinoza is 
critical of how superstition, expressed in authoritarian readings of the Bible, 
generates fear and teaches the people to “despise reason and nature.”39 To liberate 
his fellow Dutch citizens from the controlling power of superstition, Spinoza’s 
employs the concept of accommodation in his approach to reading the Bible. On 
Spinoza’s reading, not only does God accommodate his message to the 
preconceived opinions of the prophets and apostles, the authors of the various 
biblical texts subsequently accommodate their revelations to their audiences’ cast of 
mind.40 Spinoza gives the following example of Jesus accommodating his message 
to the preconceived opinions of the Pharisees:  
For example, when he [Jesus] said to the Pharisees (see Mt. 12:26), And if Satan 
throws Satan out, he is divided against himself; how, therefore would his 
kingdom stand, he meant nothing except to convince the Pharisees [of their 
stubbornness and ignorance] on the basis of their own principles, and not to 
teach that there are Demons or some kingdom of Demons.41  
 
On this reading, the existence of demons and Hell, the metaphysical preconditions 
for the dogma of judgement and condemnation, are simply the preconceived 
opinions of the religious elite Pharisees. With his concept of accommodation, 
Spinoza is able here to separate superstition from theology or true religion (i.e. the 
                                                 
39 TPT, 83.  
 
40 Ibid., 29, 161.  
 
41 Ibid., 30.  
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message of universal love and justice). Spinoza goes on to separate true religion 
(beliefs that promote the obedient practice of love and justice) from philosophy 
(rational beliefs that lead to truth) to show that religion (as opposed to superstition) 
actually promotes the freedom to philosophize. Since theology and philosophy have 
different aims and since theology is based on biblical histories and language while 
philosophy is based on reason, theology is not opposed to philosophy. Rather, as 
Spinoza famously concludes at the end of chapter 14 of TPT, faith actually 
encourages the people to freely philosophize:  
Faith, therefore, grants to each the highest freedom of philosophizing, so that he 
might think whatever he wants concerning any matters without impropriety; and 
it condemns as heretics and schismatics only those who teach opinions urging 
stubbornness, hatreds, quarrels, and anger. And on the other hand, it only 
considers those faithful who urge Justice and Charity in accordance with the 
strength of their reason and faculties.42 
 
On both Alfred and Spinoza’s readings, the dogma of judgement and condemnation, 
whether maintained by conservative Christian colonizers or Calvinists, is simply a 
superstition wielded by the religious and political elites to control the people with 
fear.  
 Our philosophical guests critique the third dogma of imperial Christianity—
the notion of a chosen people—and in its place provide a reinterpretation that 
effectively strips the dogma of any pretensions to intellectual or moral superiority. 
Drawing on the work of biblical scholar Donald Akenson, Alfred highlights how 
imperial Christianity’s dogma of chosenness associates “One True God” with one 
group of people, its tribe or converts, and interprets the god of any other people as 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 167.  
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traif (non-kosher).”43 On this view, the gods of all other peoples must either be 
destroyed (by destroying its adherents) or denigrated as “misled, mistaken, or non-
existent.”44 Alfred writes that this dogma has been projected onto the political 
realm, suffusing it with “patterns of Western thought and modes of governance.”45 
For example, in a colonial context, Alfred argues the dogma of chosenness has 
served to justify the belief in the intellectual and moral superiority of Euroamerican 
culture. “The basic substance of the problem of colonialism,” Alfred writes in 
Wasáse, “is the belief in the superiority and universality of Euroamerican culture, 
especially the concepts of individual rights as the highest expression of human 
freedom, representative democracy as being the best guarantor of peace and order, 
and capitalism as the only means to achieve the satisfaction of human material 
needs.”46 For Alfred, the monotheist dogma of chosenness has functioned to justify 
colonial privilege on Turtle Island. In stark contrast, Alfred provides an alternative 
understanding of “chosenness.” In PPR, he explains that the stewardship principle 
practiced by indigenous peoples since time immemorial reflects a “spiritual 
connection to the land established by the Creator [which] gives human beings 
special responsibilities within the areas they occupy as indigenous peoples, linking 
them in a ‘natural’ way to their territories.”47 Unlike the imperial version, Alfred’s 
indigenous version of chosenness is strictly about protecting and ensuring the 
                                                 
43 Wasáse, 108.  
 
44 Ibid.  
 
45 Ibid.  
 
46 Ibid., 109.  
 
47 PPR, 85.  
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sustainability of indigenous peoples’ homelands. The stewardship principle carries 
no pretension of intellectual or moral superiority.  
Similar to Alfred’s indigenous notion of chosenness, Spinoza’s non-imperial 
interpretation of Hebrew chosenness disallows any claim to intrinsic superiority 
over others. In chapter 3 of TPT, Spinoza argues that since intelligence and moral 
virtue are common to human nature, the “choosing” of the Hebrews only applied to 
the temporal happiness and advantages of their imperium secured by their devotion 
and obedience to God’s laws.48 Spinoza further argues that Moses originally 
conceived the notion of Hebrew chosenness as a political tactic to elicit obedience 
from his people. In Spinoza’s words, Moses only spoke of chosenness to “suit the 
grasp of the Hebrews to admonish them and bind them more to the worship of 
God.”49 Thus, the biblical passages that describe the Hebrews as chosen people are 
mere accommodations to suit the “childish grasp” of the Hebrews who did not 
understand true blessedness.50 Furthermore, it is not “sufficiently established” for 
Spinoza that the Hebrews were the only nation that were prescribed laws by God 
through prophetic revelation51 That is, in contrast with the imperial version, 
Spinoza’s interpretation of chosenness does not exclude the possibility that God 
                                                 
48 TPT, 34.  
 
49 Ibid., 32.  
 
50 Ibid., 31.  
 
51 Ibid., 34.  
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accommodated himself to the preconceived opinions of other nations and 
established laws and principles for the benefit of their self-governance.52  
In addition to rejecting all claims to moral and intellectual superiority, 
Alfred and Spinoza’s alternative non-imperial interpretations of chosenness are 
oriented towards future ends rather than privileged origins. For Alfred, indigenous 
peoples continue to carry responsibilities as stewards of their homelands. In terms 
of participating in the modern economy, these responsibilities involve resisting 
consumerism and unrestrained growth in an effort to ensure the long-term health 
and stability of the people and the land.53 Likewise, while Spinoza’s conception of 
chosenness draws from the ancient Hebrew past, he directs his notion towards the 
future of Jewish nationalism. Prefiguring the Zionist movement, Spinoza writes at 
the end of chapter 3 of TPT that the Hebrews “may someday, given the occasion—
as human affairs are changeable—erect their imperium once more, and God will 
choose them anew.”54 For both Alfred and Spinoza, then, being “chosen” does not 
imply a fixed state of intellectual or moral superiority over non-chosen others. 
Rather, it signifies and prefigures intergenerational responsibilities, self-
determination, and nation-building against insurmountable odds.  
 Alfred and Spinoza critique the fourth dogma of imperial Christianity—
suffering in the present for heavenly reward in an afterlife—as a superstition that 
needlessly keeps people in bondage to the sad affects. Alfred criticizes the historical 
                                                 
52 For a historical analysis of how the dogma of chosenness contributed to the formation of 
American racism, see Ronald Sanders, Lost Tribes and Promised Lands: The Origins of American 
Racism (New York, NY: HarperPerennial, 1992).  
 
53 PPR, 85.  
 
54 TPT, 42.  
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role the church has played in indoctrinating indigenous peoples to accept the 
“biblical ethic of suffering.”55 This biblical ethic has only served to normalize 
indigenous peoples’ colonial oppression by having them pursue, in Alfred words, 
“transcendent rather than immanent redemption.”56 Spinoza similarly critiques the 
commonly held belief in a heavenly reward in an afterlife. In Ethica, Spinoza 
observes how the majority of people regard morality, religion, and everything 
related to strength of character to be “burdens” which they hope to put down after 
death and “receive a reward for their bondage.”57 He attributes this widespread 
indoctrination to the work of theologians who teach that God approves of 
humanity’s lack of power and misfortune. Spinoza refers to these theologians as 
“the superstitious” because they “ascribe to virtue our tears, sighs, fear, and other 
things of that kind, which are [actually] signs of a weak mind.”58 
 In response to the superstitious teachings of colonialists and Calvinists, 
Alfred and Spinoza commit their philosophies of immanence to liberating and 
strengthening the indoctrinated people. For example, to strengthen indigenous 
peoples after five hundred years of colonization, Alfred models his indigenous 
manifesto on the Rotinohshonni condolence ceremony. In contrast with the 
transcendent hope offered by imperial Christianity, Alfred explains how his 
philosophy of condolence emphasizes immanent hope and redemption:  
                                                 
55 Wasáse, 145.  
 
56 Ibid.  
 
57 E V p41s.  
 
58 E IV p63s and p45s. 
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The condolence ritual pacifies the minds and emboldens the hearts of mourners 
by transforming loss into strength. . . Condolence is the mourning of a family’s 
loss by those who remain strong and clear-minded. It is a gift promising 
comfort, recovery of balance, and revival of spirit to those who are suffering. . . 
It revives the spirit of the people and brings forward new leaders embodying 
ancient wisdom and new hope. This book embodies the same hope.59 
 
In his subsequent book, Wasáse, Alfred continues to emphasize the theme of 
immanence by suggesting that the indigenous struggle for freedom has an intrinsic 
reward. “As people taking up the challenge of confronting imperialism,” Alfred 
advises, “we should take heart from what Gandhi said at his death fast, when he told 
people that, for him, after all he had been through, fulfillment lay ‘in the effort, not 
the attainment.’”60 Like Alfred’s Rotinohshonni concept of condolence, Spinoza’s 
concept of divine law challenges the doctrine of suffering in the here and now and 
the notion of a transcendent reward. In chapter 4 of TPT, Spinoza makes clear that 
the divine law has an intrinsic reward: “[W]e see that the highest reward of the 
divine law is the law itself—namely, knowing God and loving him out of true 
freedom and a full and steadfast spirit—the punishment being deprivation of these 
and slavery of the flesh, or an unsteadfast and vacillating spirit.”61 In stressing the 
intrinsic reward of divine law, Spinoza rejects the biblical ethic of suffering as a 
superstition that maintains “the good is what brings sadness, and the evil, what 
brings joy62.” In place of the ethic of suffering, Spinoza unapologetically promotes 
                                                 
59 PPR, 9-10.  
 
60 Wasáse, 282.  
 
61 TPT, 47. Spinoza reiterates the intrinsic reward of obeying the divine law in his letter to Jacob 
Ostens written a year after the anonymous publication of the TPT. “The reward of virtue is virtue 
itself,” Spinoza informs his friend, “while the punishment of folly and weakness is folly itself” 
(Ep43). 
 
62 E IV app XXXI.  
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the ethic of joy: “[The] greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater the 
perfection to which we pass, that is, the more we must participate in the divine 
nature.”63 In place of the fourth dogma, then, Alfred and Spinoza call the people to 
active states of joyful engagement in politics and religion as intrinsically rewarding 
activities of empowerment.   
 Finally, our philosophical guests expose the fifth dogma of imperial 
Christianity—uncritical acceptance of authority—as antithetical to the radical 
person and non-imperial ministry of Jesus Christ. Recall that Alfred criticizes the 
majority of biblical monotheists for forgetting that Jesus was a radical who 
challenged the authority of Roman imperial institutions.64 Among the forgetful ones 
are indigenous people and organizations that uncritically draw on the ideals of 
Christianity as a cultural foundation for political activism within the legal and 
constitutional structures of the colonial state to secure civil rights. That is, rather 
than challenging colonial authority, these organizations buttress the moral 
foundation of the state’s imperial version of Christianity.65 “On such a foundation,” 
Alfred rhetorically asks, “is it any wonder. . . [indigenous organizations] have failed 
                                                                                                                                        
 
63 E IV p45s. For a scholar who strongly celebrates Spinoza’s ethic of joy, see Gilles Deleuze’s 
two texts, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughlin (New York: Zone Books, 
1992), 271-272: “One may see Spinoza, through the scholia of Part Four of the Ethics, forming a 
truly ethical conception of man, founded on joy and joyful passions. This he opposed to a 
superstitious or satirical conception, founded on sad passions alone. . . Spinoza’s naturalism is 
defined by speculative affirmation in his theory of substance, and by practical joy in his conception 
of modes. A philosophy of pure affirmation, the Ethics is also a philosophy of the joy corresponding 
to such affirmation”; and Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 28-29: “The Ethics is necessarily an ethics 
of joy: only joy is worthwhile, joy remains, bringing us near to action, and to the bliss of 
action…The entire ethics is a voyage in immanence; but immanence is the unconscious itself, and 
the conquest of the unconscious. Ethical joy is the correlate of speculative affirmation.” 
 
64 Wasáse, 108.  
 
65 Ibid., 104.  
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to mount an effective challenge against the institutions that control us still, or to 
lead us in the revitalization and restrengthening of our people?”66 In other words, 
Christianity places strictures on questioning colonial authority in contexts where it 
has been co-opted to serve as the religious foundation of the colonial state. Hence, 
Jesus’ message is de-radicalized insofar as it is integrated into the legal structures of 
the colonial state. 
 Just as Alfred portrays Jesus as an independent radical who challenged 
imperial institutions, Spinoza interprets Jesus as a revolutionary who empowered 
his disciples to critique oppressive forces in the name of love and justice. In chapter 
19 of TPT, Spinoza considers the way in which Jesus granted authority to his 
disciples to share the message of love and justice without official authorization 
from sovereign power. Spinoza finds Jesus’ ministry so subversive that he appears 
to caution his readers against imitating him:  
If someone now asks, however, by what right Christ’s disciples—being private 
men—were therefore able to preach the religion, I say that they did so by right 
of the power they received from Christ against impure spirits. . . everyone is 
bound to keep faith even with a Tyrant, except one to whom God has promised 
special help against the Tyrant by a certain revelation. Therefore, no one is 
permitted to take an example from it unless he also has the power to make 
miracles.67 
 
When this cautious passage is read along with Spinoza’s remarks about Christ in 
chapter 14 of TPT, it is clear that Spinoza slyly and subversively implies that all 
people are Christ’s radical disciples who hold no regard for imperial authority.68 
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67 TPT, 224.  
 
68 I am drawing here on Polka’s analysis, Between Philosophy and Religion: Spinoza, the Bible, 
and Modernity. Volume 2: Politics and Ethics, 217-218:  “[W]hen Spinoza states that to believe that 
God directs everything with mercy and grace is to know Christ according to the spirit and to have 
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That is, far from placing strictures on questioning authority, Spinoza understands 
Christ’s message to encourage all peoples to contest and challenge any authority 
that violates the universal standards of love and justice. Thus, just as Alfred reminds 
monotheists that Jesus himself actively challenged imperial institutions, Spinoza 
reminds his readers that the God of the Bible, as the “immanent critique of all 
tyranny,” commands them to do likewise.69  
Taken together, Alfred and Spinoza’s biblical criticisms and non-imperial, 
eco-friendly hermeneutics can effectively serve to challenge settler institutions that 
continue to superstitiously reproduce imperial Christianity. In this regard, Brayton 
Polka’s Spinozistic analysis of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is 
important to our dialogue. Drawing on Spinoza’s theory of sovereignty, Polka 
translates the two principles of the Charter—the rule of law and the supremacy of 
God—in biblical terms to mean that settler society has a covenantal responsibility 
to practice respect for historical difference. Despite this responsibility, Polka 
perceptively notes that it “has frequently been the God of the Bible, above all, the 
God of Christians (in their various sects). . . in whose name the most horrendous 
acts eclipsing the supremacy of God and violating the rule of law have been 
done.”70 Building on Polka’s analysis, Alfred and Spinoza’s biblical criticisms and 
                                                                                                                                        
Christ within [as he does in the seventh dogma found in chapter 14 of the TPT], it is evident that 
everyone is (can be) the disciple of Christ, that everyone can follow his universal, public, biblical 
(that is, Hebrew) teaching of charity and justice. Can one, consequently, not claim that the right to 
resist tyrannical authority flows from the power received from Christ (through the apostles) to 
preach throughout the world against those unclean spirits who subvert the universal teaching of 
justice and charity?” 
 
69 This phrase is Levene’s, see Spinoza’s Revelation, 205.  
 
70 Polka, “The Supremacy of God and the Rule of Law in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms: A Theologico-Political Analysis,” in McGill Law Journal 32 (1987), 862.  
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hermeneutics have something to teach the faithful on both sides of the colonial 
divide. While Alfred highlights for faithful settlers how their society has historically 
used Christianity to justify the horrendous violation of the Charter that is Canadian 
colonialism, Spinoza highlights for Christ-following indigenous peoples that their 
land-based spiritual practices do not need to be subordinated or denigrated in their 
efforts to be faithful. For Spinoza, the Bible and indigenous spiritual practices are 
equally sacred insofar as both express and foster “loving commitment to existence, 
to human respect and dignity.”71 Accordingly, in the aftermath of deconstructing 
imperial Christianity, what Alfred and Spinoza leave us with is an open covenantal 
space of peaceful coexistence.  
3.3  Constructive Tools for Democratic Spiritual Praxis  
In this newfound covenantal space, we can now attend to the way in which 
Alfred and Spinoza practice self-conscious traditionalism as a means to making 
peace with the church as understood in their historically different locations. While 
our philosophical guests similarly regard ecclesiastical institutions to be the source 
of spiritual discord and conflict in their societies, they address different church-
created problems that necessitate different solutions.72 For Alfred, the overall effect 
                                                 
71 This phrase is Polka’s, see Philosophy and Religion: Volume 1, 104.  
 
72 It is important to note that Alfred and Spinoza do not think all biblical sects and movements 
are oppressive. Alfred, for example, expresses deep respect for the role liberation theology played in 
the Zapatista movement in the Chiapas region of southern Mexico that helped liberate the Mayan 
peoples from mixed-blood retribution squads. He also notes how the spiritual Christian anarchism of 
Leo Tolstoy and the utopian socialist Judaism of Martin Buber have had similar liberating effects 
around the world. See Wasase, 176 n. 10 and 281. Likewise, Spinoza valued and associated with 
several of the Christian sects that dissented from the Dutch Reformed Church, from the Collegiants 
and Quakers to the Anabaptists and Mennonites. Spinoza admired these sects for attempting to 
develop a more egalitarian and inward approach to spiritual matters compared with the hierarchical 
and dogmatic approach taken by the Calvinist Reformed Church. See Nadler, A Book Forged in 
Hell, 24-25.  
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of the church on Turtle Island has been the experience of spiritual defeatism among 
indigenous peoples, a situation which calls for the regeneration of indigenous 
spiritualities.73 In seventeenth century Calvinist Holland, Spinoza faced the problem 
of competing church sects embroiled in dogmatic disputes. He believed that this 
situation called for an urgent re-reading of the biblical texts that could create an 
atmosphere of inter-denominational tolerance in his predominantly Christian Dutch 
society.74 Despite these differences, Alfred and Spinoza similarly seek to transcend 
the defeatism and division plaguing their societies by developing democratic, 
action-oriented, spiritual beliefs systems based on love and justice that bring their 
people together in the common work of peacemaking.  
In their efforts to interpret their spiritual traditions anew, our philosophical 
guests confront and creatively resolve the hermeneutic problem posed by language 
loss. In Wasáse, Alfred recognizes that as a result of colonization the vast majority 
of indigenous people do not speak their ancestral languages and that language 
fluency is in serious decline generally.75 This poses a serious dilemma as Alfred 
believes indigenous languages are “the way to becoming rooted in an indigenous 
worldview and way of living one’s life.”76 Likewise, Spinoza highlights how 
biblical interpretation requires a “full knowledge of the [ancient] Hebrew 
language.”77 The “great difficulty,” Spinoza observes, is that the “ancient 
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74 TPT, xx.  
 
75 Wasáse, 245.  
 
76 Ibid., 256.  
 
77 TPT, 91.  
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cultivators of the Hebrew language left nothing of the foundation and teaching of 
this language to posterity.”78 Just as Alfred explains the loss of indigenous 
languages to be the effects of colonization, Spinoza attributes the loss of the 
Hebrew language to the many “massacres and persecutions” endured by the 
“Hebrew nation” which left it with “some few fragments of a few books.”79 Alfred 
and Spinoza address the problem posed by loss of language in different but no less 
effective and creative ways. While Alfred believes that language is the primary way 
of learning an indigenous worldview and living an authentic indigenous existence, 
he recognizes that it is not the only way. “Songs, pictures, ceremony, and many 
varied art and cultural forms contain knowledge and can be read for insight, 
knowledge, and guidance on how to be indigenous.”80 Therefore, Alfred concludes, 
it is “without a doubt possible to be Onkwehonwe without knowing an indigenous 
language.”81 By contrast, Spinoza admits that although the loss of the ancient 
Hebrew language makes it impossible to understand the “impenetrable things” of 
scripture, it does not pose a problem for understanding its simple and clear moral 
lessons.82 “For the lessons of true piety,” Spinoza reassures his readers, “are 
expressed in the words used most, since they are very common and no less simple 
and easy for understanding.”83 Aside from the moral lessons clearly found in the 
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biblical texts, Spinoza regards the rest of scripture as “matters more of curiosity 
than of utility.”84 These creative ways of resolving the issue of language loss 
demonstrate Alfred and Spinoza’s commitment to the hermeneutical work involved 
in foregrounding the universal principles of love and justice revealed in their 
traditions.  
By interpreting what remains of their ancient spiritual traditions as 
transparently communicating basic universal principles of love and justice, Alfred 
and Spinoza categorically reject the popular mystifications projected onto their 
traditions. Like language loss, Alfred attributes the recent rise in “mystical forms of 
[indigenous] traditionalism” to be part of the “syndrome of colonial behaviours.”85 
As indigenous spiritual practices meet real needs of belonging and identity in 
human beings, Alfred strongly insists that “ceremony and ritual are not mystical.”86 
Similarly, Spinoza criticizes the theologians of his time for claiming to interpret 
“mysteries in scripture [that] can be explained by no human tongue,” but are 
nothing other than the “comments of Aristotle or Plato.”87 Just as Alfred insists 
ceremonies need no mystification to fulfill real human needs, Spinoza insists that 
religion needs “no superstitious embellishments” and that its “splendour is taken 
away when it is embellished with such fantasies.”88 
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For Alfred and Spinoza equally, the “splendour” of their spiritual traditions 
is found in the way in which they uniquely reveal the universal message of love. 
With the help of his Mohawk friend and scholar Thohahoken, Alfred unpacks the 
meaning of Konoronkwa, a Mohawk word which is loosely translated into English 
as “love.” Alfred explains that the full cultural meaning of Konoronkwa conveys “a 
sense of what one values and reflects the universal connection we feel to other 
beings and the force of love that binds us together as humans.”89 Konoronkwa, he 
goes on to share, is the “connective material that bound Onkwehonwe together 
when ‘interests’ and ‘rights’ were not a part of [indigenous peoples’] 
vocabularies.”90 Drawing on Thohahoken’s reading of the Rotinohshonni creation 
story, Alfred explains how the Konoronkwa word links the three notions of 
“female-insurmountable-ours” to describe the protagonist Sky Woman’s inner 
desire to help humanity. Sky Woman teaches Konoronkwa as the “foundational 
principle of our conception of the good life” and that practicing Konoronkwa in 
interpersonal relations “relies on basic human decency and compassion.”91 Alfred 
therefore concludes that Konoronkwa or love is the “force or reason of an 
indigenous existence” and the only authentic way to replicate “the quality of an 
indigenous existence.”92 
Similar to how Alfred interprets Konoronkwa to be the central message of 
the Rotinohshonni creation story, Spinoza interprets the foundation of all the 
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biblical narratives to be the universal principle of caritas, a Latin word translated 
into the English as charity or love. “For on the basis of Scripture itself,” Spinoza 
writes, “without any difficulty or ambiguity, we have perceived the sum of it to be 
love God above all and one’s neighbour as oneself.”93 Spinoza goes so far as to say 
that if love is removed as the foundation of the biblical narratives then “the whole 
architecture sinks in one fall.”94 Just as Alfred regards Sky Woman to be a teacher 
of Konoronkwa, Spinoza regards the Apostle John to be a teacher of God as 
Caritas:  
John also teaches this expressly in verse 13 of the same chapter. Through this, 
he says, we know that we remain in him and he remains in us: that he has given 
us of his Spirit, namely, Charity. Indeed, since no one sees God, he therefore 
concludes that no one experiences or turns his spirit to God except solely on the 
basis of Charity toward his neighbour, and so, no one can acknowledge any 
other attribute of God either, besides this charity insofar as he participates in it95  
 
Whether it is indigenous creation stories or apostolic epistles, our guests interpret 
the divine protagonists of their traditions—Sky Woman and God—to clearly reveal 
the universal principle of love.96 
                                                 
93 TPT, 153.  
 
94 Ibid.  
 
95 Ibid., 163. Spinoza actually quotes 1 John 4:13 on his original title page for TPT.  
 
96 It is important to note that while Alfred and Spinoza highlight the way in which the golden rule 
of love is revealed in their respective spiritual traditions, our guests do not believe love to be a divine 
order from above. Rather, both Alfred and Spinoza regard love to be a rational action. See, Wasáse, 
54: “Even in regard to the ‘Golden Rule’ basic principles that transcend moral systems and cultures. 
. . these should be understood as rational, intelligent guidelines, or the wisdom of the ages, rather 
than divine orders.” Spinoza likewise rejects the notion of God as a king making divine orders, TPT, 
50: “We accordingly conclude that God is not described as a lawgiver or prince and called just, 
compassionate, etc., except as befits the grasp of the vulgar, and solely from a deficiency of 
knowledge” Also see Spinoza’s rational understanding of love in E IV p73s: “For these and all 
things which relate to true life and religion are easily proven, namely, that hate is to be conquered by 
returning love, and that everyone who is led by reason desires for others also the good he wants for 
himself.” Although our philosophical guests understand love in rational terms to be a universal 
ethical guideline, they seriously engage their spiritual traditions—despite its “supernaturalism” and 
its associated histories of religious war and tribal division—because Alfred and Spinoza equally 
A Post-Delgamuukw Philosophical Feast:  
Feeding the Ancestral Desire for Peaceful Coexistence   
115 
 As a complement to the universal principle of love, Alfred and Spinoza 
equally conceive the principle of justice to be centred on achieving harmony and 
practiced in covenantal relationship. In PPR, Alfred defines justice as “the process 
of healing relationships so that each element in creation can live its natural power 
and fulfil its responsibility.”97 This “indigenous conception of justice,” Alfred 
explains, “goes beyond humanism and environmentalism to touch the realm of the 
spirit. . . Justice embodies the state of balance that exists when a community has 
achieved harmony in all the relationships out of which it is formed, on both 
individual and collective levels.”98 While Alfred articulates a relational conception 
of justice grounded in indigenous philosophy, Spinoza endorses a biblically-rooted 
notion of justice as a covenantal responsibility. Throughout TPT, Spinoza interprets 
the biblical texts as communicating the accommodated message that God desires 
from humanity “no other knowledge of himself but the knowledge of his divine 
Justice and Charity—that is, such attributes of God as human beings can imitate by 
a certain plan of living.”99 When Spinoza shifts his discussion in TPT from religion 
to politics, he defines justice as the “steadfastness of spirit in rendering to each what 
belongs to him on the basis of civil right.”100 Spinoza admits that this definition of 
                                                                                                                                        
maintain that universal principles and values like love and justice are only meaningful to a people as 
expressed in their distinct traditions. For this point, I am indebted to Dr. Grant Havers and his 
question posed to me during my oral examination which allowed me to clarify this universal-
historical nexus in the context of Marxist concerns about religion and supernaturalism. Also see c. 1 
n. 87 for a scholar who eases Marxist concerns by reconciling Marxist historicism with South Asian 
“supernaturalism.” 
 
97 PPR, 67.  
 
98 Ibid., 69.  
 
99 TPT, 158.  
 
100 Ibid., 186.  
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justice can also be called “equity” since “those who are constituted to settle lawsuits 
are bound to have no regard for persons, but to consider everyone equal and defend 
each’s right equally, and not envy the rich or despise the poor.”101 Yet Spinoza’s 
definition of justice goes far beyond the formal adjudication of differences. “The 
things which beget harmony,” Spinoza writes in Ethica, “are those which are 
related to justice, fairness, and being honourable.”102 It is this notion of justice as a 
character disposition that is consistent with Spinoza’s reading of the biblical 
narratives that pair justice with love as divine attributes human beings are 
responsible for cultivating in their lives.103   
To explain and resolve the internal divisions facing their respective 
societies, Alfred and Spinoza employ a common strategy of separating the 
particular from the universal messages revealed in their traditions. In Wasáse, 
Alfred recognizes that the work of strengthening indigenous spiritualities 
                                                                                                                                        
 
101 Ibid.  
 
102  E IV App. XV.  
 
103 Spinoza’s relational notion of justice is unique among Western theories of justice. Alfred, for 
example, notes that “the dominant Western conception of justice is rooted in a fundamentally 
individualistic, materialistic ideal of equity or sameness.” While Alfred argues that the “cultural 
values that determine fairness in the Western conception are limited, he does acknowledge there are 
rare exceptions (although he does not mention any specific examples). I would argue that Spinoza’s 
conception of justice is one of these rare exceptions. For Alfred’s discussion of the differences 
between the dominant Western concept of justice and indigenous understandings, see PPR, 66-68. 
For an example of the dominant Western conception of justice rooted in a materialistic ideal of 
equity and an illustration of how this notion of justice adjudicates indigenous land claims, see Will 
Kymlicka’s distributive theory of justice, Multicultural Citizenship, 220: “It is important to note that 
the equality argument for land claims is not based on notions of compensatory justice. The 
compensatory argument says that because indigenous peoples were the legal owners of their 
traditional lands, and because their lands were taken away illegally, they should be compensated for 
this historical wrong. . . The idea of compensating for historical wrongs, taken to its logical 
conclusion, implies that all land which was wrongly taken from indigenous peoples in the Americas. 
. . should be returned to them. This would create massive unfairness, given that the original 
European settlers and later immigrants have produced hundreds of millions of descendants, and this 
lands the only home they know. . . In short, the equality argument situates land claims within a 
theory of distributive justice, rather than compensatory justice.”  
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necessitates addressing the internal spiritual divisions and conflicts that have always 
existed and continue to persist amongst indigenous peoples. This leads Alfred to 
envision a “unified or singular indigenous spirituality”: 
If there is unity, then all Onkwehonwe rituals and ceremonial practices, quite 
aside from how attracted or repelled people are to them because of histories of 
religion, division and conflict among Onkwehonwe, have equal validity and 
value in helping us to understand and practise an indigenous existence. 
Ceremonies are gifts to be shared, and in this time of loss and disconnection, 
sharing and learning together and building unity among Onkwehonwe through 
ceremonial relations is a powerful example of anti-imperial practice.104  
 
To support his vision of a unified indigenous spirituality, Alfred identifies the 
common universal teachings reflected in different indigenous spiritual practices:  
There is nothing unique taught in the Lodge, the Longhouse, or Hogan or 
through the tobacco or sweetgrass. All over the world, all indigenous peoples’ 
dances and songs tell us the same things. Wherever people are still close to the 
earth and living in harmony with nature, the teachings are the same. The 
ceremonies do more than connect us to a particular tradition or community, they 
connect us to the earth and to our true, natural existences as human beings.105 
 
For Alfred, all indigenous spiritual practices reconnect indigenous peoples to their 
true and natural existences as human beings through the teaching of the universal 
message of Konoronkwa or love.106 Like Alfred, Spinoza confronts a similar 
problem of having to negotiate historical differences amongst the various Christian 
sects of Dutch society. Given the number of divergent interpretations of scripture 
held by competing sects, Spinoza sarcastically predicts that “among the Dutch it 
will pass into the usage of a proverb: Geen ketter sonder letter [No heretic without a 
                                                 
104 Wasáse, 250.  
 
105 Ibid.   
 
106 Recall from p. 103 that Alfred regards Konoronkwa or love as “the force or reason of an 
indigenous existence” and the only authentic way to replicate “the quality of an indigenous 
existence.” See Wasáse, 254.  
 
A Post-Delgamuukw Philosophical Feast:  
Feeding the Ancestral Desire for Peaceful Coexistence   
118 
text].”107 To unite the Dutch faithful, Spinoza employs his concept of 
accommodation to shift attention from the particular opinions to the universal 
teachings of the Bible:  
For one who embraces indiscriminately everything that is found in Scripture as 
the universal and absolute teaching about God, and has not accurately known 
what has been accommodated to the grasp of the vulgar, cannot help confusing 
the opinions of the vulgar with the divine teaching [of love and justice], and 
passing off the comments and wishes of human beings as divine lessons, and 
abusing the authority of Scripture. Who, I say, does not see that this is the 
greatest cause of why there are so many sectarians, and why they teach such 
contrary opinions as lessons of faith and confirm them with many examples of 
Scripture.108  
 
For Spinoza, the divisions and conflicts between various Christian sects in Dutch 
society are essentially the result of a hermeneutical confusion between the universal 
and the particular messages of scripture. Similar to how Alfred separates the 
universal message of love from particular ceremonial teachings of them, Spinoza 
separates the “divine teaching” from the “opinions of the vulgar” in scripture.  
By clarifying the difference between the particular and the universal, the 
divine and the vulgar, Alfred and Spinoza go on to develop a democratic spiritual 
belief system based on the principles of love and justice that functions to inspire the 
people to action. In chapter 14 of TPT, Spinoza famously presents his seven 
universal dogmas to unite the various sects of Dutch society. According to Spinoza, 
there are seven key beliefs that are central to ensuring obedience to scripture:  
1. God exists 
2. God is one and unique  
3. God is omnipresent  
4. God is omnipotent 
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5. Worship and obedience to God consists solely in acts of justice and charity 
towards others 
6. Only human beings who worship and obey God experience salvation, while 
those who live to gratify their pleasures alone are lost 
7. God is merciful and forgives the sins of human beings, and those who 
believe this are more enflamed with God’s love and acknowledge Christ in 
accordance with the Spirit and Christ is in him.109  
 
What makes Spinoza’s presentation of these seven beliefs, all drawn from the 
biblical tradition, remarkably democratic is that he encourages citizens to freely 
interpret and accommodate them to their preconceived opinions. “[E]ach is bound 
to accommodate these dogmas of faith,” Spinoza advises his readers, “to suit his 
own grasp, and to interpret them to himself in the mode in which it seems easier to 
him to be able to embrace them without any hesitation, but with the spirit’s full 
consent, so that consequently he obeys God with the spirit’s complete consent.”110 
What is critically important to Spinoza is the democratic principle of consent. This 
democratic principle which guarantees the freedom to interpret according to one’s 
own conscience is noticeably absent among the various sects of Dutch society. In 
fact, Spinoza goes so far as to say that there is “nothing more wicked and pernicious 
to a republic” than the actions of Christian sects freely accommodating scripture to 
their own preconceptions while denying this very freedom to others.111 The 
democratic nature of Spinoza’s universal faith is made possible by dogma 5 which 
holds biblical faith can be substantively articulated only in the practice of love and 
justice. “For those who love Justice and Charity,” Spinoza writes, “we know 
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through this alone to be the faithful”112 In his letter to Jacob Ostens written a year 
after the publication of TPT, Spinoza clarifies that the “faithful” need not even hold 
biblical dogmas so long as they practice love and justice. “As for the Turks and the 
other Gentiles,” Spinoza writes, “if they worship God by the exercise of justice and 
by love of their neighbour, I believe that they possess the spirit of Christ and are 
saved, whatever convictions they may hold.”113 Spinoza’s fundamental aim in 
evaluating pious faith in terms of love and justice is to achieve peaceful coexistence 
amongst the various Christian sects of Dutch society:  
Therefore, he who shows the best reasons does not necessarily show the best 
faith, but he who shows the best works of Justice and Charity does. How 
salutary and how necessary this Teaching is in a republic, so that human beings 
might live peacefully and harmoniously—and, I say, how many and how great 
the causes of disturbances and wicked deeds which it might prevent—leave for 
everyone to judge.114  
 
Spinoza restates his view that spirituality is a basic precondition for achieving 
peaceful coexistence in Ethica. “But especially necessary to bring people together 
in love,” Spinoza concisely explains to his philosophical readers, “are the things 
which concern religion and morality.”115 
Just as Spinoza provides a democratic summation of biblical monotheism, 
Alfred outlines the basic beliefs of a unified indigenous spirituality to support 
democratic struggles motivated by love and justice. In HVA, Alfred references a 
journal entry written by an 18th century English captive named James Smith who 
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records the diverse range of spiritual beliefs held among the Iroquois at the time. 
Alfred interprets Smith’s entry as illustrating how the “non-Christian Iroquois belief 
system was absolutely democratic in terms of interpreting the nature of God and 
man’s obligations to the Creator.”116 Adopting this democratic Iroquois approach to 
spiritual matters, Alfred presents a summation of indigenous spirituality similar to 
how Spinoza provides a 7-dogma statement of biblical faith:  
The wisest among our elders and spiritual teachers tell us that there is a 
connection between all our peoples and that each ceremony possesses part of 
the knowledge we need to survive. What are the basics of this Onkwehonwe 
spiritual and philosophical belief system? They are simple, and I have been 
referring to them directly and indirectly throughout this book: [1] 
interdependency, [2] cycles of change, [3] balance, [4] struggle, and [5] 
rootedness.117 
 
By suggesting these principles are found throughout his book, Alfred subtly 
discloses the democratic character of his summation of indigenous spirituality. 
Wasáse is based around the themes that directly emerge from Alfred’s dialogues 
with engaged indigenous activists and scholars.118 “The reflections, meditations, 
                                                 
116 HVA, 37. Alfred includes the following excerpt from James Smith’s journal entry: “Those of 
them who reject the Roman-Catholic religion, hold that there is one great first cause, whom they call 
Owaneeyo, that rules and governs the universe. . . but they differ widely in what is pleasing or 
displeasing to this great being. Some hold that following [the] nature of their own propensities is the 
way to happiness, and cannot be displeasing to the deity. . . Others reject this opinion altogether, and 
say that following their own propensities in this manner, is neither the means to happiness nor the 
way to please the deity.” 
 
117 Wasáse, 250.  
 
118 Alfred interviews a total of nineteen indigenous people actively engaged in cultural and 
political resurgence: Mi’kmaq scholar and activist Sakej (67-75); Nuu-Chah-Nulth youth activist 
David Dennis (90-96); Nuu-Chah-Nulth activist Tahehsoomca (114-119); an anonymous woman 
from a West Coast First Nation on Vancouver Island expressing concerns about political corruption 
in her community (123-125); Zapoteca doctoral student Isabel Altamirano (140-143); Mohawk 
anthropologist Audra Simpson (159-162); Ditidaht artist Tsaqwuasupp (165-175); Okanagan 
politicians Joan and Stewart Phillip (181-186); Nuxalk activist Sximina (189-196); Oneida 
businessman Ray Halbritter (213-221); Onondaga Elder and Faithkeeper Oren Lyons (237-244); two 
Elders and Clan Mothers from the Six Nations reserve in Ontario, Kawinehta and Gaigohwakohn, 
(251-254); a group of high school and college students, including 17-year-old Mika Settee (Metis), 
17-year-old Chris Standing (Dakota), 18-year-old  J. Brandon Monture (Cree/Mohawk), 24-year-old 
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teachings, and dialogues that form the core of this book,” Alfred writes in Wasáse, 
“are indigenous and organic; they emerge from inside Onkwehonwe experiences 
and reflect the ideas, concepts, and languages that have developed over millennia in 
the spaces we live, among our peoples.”119 In other words, the 5 basic spiritual 
tenets of interdependency, cycles of change, balance, struggle, and rootedness 
emerge from the lived experiences of the people themselves. Like Spinoza’s fifth 
dogma that makes faith a matter of actively practicing love and justice, Alfred links 
these five tenets to indigenous struggles motivated by love and justice. “Survival 
demands that we act on the love we have for this land and our people,” Alfred 
advises his indigenous readers at the beginning of Wasáse.120 Along with acts of 
love, Alfred clearly understands justice to be a means to achieving peace:  
Justice is one element of a good relationship. . . but it cannot be the end goal of 
a struggle. . . We must move from injustice, through struggle, to a mutual 
respect founded on the achievement of justice and then onward towards peace. 
Step by step. Lacking struggle, omitting respect and justice, there can and will 
be no peace.121 
 
 Working within their historically different traditions, Alfred and Spinoza draw out 
universal principles of love and justice to form democratic, action-oriented spiritual 
belief systems designed to resolve the church-created defeatism and divisions 
plaguing their respective societies.  
                                                                                                                                        
Shana Laframbroise (Metis), 30-year-old Marilyn Atsis (Taku River Tlingit) (259-264); and the 
Kanien’kehaka activist couple Teyowisonte and Konwatsi’tsa:wi (270-278). 
 
119 Ibid., 34.  
 
120 Ibid., 36, italics mine.  
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Since our philosophical guests do not regard culture and scripture to be 
inherently sacred, they place great responsibility on the people for maintaining the 
sacred ontological status of culture and scripture.122 In PPR, Alfred writes that 
when indigenous people use culture only for show, producing no real effects in their 
lives, they effectively turn culture into “folklore.”123 Alfred criticizes so-called 
“traditionalists” who “parrot what they’re supposed to be doing, but then. . . go and 
live their lives totally differently and ignore the inconvenient messages—the ones 
that don’t conform to their own choices in life.”124 Along with spiritual 
traditionalists, Alfred notes the cultural teachings are inconvenient messages for co-
opted indigenous politicians. “In too many First Nations, traditional ceremonies and 
practices have become nothing more than a cover for the cynical manipulation of 
our peoples’ weakness by the state in collaboration with our own indigenous 
politicians.”125 Alfred goes so far as to say that if indigenous people do not 
understand and practice “the real meaning” of culture, then in “two or three 
generations it’ll just be folklore.”126 Against this folklorist trend of behaviour and as 
an alternative to “shallow materialism,” Alfred encourages indigenous people to 
                                                 
122 For an analysis of Spinoza’s theory of the sacred in relation to his ontological argument 
advanced in Ethica, see Polka, Between Philosophy and Religion: Volume 1, 104.  
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revive their “ceremonial and ritual cycles as a means of restoring social connection 
and spiritual rootedness, thus making life sacred again.”127  
Just as Alfred makes a critical distinction between culture and folklore, 
Spinoza makes a key distinction between scripture and “parchment and ink.” In 
chapter 12 of TPT, Spinoza writes that scripture is divine “so long as it moves 
human beings to devotion towards God.”128 If human beings neglect to practice love 
and justice, Spinoza states that scripture becomes “nothing besides parchment and 
ink.”129 Similar to Alfred’s criticism of the hypocritical behaviours of spiritual 
traditionalists, Spinoza criticizes the theologians of his time for being “too eager to 
be holy,” adoring “simulacra and images” instead of God’s word, and consequently 
turning true religion into superstition.130 In PT, Spinoza further emphasizes how the 
biblical meaning of love is an inconvenient message for political elites. Spinoza 
sarcastically admits that the teaching of love thy neighbour is no doubt effective “at 
death’s door. . . when sickness has subdued the passions and a man lies helpless; or 
again in places of worship where men have no dealings with one another.”131 
However, Spinoza follows with the perceptive observation that the biblical teaching 
                                                 
127 Alfred, Wasase, 87, italics mine. Alfred also rejects the argument that indigenous languages 
need to be revitalized because they are inherently sacred. Rather, he believes indigenous languages 
need to be revitalized on strictly philosophical and political grounds See Wasase, 247: “Herein lies 
the main argument for the resurrection of Onkwehonwe languages. It is not their sacredness, 
essential superiority, or divine or mystical quality that is the reason for wanting to save them, but the 
combination of their usefulness as philosophical systems and as the gauging of people’s success at 
reasserting their authentic existences.” 
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of love “has no weight in law-court or palace, where it would be needed most of 
all.”132 Alfred and Spinoza are thus deeply aware of how culture and scripture are 
either made sacred or profane by the actions and behaviours of the people. 
Moreover, they know how making peace with the church ultimately relies on the 
patient labour of the people—the Onkwehonwe and multitudo—working with the 
constructive tools of love and justice in hand. 
3.4 Serving Wo’os: Wiigyat and His Wooden Jaw 
Our second feast dialogue has generated a variety of conceptual tools for 
making peace with the church. We first witnessed how Antgulilbix responded to 
Mr. Goldie’s suggestion that the presence of the United Church in her village was 
an imperial marker of assimilation. From her spiritually-rooted Gitxsan perspective, 
Antgulilbix explained that the history of the United Church was best recounted by 
Klii yem lax haa’s House as one of its head chiefs was emotionally affected by the 
church’s burning. In this way, Antgulilbix’s taught us how each Gitxsan wilp 
network has an intergenerational responsibility to not only narrate its historical 
relationship with the church but to also help decolonize and rebuild the church in 
the future to ensure peaceful coexistence.  
We then dialogically engaged Alfred and Spinoza’s ideas to deconstruct five 
dogmas associated with the imperial Christianity confronted by Antgulilbix. Alfred 
and Spinoza’s biblical criticisms and non-imperial hermeneutics left us with open 
covenantal space for peaceful indigenous-church relations to emerge on equal 
footing. In the aftermath of deconstructing imperial Christianity, we turned our 
attention to a critical comparison of how Alfred and Spinoza self-consciously 
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engaged their ancestral traditions as modern practices of freedom aimed at resolving 
the church-created problems disrupting their respective societies. In their 
historically different locations, we witnessed how our philosophical guests drew on 
the universal principles of love and justice implicit in their traditions and used these 
principles as constructive tools to inform democratic, action-oriented spiritual belief 
systems capable of overcoming the defeatism and division among their people. 
To help us digest Antgulilbix’s gawagaani teaching and the ideas of our 
philosophical guests, I conclude by self-consciously serving another trickster story. 
In Wiigyat and His Wooden Jaw, we encounter the same philosophical issues raised 
in our dialogue: democratic interpretation, fear, superstition, the sacred, and 
spiritual unity. As we journey with Wiigyat in pursuit of his mouthpiece we learn 
how to collectively interpret and relate to “foreign” objects like the Bible and the 
church.  
While wandering along a river bank, Wiigyat came upon a row of young men 
fishing from the shore using small fish for bait. The small bait caught Wiigyat’s 
eye.  
   ‘What is good food for my brothers of the water is good food for me,’ Wiigyat 
said to himself, ‘I will share with my brothers.’  
 
It is one thing to speak of justice; it is a wholly other thing to practice justice with 
all one’s relations. Will Wiigyat honour his promise with just acts of sharing? Or 
will the Big Man find justice to be an inconvenient message and profane his own 
words?  
    Unseen by the fishermen, Wiigyat slipped into the water. In a short time 
every fishermen had a big strike! In an equally short time every fisherman had 
lost the fish that struck, and the bait. The fishermen, certain that big fish were at 
hand, quickly replaced their bait fish and tried again, positive that their food 
boxes would be full that evening! 
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In the face of an uncertain future, the fishermen prefer to act on hope rather than 
fear.133 These are free people unknowingly in the midst of an underwater trickster! 
As they struggle to secure their giant catch, will they continue to act on hope or will 
they succumb to fear and superstition?  
    Wiigyat happily supplied the optimistic fishermen with another round of 
excitement as he feasted on the new bait.  
    While opening his mouth to begin a third course of bait fish, a fisherman with 
a fishing fork drove the prongs through Wiigyat’s open jaw.  
    ‘I’ve got one! I’ve got one!’ shouted the man as he pulled with all his might. 
‘It’s the biggest fish I’ve ever caught! It’s too big, too heavy for me to land 
alone. Will some of you come and pull with me?’ His friends willingly rushed 
to help him and together they struggled to tug and heave to land the giant fish. 
    At the other end of the fishing fork Wiigyat was in a frenzy. He knew that he 
would be killed as a thief and trespasser if he surfaced so he anchored himself 
by clinging desperately to a huge boulder.  
 
Knowing he has profaned his words with unjust acts, Wiigyat frantically seeks to 
escape from the strength of the united fishermen. His empty, weightless words are 
no match for the collective labour of the free fishermen deeply rooted in the land:  
    But the combined efforts of the fishermen were too much for Wiigyat. 
Thumb-length by thumb-length, they drew him towards the surface.  
    The wish-making words were his only hope. ‘Bsaa! Bsaa! May my jaw break 
off so that I may not be discovered!’  
   Wiigyat’s wish was granted, but at the very same moment the fishermen gave 
one final, mountain-moving pull.  
    Swoosh! Wiigyat’s open jaw sprang from the water like a stone from a sling 
shot! The fishermen tumbled backwards. The jaw flew off the fork and 
chomped on the nose of the nearest fisherman then fell to the ground at the 
stunned man’s feet! 
    If the sun had dropped on them the fishermen could not have been more 
terrified and surprised. They crept away from the jaw ‘fish’… 
    Was it a warning?  
    Was it good luck? 
    Was it bad luck? 
    Should they throw it back in the water? 
    Should they take it home? 
    What should they do with it? 
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The series of questions the fishermen ask themselves illustrate the interdependent 
relation between interpretation and action. They quickly go from speculating about 
what the jaw ‘fish’ signifies to what they should do with it? What is remarkable 
about the free fishermen is that even in a moment of terror they take a democratic 
stance towards interpreting the unidentified flying and chomping object. They 
maintain their spiritual unity in the face of danger.  
      Eventually the fishermen decided to conceal the foreign object in a woven 
cedar bag and smuggle it back to the village where their elders could advise 
them.  
     At home in their village they hesitantly displayed their unusual catch to the 
wise and elderly leaders. After many hours of deliberation the elders decided 
not to rush headlong into a course of action which might end in disaster. They 
suggested that the jaw be lashed to one of the high crossbeams of the longhouse, 
where all could keep an eye on it, and that they then await the developments.  
 
The household’s handling of the silent trickster mouthpiece speaks volumes about 
the way a free people govern themselves. Far from counselling the young fishermen 
with an authoritative interpretation of the trickster’s jaw, the elders prudently decide 
to make the jaw an object of collective responsibility and democratic deliberation. 
Hanging from the crossbeam of the longhouse, the elders invite all members of the 
wilp network to share their varied interpretations.  
     In the meantime Wiigyat was having problems. He had made a substitute 
wooden jaw but it did not fit him properly. While he could talk with it, he could 
not eat. As much as he relished conversation, particularly his own, it did not fill 
his stomach. He decided that he must recover his real jaw or starve to death.  
     He made a plan. Somehow he assembled apparel which gave him the 
appearance of a wealthy and prominent chief. Then he started off toward the 
village of those who had fished up his jaw. Close to the village he met a young 
boy whom he paid to run ahead to the village and make it known that a great 
and wealthy chief was close at hand.  
     As a result the village chief welcomed Wiigyat at the outskirts of the village. 
Wiigyat silently made the wish, ‘Bsaa, bsaa, may my jaw be in this man’s 
house.’ As Wiigyat entered his host’s house he looked around to see if his wish 
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had been granted and was immensely relieved when he caught sight of his jaw 
hanging from the rafters.  
     The village chief instructed the ladies of his household to spread a new food 
mat for Wiigyat and serve the best cuisine the house had to offer. Wiigyat had 
some trouble concealing the fact that he could not eat and even greater trouble 
concealing his longing to devour everything in sight! To cover up he pretended 
not to be hungry so the courteous host asked his entertainers to perform for 
Wiigyat.   
     During the entertainment, Wiigyat planned his rescue of his jaw. ‘Great 
Chief,’ he said to the host, ‘is there a good fishing place close by?’ 
‘Yes, Chief, indeed there is. A very fine fishing hole!’ the host proudly replied.         
    When speaking of the hole he remembered the jaw as Wiigyat had anticipated 
he would. The chief decided to consult the knowledgeable visitor.  
‘At the fishing hole of which I speak, youths of our village recently made a 
most unusual catch. We are not as yet sure how to interpret it. Perhaps, Chief, 
you have knowledge of such matters. One of our young fishermen caught what 
appears to be a…human jaw!’ 
 
By supposing Wiigyat, a wealthy foreign chief impostor, has special knowledge 
about the strange object hanging over them, the host chief undermines the 
democratic approach his wilp network originally adopted. Mesmerized by foreign 
power and status, the house chief represents contemporary indigenous leaders who 
delegate intelligence to outside consultants in order to resolve outstanding 
community issues. As we will see, such delegations weaken the collective capacity 
of the wilp members to think and interpret for themselves.134 As a consequence, 
they leave the people at the mercy of outside and oftentimes misleading trickster 
powers.  
    ‘A human jaw?’ Wiigyat said in a tone of complete disbelief. ‘Surely one 
cannot net a human jaw in your fine fishing hole. It must be something else.’ 
Wiigyat looked up at the beam as though he had not noticed the jaw until that 
moment.  
    ‘That cannot be a human jaw,’ he stated in a tone of authority. ‘Perhaps you 
had better let me examine the thing carefully.’ 
                                                 
134 PPR, 178: “One of the major consequences of colonialism was the loss of our ability to think 
for ourselves; thus many of our leaders and communities rely on others to think for them (for a 
price). The cost of delegating intelligence is enormous in terms of misrepresentation or 
misappropriation of indigenous knowledge and perspectives.” 
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     They took down the jaw and gave it to Wiigyat. The trickster pretended to 
handle his own jaw with the greatest reluctance. He warily held it at arm’s 
length, scrutinizing it with the utmost care. After a moment his face grew very 
solemn and his eyes filled with dread as one might who heard the Dead moan.  
     ‘My dear Brother, it grieves me to tell you of this but your kindness to me 
has known no bounds and I must repay you by warning and advising you. A jaw 
exactly like this was fished out of the river close by the dwelling of my dearest 
uncle. Within a day, a terrible Sickness overcame the villagers. Everyone died.      
     There was no one left to cremate the dead. There was no one left to sing the 
mourning songs. I advise you to depart immediately and take nothing with you 
lest it be poisoned with the Sickness.’   
     Fear filled the hearts of all who listened. Even the wisest men did not pause 
to question Wiigyat. In great haste the villagers raced down to the water’s edge, 
ripped the woven cedar coverings off their canoes and rudely scrambled for 
space in them.       
 
All tricksters are keenly aware of how dread generates superstition and skilfully use 
this knowledge to control and manipulate the people. Wiigyat the Prognosticator 
now manipulates the entire wilp network with his grand narrative of sickness and 
death so much so that the people uproot themselves from their own homelands in 
order to prevent becoming victims. Little do they know they assumed the posture of 
victimry as soon as they surrendered their interpretive authority to Wiigyat. Instead 
of trusting in their commonsense interpretation of his silent mouthpiece, the entire 
village uncritically acts on his superstitious words!  
    Wiigyat rushed down to the water too, generously finding seating space for 
elderly people and unselfishly seeing to the welfare of all his new friends. 
Nobly he gave up seat after seat to make room for a villager.   
   ‘I’ll stay behind and warn any who come by,’ Wiigyat promised bigheartedly 
as the last canoe pulled from the bank.  
    As soon as the canoe was out of sight Wiigyat tore out the wooden jaw and 
crammed the real one into his mouth. Then he pranced through the village 
gobbling food right and left while he made a joyful count of all the good things 
he had tricked out of the gullible villagers. 
 For the moment, Wiigyat’s journey was at a standstill.135 
 
                                                 
135 K’san Book Builders, “We-gyet and His Wooden Jaw,” in We-gyet Wanders, 30-33. I have 
interrupted and made minor modifications to this story for style and content. 
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While Wiigyat began his misadventure by breaking his promise to act justly 
towards his fish “brothers,” he ends his journey under the deceptive appearance of 
acting justly towards the villagers by helping them into their canoes and staying 
back to warn others of the pending sickness. Wiigyat’s trickery teaches that under 
the false pretences of fear-based myths and ulterior motives, real acts of love and 
justice are not possible. Rather, what culture and scripture equally demand of all 
people is a genuine desire to treat others—whether fish, people, or any other diverse 
mode of nature—with a simple and truthful spirit expressed in genuine acts of love 
and justice.136 
Ultimately, the story of Wiigyat recovering his mouthpiece gives a new 
voice to Antgulilbix’s gawagaani teaching and the ideas shared by our philosophical 
guests. The trickster voice reiterates the importance of keeping uncertain “sacred” 
objects of interpretation—be they United Churches, the Bible, or indigenous 
spiritual practices—suspended in open space for each to freely and responsibly read 
for the good of the community. For whenever the free people place the sacred in the 
hands of elites—be they government lawyers, fundamentalist churches of all stripes 
and places, or any other hungry tricksters—the people inevitably become the object 
of another’s self-serving interpretation. An uncertain yet hopeful future of peaceful 
coexistence between the Gitxsan Nation and the Church thus depends first and 
foremost on the continued work of each Gitxsan wilp network democratically 
exercising its hermeneutical responsibilities. 
                                                 
136 TPT, 100. Spinoza writes that true religion “does not consist in outward actions so much as in 
a simplicity and truthfulness of spirit.”  
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CHAPTER 4: 
GAWAGAANI DI NII’Y 
What makes an individual “indigenous” is her situation within a community. 
In fact, it is impossible to understand an indigenous reality by focusing on 
individuals or discrete aspects of culture outside of a community context. 
However knowledgeable and rooted the individual, one cannot be truly 
indigenous without the support and inspiration, as well as the reprobation 
and stress, that a community provides. 
                                   –Taiaiake Alfred1 
 
Surely nature does not create nations, but individuals, who are not divided 
into nations except on the basis of the diversity of languages, laws, and 
accepted mores; and only on the basis of these last two—laws and mores—
can it arise that each nation has a special mental cast, a special condition, 
and, finally, special prejudices. 
       –Benedict Spinoza2  
 
Gawagaani di ni’y announces the inward turn of our third feast dialogue, from 
making peace with the state and church to making peace with the self. In 
Gitxsanimx, “ni’y” signifies the “I” rooted in the wilp network, the single house 
member, the lone wolf, frog, fireweed, or eagle.3 In response to our new 
conversational topic, our philosophical guests shift their dialogue from transforming 
nation-states and ecclesiastical institutions to transforming decultured individuals 
into self-determining peoples in peaceful coexistence with their nation’s laws and 
traditions. For Alfred and Spinoza, and equally so for the Gitxsan, peace with the 
self is achieved when the cultured individual freely honours his people’s laws by 
living a virtuous life. In settler society, however, the colonial legal order holds 
                                                 
1 PPR, 14.  
 
2 TPT, 207.  
 
3 The wilp-centric Gitxsan Nation has four pdeek’ or clan affiliations: the lax gibuu (wolf), 
laxsee’l (frog), gisk’ahaast (fireweed), and lax xsgiik (eagle). Each Gitxsan citizen inherits from his 
mother his wilp and pdeek membership.  
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“special prejudices” against indigenous legal traditions that hinder indigenous 
peoples from honouring their law and achieving inner peace. As we will see, such 
special prejudices surfaced at the Delgamuukw trial.  
 To begin our feast dialogue on making peace with the self, we continue in 
the li’ligit protocol of am goosinsxw by remembering Gwaans and her gawagaani 
teaching in response to Mr. Macaulay’s attempt to undermine the authority and 
contemporary relevance of Gitxsan ayook or law. Then, following the li’ligit 
protocol of k’otsgesxw, we will witness our philosophical guests disclose how the 
premise of colonial legal supremacy confronted by Gwaans is nothing more than an 
empty pretension of an autocrat legal order based on fear and superstition. In place 
of the false premise of colonial legal supremacy, our philosophical guests will 
articulate complementary visions of legal pluralism based on their respective 
notions of the natural and natural divine law. We will then critically compare the 
way in which Alfred and Spinoza reconstruct the moral figures of their traditions—
the warrior and the prophet—as models to inspire the people to cultivate virtuous 
character through obedience to the higher principles of their legal traditions and 
achieve peace with the self. Informed by the ideas of Gwaans and our philosophical 
guests, I conclude our feast dialogue by serving up a trickster story of marriage and 
divorce. In Wiigyat and His Wife, we will meet the trickster’s better half, an eco-
feminist warrior figure who teaches the Gitxsan how to peacefully defend the legal 
order of our Gitxsan homelands.  
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4.1  Remembering Gwaans 
Gwaans (Olive Ryan) of the gisk’ahaast clan from the western village of 
Kitsegukla was the third sim’oogit to share her adaawk with the court on behalf of 
her wilp and wil’naa’t’ahl. On June 18, 1987, under cross-examination by Mr. 
Macaulay, the chief legal counsel for the government of Canada, Gwaans examines 
a Vancouver museum’s guidebook. The guidebook explains that the museum’s 
front doors were carved at the K’san School of Art located on the Gitxsan 
homelands. As the carvings on the front doors represent the adaawk of Gwaans’ 
daughter, Hanamuxw (Joan Ryan), Mr. Macaulay compliments the artistry of the 
doors:  
Mr. Macaulay: And they are splendid doors. And do you know who carved 
them?  
Gwaans: No.  
. . .  
Mr. Macaulay: You don’t know whether it was Earl Muldoe or some other 
famous carver?  
Gwaans: Well, one of them, I guess, I don’t know. I can’t say.4 
 
As Mr. Macaulay proceeds with his questioning, he reveals his true colonial 
intentions for complimenting the Gitxsan artistry inscribed on the front doors.  
Mr. Macaulay: Would carving that adaawk [the Gitxsan oral histories] and 
sending it to Vancouver be against Gitksan law?  
Gwaans: Well, we can’t – against the way it is now, you know, the young 
people who carving the things and they – well, I can’t explain it, you. They may 
get mad at me if I – 
Mr. Macaulay: Well, they might, but you have told the court. . . that Jeffrey 
Johnson should not have carved the house posts that he carved. 
. . .  
Gwaans: Well, that’s what they said before, you know, but nowadays different. 
We trying to stop those young people, but they were – you know, I can’t –  
Mr. Macaulay: They don’t pay attention? 
                                                 
4Trial Transcripts, Delgamuukw v. The Queen in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Action 
No. 0843, Smithers Registry, 1439.  
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Gwaans: They don’t pay attention to the elders.5 
 
Gwaans’ response highlights how the Gitxsan ayook or law is an intergenerational 
process initiated and sustained by knowledgeable Elders and the talented Gitxsan 
youth, a process that involves community support and inspiration as much as it does 
reprobation and stress.6 Mr. Macaulay does not appear to understand the dynamic 
nature of the ayook, intent as he is on showing it to be an archaic thing of the past. 
Continuing with his faulty imperial logic, Mr. Macaulay questions the adaptability 
of Gitxsan laws in light of the fact that museums and botanical gardens did not exist 
a century ago:  
Mr. Macaulay: Well, how – So this Gitksan law you are talking about is a law 
which meets a new circumstances [sic] in the last hundred years because the 
problem in the old times – there was no problem of that kind?  
Gwaans: Well, the young people listen to the Chiefs, you know, not supposed 
to do that. But today, you know, they was trying to be a white man, that’s the 
reason why they carry the pole and put it in the cities. Do you understand what I 
am saying?7 
 
While Mr. Macaulay says he understands, his questions suggest otherwise. He does 
not appear to understand that just as the Gitxsan oral histories are inscribed on the 
museum’s wooden doors, the universal principles and values of the ayook—love 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 1439-1440.  
 
6 Gwaans’ oral testimony reveals the deliberative source of Gitxsan legal traditions. For a 
description of the deliberative source of indigenous legal traditions, see Borrows, Canada’s 
Indigenous Constitution, 35: “[T]he proximate source of most Indigenous law is developed through 
people talking with one another. The human dimension of these laws means that recognition, 
enforcement, and implementation make them subject to re-examination and revision through the 
generations. Indigenous law is not static and can move with the times. The deliberative nature of 
many Indigenous laws means they can be continuously updated and remain relevant in the 
contemporary world.”  
 
7 Trial Transcripts, Delgamuukw v. The Queen, 1441.  
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and justice—are inscribed on the hearts and minds of the Gitxsan people.8 Intent as 
he is with proving the Gitxsan ayook is obsolete and that colonial law is the 
supreme law of the land, Mr. Macaulay does not understand that Gwaans is not 
simply agreeing with him that aspects of the Gitxsan ayook are not followed. She is 
demonstrating the continued need for the Gitxsan Nation to provide substantive 
articulation of its legal traditions and its continued relevance for present and future 
generations.9 Before fighting to have colonial courts recognize and respect Gitxsan 
ayook, Gwaans teaches that wilp members themselves need to first learn and freely 
obey the higher principles of the ayook in their own lives as a way of achieving 
peace with their Gitxsan selves.  
4.2   Deconstructive Tools for Colonial Legal Supremacy  
The interaction between Gwaans and Mr. Macaulay reveals that peaceful 
coexistence between wilp members and the legal traditions of the Gitxsan Nation 
cannot be achieved so long as settler society and its institutions continue to 
subordinate Gitxsan ayook and undermine its authority in the lives of wilp 
members.10 What Gwaans confronted was the premise of colonial legal supremacy 
                                                 
8 My description of the Gitxsan ayook inscribed on Gitxsan hearts and minds borrows from 
Spinoza’s description of God’s compact, see TPT, 211: “God’s compact is no longer written with ink 
and on stone tablets, but with God’s Spirit on the heart.”  
 
9 For a substantive theoretical articulation of Gitxsan ayook that draws from Western and 
Indigenous legal theorists to explore, describe, and analyze Gitxsan legal traditions in a way that is 
practical and useful for contemporary Gitxsan, see Valerie Ruth Napoleon, Ayook: Gitksan Legal 
Order, Law, and Legal Theory (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Victoria Faculty of 
Law, 2009).  
 
10 For legal argumentation in support of this claim, see Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous 
Constitution, 143: “Steps to increase accessibility [of Indigenous law] are important because there 
has been such socio-economic dislocation amongst Indigenous peoples in Canada as a result of 
colonialism. . . Such disconnections may make it difficult for an Indigenous legal authority to clearly 
communicate laws to its citizens. This problem may lead to a lack of information amongst those to 
whom such laws are meant to apply. In these circumstances, people may not be aware of the 
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that justifies unilaterally imposing a colonial legal order on indigenous people.11 
Not only is the premise of colonial legal supremacy blatantly Eurocentric, it is a 
clear violation of the Charter’s professed “founding principles of Canada.” In his 
Spinozistic interpretation of the Charter, Polka links the sovereign (causa sui) 
principles of “supremacy of God” and “rule of law” in an absolute and dialectical 
relation modelled on the biblical covenant between God and man. On this reading, 
inadequate and false (inhuman) interpretations of the founding principles of Canada 
are those that “in failing to recognize that they must will to interpret others as they 
would will to be interpreted, reduce the sovereignty of God and the rule of law to 
either certain knowledge or uncertain relativity.”12 In the case of the Canadian 
state’s claim to colonial legal supremacy, the founding principles are reduced to 
“certain (totalitarian) knowledge” of settler society’s legal superiority over 
                                                                                                                                        
consequences that flow from violating Indigenous law provisions. Such misunderstandings could 
lead to a lack of confidence and respect amongst Indigenous peoples concerning their own laws. At 
the same time, accessing Indigenous law is an issue for other Canadians, too. If the overall 
population is not able to easily learn about Indigenous law, it will be more difficult for our different 
legal traditions to coexist.” 
 
11 For example, Tully points out how the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was 
generally understood by indigenous people as a legal imposition. See Tully, Strange Multiplicity: 
Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 12: 
“The 683 [indigenous nations] of Canada protested that the Charter oppressed and failed to 
recognize their [indigenous] cultures: that is, their forms of self-government, legal systems, 
languages and so on.” For a legal commentary on the way in which the Charter’s liberal rights 
discourse has positively and negatively impacted indigenous politics, see Borrows, “Contemporary 
Traditional Equality: The Effect of the Charter on First Nation Politics”, in University of New 
Brunswick Law Journal 43 (1994), 48: “The effect of the Charter on Aboriginal politics illustrates 
the complications that are involved in working with rights discourse. While there are many 
constraints and limitations to the employment of rights, they also possess the potential to remove 
impediments to greater individual and collective self-determination for Aboriginal peoples. Those 
invoking the language of rights should harbour no illusions or misconceptions that summoning rights 
will always produce the desired results. There are many obstacles which can, in reversionary 
fashion, take away the very thing you are claiming.”  
 
12 Polka, “The Supremacy of God and the Rule of Law in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms: A Theologico-Political Analysis,” in McGill Law Journal 32 (1987), 862. 
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indigenous peoples.13 In Polka’s words, accepting the premise of colonial legal 
supremacy can be understood as the ideological act of settler society chasing “after 
false idols whose finite supremacy involves the hierarchical subordination of 
otherness.”14 That is to say, the premise of colonial legal supremacy allows settler 
society to subordinate indigenous legal traditions in order to worship the false idol 
of finite colonial power. 
Following the li’ligit protocol of k’otsgesxw, Alfred and Spinoza’s ideas 
will expose and deconstruct colonial legal supremacy as an empty pretension of an 
autocratic legal order.15 We will then witness our guests reconceptualize peace with 
                                                 
13 Ibid. The presumption of settler society’s legal superiority over indigenous peoples continues to 
go unquestioned by the majority working in Canadian law and politics. See, for example, Borrows, 
Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, 13: “The formal hierarchy of law’s sources is buttressed by 
theories about the so-called reception of law in Canada. In the legal literature, Canada is largely 
regarded as a settled territory, meaning that it is considered legally vacant at its foundation. While 
Indigenous peoples lived in the territory prior to colonization, it has been said that ‘their laws and 
customs were either too unfamiliar or too primitive to justify compelling British subjects to obey 
them.’ These labels are offensive to me and many others because they presume the legal inferiority 
of Indigenous peoples. Yet most parliamentarians, lawyers, and judges have not adequately 
questioned this presumption. . . Colonization is not a strong place to rest the foundation of Canada’s 
laws. It creates a fiction that continues to erase Indigenous legal systems as a source of law in 
Canada.” For an example of the reception of law view in the political science literature, see Janet 
Ajzenstat’s The Canadian Founding: John Locke and Parliament (Montreal and Kingston:  McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2007), 21. While Ajzenstat recognizes that no other settled liberal 
democracy has debated constitutional reform for so long and with such passion as much as Canada 
has, she maintains a reception of British law view of Canada’s Constitution by arguing that we 
essentially have today the Lockean-informed “Constitution that the fathers of Confederation gave us, 
the Constitution that the legislators in the federating provinces ratified.” Accordingly, Ajzenstat 
makes no mention of the place of indigenous legal traditions in the Canadian legal landscape.  
 
14 Polka, “The Supremacy of God and the Rule of Law in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms: A Theologico-Political Analysis,” 862.   
 
15 While Spinoza intended to conclude PT with a chapter on “Laws and other particular questions 
concerning Politics” (Ep 84), he died prior to completing this concluding chapter which would have 
likely dealt with colonial law. Although Spinoza did not directly write on colonial law in his works, 
he was critical of all autocratic legal orders, especially monarchical law. To the degree then that 
monarchical and colonial law are similar forms of autocratic legal order, Spinoza’s critique of 
monarchical law can be extended as an indirect critique of colonial law. I am drawing here on the 
remarks made by Levene, Spinoza’s Revelation, 170: “An autocratic sovereign may well see these 
things [the ends of human and divine law] as entirely independent of each other, advancing its 
political interests without in any way contributing to the good of its citizens. . . Spinoza remains a 
classical republican thinker – a critic of autocracies both political and spiritual – in assuming that the 
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the self as the cultivation of human reason in solidarity with others in order to 
challenge the simplistic notions of peace as stability that all autocratic legal orders 
rely upon for legitimacy. We will then see how autocratic legal orders are based on 
fear and superstition and co-opt citizens to participate in their own subjugation, 
suppressing the possibility of peace that begins to emerge with the cultivation of 
reason. In place of colonial legal supremacy, Alfred and Spinoza draw on their 
respective traditions to articulate complementary visions of legal pluralism that 
recognize the multiple ways the universal principles of love and justice—the 
substance of what Alfred calls “natural law” and Spinoza calls “natural divine” 
law—are revealed in diverse legal traditions. Ultimately, their ideas of natural and 
natural divine law broaden our legal horizons from the “rough ground of 
colonization” to the multiple terrains of indigenous legal traditions where peace 
with the self is fully made possible.16  
In their historically different locations, Alfred and Spinoza reconceptualize 
peace with the self as the cultivation of reason in solidarity with others to challenge 
the oppressive status quo maintained by autocratic legal orders. In the unfinished 
PT, Spinoza slyly critiques the notion of peace that legitimizes the dominant 
monarchical form of autocratic legal order championed by Hobbes. “A 
commonwealth whose subjects are deterred from taking up arms only through fear,” 
                                                                                                                                        
societies most likely to preserve themselves in terms of peace and security over the long term are 
those that pay the most heed to the divine law and to human nature, and especially to the ways in 
which they conflict.” 
 
16 This phrase is Tully’s. See, Public Philosophy in a New Key: Volume 1, 288: “These 
[indigenous] practices of freedom on the rough ground of daily colonisation usually fall beneath the 
attention and interest of Western political theorists, unless they are members of an oppressed group, 
and the big, abstract questions of normative legitimisation tend to capture the attention of most in the 
field.” 
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Spinoza writes indirectly about monarchy, “should be said not to be at war rather 
than to be enjoying peace.”17 As a veiled critique of Hobbes’ monarchist definition 
of peace, Spinoza famously proclaims that peace is “more than the absence of 
war.”18 For Spinoza, peace is a “virtue which comes from strength of mind; for 
obedience is the steadfast will to carry out orders enjoined by the general decree of 
the commonwealth.” Spinoza’s concept of peace with the self is closely associated 
with human reason, a quality he celebrates as the “true virtue and life of the 
mind.”19 In terms of the relation between a community and its legal order, peace 
consists in a “union or harmony of minds” among citizens who critically engage the 
legal order to achieve communal consensus and freely and steadfastly follow the 
agreed upon laws.20 This is why Spinoza writes in an annotation to TPT that “reason 
urges peace” but cannot be achieved unless the “rights of the city [i.e. the right to 
think freely with one’s reason] are kept inviolate.”21 Since peace under a legal order 
depends on an intellectual process initiated by the people in solidarity, Spinoza 
maintains that autocratic legal orders like monarchy which “depend on the sluggish 
                                                 
17 PT, 5.4.  
 
18 Hobbes defines peace as the “absence of war” in De cive I, xii: “Bellum enim quid est praetor 
tempus illud, in quo voluntas certandi per vim, verbis factisve satis decalaratur; tempus reliquum 
Pax vocatur.” Also see annotation 33 of TPT, where Spinoza explicitly differentiates his notion of 
peace with Hobbes’: “Yet (n.b. Hobbes notwithstanding) reason altogether urges peace this cannot 
be obtained, however, unless the common rights of the city are kept inviolate” (TPT, 249).  
 
19 PT, 5.5.  
 
20 Ibid., 6.4.  
 
21 TPT, 249.  
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spirit of its subjects who are led like sheep to learn to be slaves can more properly 
be called a desert than a commonwealth.”22  
Just as Spinoza rejects the Hobbesian notion of peace as the mere “absence 
of war,” Alfred rejects the notion of peace as merely “the lack of violent conflict or 
rioting in the streets.”23 In Wasáse, Alfred states that his goal is to discover a “real 
and deep notion of peace in the hope of moving [indigenous people] away from 
valuing simplistic notions of peace such as certainty and stability, for these are 
conceptions that point only to the value of order.”24 For Alfred, peace defined as 
stability only “serves the powerful in an imperial situation.”25 As long as peace is 
“strictly defined as the maintenance of order and the rule of law,” Alfred instructs 
his indigenous readers, “we will be defeated in our struggle to survive as 
Onkwehonwe.”26 Challenging this colonial legal order, Alfred reconceptualizes 
peace with the self as “being Onkwehonwe, breaking with the disfiguring and 
meaningless norms of our present reality, and recreating ourselves in a holistic 
sense.”27 Alfred’s redefinition of peace is more than a matter of ethnic preservation. 
Rather, he equates peace with “being Onkwehonwe” for two reasons. First, he 
understands the ideal of peaceful coexistence to be the heritage of all indigenous 
                                                 
22 PT, 5.4.  
 
23 Wasáse, 28.  
 
24 Ibid., 27.  
 
25 Ibid.  
 
26 Ibid.  
 
27 Ibid.  
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peoples.28 Secondly, his own Iroquois heritage links peace with the practice of 
reason. For example, one of the fundamental principles of the Iroquois’s 
Kaienerekowa (Great Law of Peace) is “using reason and [cultivating] a good 
mind.”29 Likewise, Alfred shares how the Kariwiio (Code of Handsome Lake), a 
nineteenth century document that partly draws its message from the Great Law of 
Peace, teaches that being Onkwehonwe means striving to achieve kariwiio ne 
skennen, a reasonable balanced state, through kanikonriio tanon ne kashastensera 
or “powerful reasoning.”30 Since indigenous heritage links peace with the practice 
of reason, Alfred’s redefinition of peace as “being Onkwehonwe”  makes the 
enjoyment of peace under a given legal order dependent on the active exercise of 
the people’s critical faculties. For Alfred and Spinoza, then, peace defined as an 
individual and collective “state of mind” rather than a docile state of behaviour 
slyly functions to undermine the legitimacy of autocratic legal orders.31  
 Not only do autocratic legal orders fail to regard peace as an individual and 
collective reasonable state of mind, Alfred and Spinoza further expose autocratic 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 232: “I believe we need to. . .  maintain consistency with the teachings and vision of 
peaceful coexistence that is the heritage of all Onkwehonwe.” 
 
29 This is how Atsenhaienton, a Mohawk leader in international politics, describes the Great Law 
of Peace in his interview with Alfred. See PPR, 130.  
 
30 Ibid., 198. Alfred writes that Thohahoken’s indigenous re-reading of the Code of Handsome 
Lake–that speaks of achieving a reasonable balanced state through powerful reasoning–forced him to 
think “deeper about what it means to be Onkwehonwe.” So while Alfred does not directly link peace 
to the practice of human reason, his interrelated remarks about peace, being Onkwehonwe, and 
reason lead to this conclusion.  
 
31 Recall from the epigraph of chapter 1 that Alfred finds Audra Simpson’s Mohawk description 
of peace and Spinoza’s notion of peace as sharing an uncanny understanding of peace as a state of 
mind. See Wasáse, 161: “The way you’ve described it, as a state of mind, is exactly how Spinoza, 
the philosopher, referred to it. He said that peace is more than the absence of war; in his words, it is a 
‘disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice.’” 
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legal orders as regimes based on fear and superstition that co-opt citizens to 
irrationally participate in their own subjugation. As many of Spinoza’s ancestors 
were persecuted and murdered by the Inquisition sanctioned by the Portuguese and 
Spanish monarchical legal orders in collaboration with the Catholic Church, it is not 
surprising that he critiques monarchical legal orders as founded on fear and 
superstition. In his Preface to TPT, for example, Spinoza suggests that the “highest 
secret of a monarchical regime, and its interest altogether, is to have human beings 
deceived and to cover up the dread by which they have to be restrained by the 
showy name of Religion.”32 Spinoza specifically criticizes the Turkish monarchical 
legal order for embellishing its state religion to such a degree that its citizens are 
preoccupied with so many “prejudices” that there is no room for “sound reason or 
doubting anything.”33 Not only are citizens prevented from freely exercising reason 
under a monarchical legal order, Spinoza believes they are implicated in their own 
oppression to such a degree that they are deceived into fighting “for their servitude 
as though for their salvation and would not deem it shameful, but the greatest glory, 
to spread blood and soul for the vanity of one human being.”34 For these reasons, 
Spinoza concludes that although monarchical legal orders may outlast democratic 
legal orders they can only ever offer “slavery, barbarism, and desolation” as 
peace.35  
                                                 
32 TPT, xviii.  
 
33 Ibid.  
 
34 Ibid.  
 
35 PT, 6.4.  
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Similar to Spinoza’s description of monarchical power, Alfred describes 
colonial governmental power to be “founded on fear, which is used to control and 
manipulate [indigenous people] in many ways.”36 In Wasáse, Alfred argues the 
colonial legal order generates various “colonial myths and symbols” that create 
“artificial and emotional attachments” among indigenous people.37 In PPR, Alfred 
explains that these psycho-affective attachments influence most indigenous people 
into accepting and even defending the continuation of unjust power relationships 
under the colonial legal order. He calls this the “colonial mentality,” a form of false 
consciousness that “blocks recognition of the existence or viability of traditional 
perspectives.”38 Indigenous people with a colonial mentality, Alfred goes on to say, 
“rationalize and participate actively in their own subordination and the maintenance 
of the Other’s superiority.”39 Alfred identifies Stan Dixon, the former chief of the 
Sechelt Indian Band located on British Columbia’s lower mainland, as a good case 
study of this colonial psychology. Alfred examines one of Dixon’s public 
                                                 
 
36 Wasáse, 20.  
 
37 Ibid., 33. In PPR, Alfred identifies two of the greatest colonial myths to be the belief that 
indigenous people can achieve justice within the colonial legal system, and the belief that accepting 
politically correct terminology (e.g. “First Nations” and “Aboriginal”) can somehow by mere re-
description correct historical injustices and alleviate contemporary socio-economic realities. See 
PPR, 107. Compare the two colonial myths identified by Alfred with the two colonial presumptions 
identified by James Tully, viz. the presumptions that 1) the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction by 
settler-governments over the territories of Indigenous peoples is not only effective but also 
legitimate, and 2) there is no viable alternative to the exclusive jurisdiction by settler governments. 
According to Tully, these presumptions function as the “hinge propositions” that constrain 
negotiations between indigenous people and settler governments in a way that keeps the dominant 
colonial structures in place. For Tully’s description of these presumptions and his critique of them, 
see Public Philosophy in a New Key: Volume I, 276-288.  
 
38 PPR, 95.  
 
39 Ibid., 97.  
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statements in which he casts his Sechelt Indian band’s transition to “quasi-
municipal status” in 1986 as an act of self-determination:  
After watching my friend. . . raise our Sechelt flag, along with the British 
Columbia and Canada flags; I felt a deep emotion and realized how much I 
loved Canada and my people. . . And today, for the public perception we 
regained our distinction and Sechelt was granted local autonomy through Bill C-
93.40  
 
In Alfred’s view, Dixon’s compromised position is evident in the fact that his 
community’s “autonomy” is dependent on the Canadian colonial state’s federal 
legislation. Moreover, Alfred believes Dixon’s statement clearly reveals “his 
blindness to his own co-optation, not to mention deep confusion and shocking 
naiveté.”41 Just as Spinoza understood the monarchical legal order to deceive its 
subjects into fighting for their servitude as if it were their salvation, Alfred shows 
here how the colonial legal order misleads indigenous politicians into fighting for 
their continued colonization as though it were their independence.  
So whether experienced in monarchical or colonial form, Alfred and 
Spinoza equally show how autocratic legal orders prevent the people from 
achieving peace with themselves by generating fear and superstition that functions 
to suppress the people’s ability to exercise their critical faculties. To encourage 
people to achieve inner peace, our philosophical guests ultimately holds the people, 
individually and collectively, responsible for fighting for their freedom against 
autocratic legal orders. In his preface to TPT, for example, Spinoza boldly writes 
that in conditions where right or authority has no basis besides the assertion of brute 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 124.  
 
41 Ibid.  
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power, “each [citizen] is the avenger of his own freedom.”42 Just as Spinoza 
describes the people as “avengers of their own freedom” under a peace-suppressing 
legal order, Alfred describes a “true decolonization movement” led by the people to 
be nothing less than a “political battle for the cause of freedom.”43  
To empower the people committed to the cause of freedom, Alfred and 
Spinoza expand legal horizons with their respective notions of “natural” and 
“natural divine” law. To understand what our philosophical guests respectively call 
“natural” and “natural divine” law it is critical to first understand how they similarly 
conceive human nature. In HVA, Alfred explains how the Iroquois view of human 
nature recognizes “the dichotomy between good and evil as it exists in human 
beings” and that human nature therefore necessitates the establishment of a “formal 
system of government.”44 By recognizing the “evil side to man’s nature” and the 
difficulty this poses to peaceful coexistence, Alfred plainly rejects any romanticized 
“noble savage” notion of human being.45 Spinoza likewise rejects any utopian 
notion of human nature.46 In chapter 16 of TPT, for example, Spinoza writes that 
                                                 
42 TPT, xxii.  
 
43 Wasáse, 21.  
 
44 HVA, 80.  
 
45 Ibid., 81.  
 
46 It is important to show that Alfred and Spinoza equally reject a “noble savage” view of human 
nature in light of historical misrepresentations of both Iroquois peoples and Spinoza’s ideas of 
human nature that date back to the early Enlightenment. For example, Spinoza scholar Jonathan I. 
Israel notes how Lahontan’s seventeenth century work, Voyages, drew on Spinozism to describe the 
Iroquois people in utopian terms. See, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of 
Modernity 1650-1750 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001), 272: “Images of primitive 
societies which evolved into earthly utopias based on ‘natural religion’, often strongly redolent of 
Spinozism and characterized by a high degree of social equality, became a familiar theme of Early 
Enlightenment intellectual culture, not least owing to the widespread impact of the Voyages of 
Lahontan who portrays the Canadian Iroquois Indians as wise and noble savages, steeped in a 
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“everyone is born ignorant of everything” and that the “highest law of nature is that 
each thing endeavour, as much as is in it, to preserve in its state—and do so by 
taking no account of another but only of itself.”47 That is, human beings live and 
preserve themselves “solely on the basis of the impulse of appetite since nature 
gives him nothing else and denies him the actual power of living on the basis of 
sound reason.”48 Just as Alfred understands the “evil side” of human nature to 
require a formal government system, Spinoza concludes that “human nature is such 
that men cannot live without some common code of law.”49 In contrast with Alfred, 
however, Spinoza qualifies his “evil” ascription to human nature. “We want 
everything to be directed on the basis of the use of our reason,” Spinoza explains, 
“while yet what reason dictates as being evil is not evil with respect to the order and 
laws of nature as such, but only with respect to the laws of our nature alone.”50 In 
other words, since human nature is “without religion and law” at birth, Spinoza 
understands “evil” to be a moral term projected onto human nature from the 
standpoint of our socialized, rational understanding.51 If human nature is without 
religion and law and in need of formal government, what do Alfred and Spinoza 
then mean by “natural” and “natural divine” law? 
                                                                                                                                        
Spinozistic view of man and the universe…It is a tradition which explicitly opposes Hobbes’ harsh 
and allegedly distorted portrayal of ‘natural man’”  
 
47 TPT, 170-180.  
 
48 Ibid., 180.  
 
49 PT, 1.3.  
 
50 TPT, 181.  
 
51 Ibid., 187.  
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Consistent with their notions of peace as an individual and collective state of 
mind, Alfred and Spinoza equally maintain that the aim of the natural and natural 
divine laws is the highest good of human nature expressed through rational 
understanding and the practice of virtue. In Wasáse, Alfred explains that the goal of 
a peaceful human life as understood within indigenous cultures is an on-going 
commitment to “understand[ing] basic spiritual teachings and to shap[ing] one’s life 
to embody the values that emerge from respecting those fundamental principles.”52 
A peaceful life which embodies these fundamental principles reflects honour, the 
ethic of courage, interdependency, sharing, humility, respect, freedom, and 
struggle.53 Alfred further maintains that these values and principles are the 
“framework for peace” and are “rooted in the natural law worldview shared by all 
indigenous peoples.”54 Thus, the end goal of what Alfred calls “natural law” is to 
                                                 
52 Wasáse, 236.  
 
53 Ibid.  
 
54 Ibid. For legal commentary on indigenous understandings of natural law, see Borrows, 
Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, 28-34. Borrows differentiates indigenous notions of natural law 
from Western legal theories at 28-29: “When considering [indigenous] laws from this [natural law] 
source, it is often necessary to understand how the earth maintains functions that benefit us and all 
other beings. This [indigenous] approach to legal interpretation attempts to develop rules for 
regulation and conflict resolution from a study of the world’s behaviour. . . Note how Indigenous 
definitions of nature may at times have a somewhat different emphasis than what is found in many 
leading natural law theories within Western jurisprudence. The separation of man from nature may 
not be as stark as in Aristotle’s philosophy. . . There may also be less emphasis on ‘right reason’ as 
universal, and the measure of law’s commands and prohibitions, as in the Roman jurist Cicero’s 
works. . . In contrast with many Western theorists many Indigenous societies do not act in the same 
way to restrain nature, because they find more to embrace within it. Finally, perhaps many 
Indigenous peoples might de-emphasize particular Western natural law theories (if they were 
conscious of them) because these theories so often provided the justification for Indigenous peoples’ 
land dispossession. For many Indigenous peoples, the casebook for learning natural law requires an 
intimate knowledge of how to read the world; understanding natural law from this point of view does 
not require an intimate knowledge of how to read legal philosophy.” Borrows provides a Gitxsan 
example of natural law interpretation at 32-35. In addition to natural law, Borrows identifies sacred 
law, deliberative law, positivistic law, and customary law as sources of indigenous legal traditions. 
See 23-55.  
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peacefully lead a virtuous life according to the higher ideals, values, and principles 
revealed in indigenous traditions. Similarly, Spinoza defines the “natural divine” 
law as having to do “solely with the highest good” or what he calls the “true 
knowledge and love of God.”55 Since “nothing can be or be conceived without 
God,” Spinoza reasons that everything in nature expresses the concept of God and 
that the more human beings “know natural things, the greater and more perfect is 
the knowledge of God which we acquire.”56 “The plan of living which has to do 
with this aim [to know and love God],” Spinoza concludes, “is best called the 
Divine law” or “natural divine Law.”57 Like Alfred’s understanding of “natural 
existence” to be a life reflecting the higher values and principles revealed in 
indigenous traditions, Spinoza describes the “divine plan of living” to be reflected 
in the “purification of the spirit, in the practice of habit of virtue or of good actions, 
and, finally, in bringing help to the poor.”58 Thus, for Spinoza, the end of the 
natural divine law is to peacefully practice the relational principles of love and 
justice as revealed in the biblical tradition. Since the natural and natural divine laws 
are not intrinsic to human nature, Alfred and Spinoza refer to them as “natural” and 
“natural divine” only because they are concerned with the highest aim all human 
beings are naturally capable of achieving through the cultivation of reason and 
virtue in community. Furthermore, these natural and natural divine laws transcend 
                                                 
55 TPT, 44-45.  
 
56 Ibid., 45.  
 
57 Ibid., 45-46.  
 
58 Ibid., 55.  
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autocratic legal orders by articulating universal principles that challenge peace-
suppressing autocratic authority.  
While the principles of natural and natural divine laws transcend autocratic 
legal orders by promoting peace with the self, Alfred and Spinoza show through an 
analysis of their ancestral histories that these laws can only be enacted through 
political laws. In Alfred’s Rotinohshonni tradition, it is the Kanienerekowa—the 
Great Law of Peace—that reveals the higher values and principles of the natural law 
to the Iroquois people. Alfred describes the Great Law of Peace as an “ancient 
mythic narrative” and “oral law” originating in the fourteenth century that was 
given to the his people by “Sonkwaiatison [the Creator] through his messenger in 
the personage of Deganawida [a Huron Peacemaker].”59 During a time of 
internecine war between the five Iroquois nations, the Peacemaker travelled across 
Lake Ontario into the land of the Iroquois and brought his ideas of peace and justice 
first to the Mohawk and then to the other Iroquois nations to unify the people under 
his system of religion and government.60 Alfred admits that while the story of the 
Peacemaker is “thoroughly infused with symbolism and mythology” the nature of 
the Peacemaker’s message and political ideas remain clear. As an example, Alfred 
cites the following section of the transcribed copy of the Great Law of Peace in 
which the Peacemaker addresses a wicked woman who symbolizes all those who 
initially resisted his basic message:  
The message I bring is that all people shall love one another and live together in 
peace. This message has three parts: peace, righteousness and power, and each 
                                                 
59 HVA, 80-81.  
 
60 Ibid., 80.  
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part has two branches. Health means soundness of mind and body. It also means 
Peace, for that is what comes when minds are sane and bodies cared for. 
Righteousness means justice practiced between men and nations. It means a 
desire to see justice prevail. It also means religion, for justice enforced is the 
will of the Creator and has his sanction.61 
 
The Great Law of Peace demonstrates that the “natural law” only has authority in 
the normative legal order where it is established as binding over a particular people 
and homeland. Just as Alfred describes how the natural law was revealed to his 
Iroquois ancestors by the Creator through the Prophet Deganawida and his Great 
Law of Peace, Spinoza demonstrates how the natural divine law was revealed to his 
Hebrew ancestors by God through the Prophet Moses and his Mosaic Law. In 
chapter 17 of TPT, Spinoza explains that since the Hebrews transferred to God all 
their natural power to preserve themselves, God alone “held the imperium of the 
Hebrews.”62 Under the Hebrews’ initial compact with God, political and divine 
laws were fused as one:  
In this [Hebrew] imperium, therefore, civil right and Religion—which, as we 
have shown consists solely in obedience toward God—were one and the same. 
Viz., the dogmas of religion were not lessons, but rights and commands; piety 
was regarded as justice, and impiety a crime and injustice. One who abandoned 
the Religion ceased to be a citizen and was by that fact alone considered an 
enemy; and one who died for the Religion was reputed to have died for the 
Fatherland; and, in short, there was absolutely no distinction between civil right 
and Religion.63  
 
Spinoza goes on to explain that the Hebrews abolished their first “compact” with 
God and transferred their right to “consult God and interpret his edicts to Moses 
                                                 
61 Ibid., italics mine.  
 
62 TPT, 195.  
 
63 Ibid., 196.  
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absolutely” who “remained the giver and interpreter of the divine laws.”64 Like 
Alfred’s analysis of the Iroquois history, Spinoza’s analysis of Hebrew history 
highlights how divine law can only be enacted through political laws binding over a 
particular people and place.  
For Alfred and Spinoza equally, then, the central issue for all legal orders is 
to balance political laws that promote collective security and well-being, with the 
higher natural and natural divine laws that promote peace with the self. In PPR, for 
example, Alfred interprets the Great Law as a “set of principles reflecting a set of 
values that were there before any type of [governmental] structure” and that it is 
these underlying values which are “essential, not the structure that evolved to 
perpetuate them.”65 In other words, Alfred maintains that the Mohawk must strive 
to practice the higher “natural law” values and principles of love and justice 
revealed in the Great Law of Peace in whatever modern form their governance 
system may take in the present and future. He therefore advises his indigenous 
readers “to keep the traditional teachings in your heart and mind. Adapt, change, go 
forward, but always make sure you’re listening to the traditional knowledge at the 
same time. Commit yourself to uphold the first principles and values.”66  Likewise, 
Spinoza takes a balanced, non-oppositional approach to divine and political laws. In 
chapter 18 of TPT, Spinoza writes that while the Hebrew imperium could have been 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 197.  
 
65 PPR, 127.  
 
66 Ibid., 20.  
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“eternal,” it could not be “imitated now, nor is it even advisable.”67 “For God’s 
compact is no longer written with ink and on stone tablets,” Spinoza goes on to 
explain, “but with God’s Spirit on the heart.”68 In other words, Spinoza maintains 
that it is not the formal governance structure that needs to be replicated. Rather, it is 
the universal and relational values of the natural divine law—love and justice—that 
human beings need to commit to as the true plan of living a life of peace. Since the 
natural divine law is inscribed on all people’s hearts, Spinoza further implies that no 
nation can claim that the divine law is only available in their political law. “It 
makes no difference whether God teaches and commands the true cultivation of 
justice and charity by the natural light or by revelation,” Spinoza explains, for how 
these relational principles are revealed “is not important, only that it obtain the 
highest right and be the highest law for human beings.”69 That is to say, all political 
regimes—whatever their tradition or location and however they may teach the 
natural divine law—are responsible for balancing the universals of love and justice 
with the political objective of maintaining security and well-being for a particular 
people.70 It is our philosophical guests’ holistic and balanced approach to the higher 
                                                 
67 TPT, 211.  
 
68 Ibid.  
 
69 Ibid., 220.  
 
70 My discussion on balancing natural divine law with political law has been drawing on 
Levene’s interpretive insights. See Spinoza’s Revelation, xii: “What Spinoza calls true religion is not 
the divine law taken in its pristine apolitical form as opposed to its false interpretations by flawed 
human beings. True religion is the exceedingly delicate and always unstable balance between the 
commands of God which issue in universal principles of justice and charity and the commands of the 
political sovereign whose concern is peace and security for its particular realm; false religion is 
simply the tipping of this balance at the expense of one side or the other. Religion, the divine law, 
can only be true if it is also political, human. Politics, human law, can only be true if it is also 
divine” 
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(natural, natural divine) and political laws that autocratic legal orders ultimately fail 
to practice, tipping the balance to secure their illegitimate power at the expense of 
practicing the universal principles of love and justice towards all.  
Together, Alfred and Spinoza’s conceptions of the natural and natural divine 
laws broaden our legal horizons and expose the restricted vision of the colonial 
legal order and its pretentious claim to (finite) supremacy. Far from being the 
supreme law of the land, we have witnessed how colonial law maintains its 
illegitimate power by generating fear and superstition, suppressing the people from 
exercising their critical reason, and ultimately failing to balance natural divine and 
political laws. These inadequacies of colonial law may be traced to the fact that, 
unlike indigenous legal traditions, they are not rooted in the land. Nancy Levene has 
perceptively suggested that Spinoza was critical of his own people continuing to 
practice their ancient Jewish laws outside of their homelands because he understood 
that enacting political laws on another people’s homeland tends to turn those laws 
into an oppressive force:  
Without occupying its land, that is, by occupying the land of another natio—it 
[the political law] loses its connection to social well-being, to power, becoming, 
instead of a liberating force (that by which a ‘free multitude’ can achieve 
independence from other nations) an enslaving one (PT V:6). It is only through 
the laws of the land that freedom is possible—competing laws serve 
simultaneously to distract attention from the channels of power and undermine 
them.71 
 
With its historical roots located elsewhere, colonial law on Turtle Island has 
ruthlessly undermined the channels of peace and power found in the indigenous 
                                                 
71 Ibid., 154-155.  
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legal traditions of the land.72 Removing the special prejudice of colonial law, Alfred 
and Spinoza articulate a vision of legal pluralism in which all peoples, as avengers 
of their own freedom, are responsible for balancing the laws of the land with the 
higher principles of love and justice within and between indigenous and non-
indigenous natios.  
3.3   Constructive Tools for Peaceful and Principled Self-Transformation   
 
With our legal horizons now broadened, we now move to a critical 
comparison of the way in which Alfred and Spinoza engage their ancestral 
traditions for constructive tools that help their people live peacefully by the higher 
principles revealed in their legal traditions. To be sure, our philosophical guests 
understand the majority of people in their historically different locations to be frail 
and prone to passions and superstitions, especially when enduring under the 
oppressive conditions of autocratic legal orders. To discern between the free-
thinking and those who remain in bondage to the affects and superstitions, Alfred 
and Spinoza respectively refer to the latter as the “colonized” and the “vulgar.” 
Given the weakened intellectual and moral state of the colonized and vulgar, our 
guests equally reject the claim that mere accessibility to legal traditions will 
guarantee the people will freely obey their laws with a steadfast spirit. At the 
                                                 
72 While I have described Canadian law as a form of autocratic legal order, I cautiously hold the 
same hope as Borrows that the legal future on Turtle Island can be otherwise. See Canada’s 
Indigenous Constitution, 282-283: “In working to expand our [indigenous] legal traditions it must be 
remembered that Canadian law derives its authority from appeals to precedent, consensus, reason, 
and consistency. It should also be remembered that Canadian law also derives its authority from 
force. . .  Fortunately, we have a choice about how we will respond to our multi-juridical heritage. 
We can choose to recognize, affirm, and apply Indigenous legal traditions alongside common law 
and civil law, or we can choose to deny their historic reality and contemporary force. The 
consequences of this choice will mark our country as progressive and open to legal guidance from 
the best of our traditions, or as oppressively fundamentalist and frozen in our orientation to law. 
There should be no doubt about my choice between these alternatives. I choose openness and 
freedom.” 
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beginning of Wasáse, for example, Alfred writes indigenous people first need to be 
regenerated in order to have the capacity to maintain their traditional laws and 
governance systems. For this reason he thinks it is naïve to believe that simply 
“resurrecting old [indigenous] laws” by itself will solve everything.73 Likewise, 
Spinoza is critical of the vulgar who are so concerned with dogmatic matters that 
they “do not seem to care for anything less than living by the lessons [the divine 
law of love and justice] of Sacred Scripture.”74 Notwithstanding their realistic 
assessments, Alfred and Spinoza also believe that the colonized and the vulgar can 
engage in genuine self-transformation. To this end, our philosophical guests 
reconstruct the warrior and prophet figures of their traditions as models of human 
nature to inspire individuals—both men and women—to achieve peaceful and 
principled self-transformation by cultivating virtue in obedience to the higher 
principles revealed in their legal traditions.75  
                                                 
73 Wasáse, 88, 31.  
 
74 TPT, 83.  
 
75 While my focus in this section is on the way in which Alfred’s warrior construct functions as 
an ancient ethical ideal that can guide indigenous people in their individual self-transformation 
processes, I acknowledge there are a range of alternative constructs and figures within both the 
Western and indigenous traditions that can be a source of inspiration for ethical self-fashioning, 
including the notion of the “peacemaker.” For this insight, I am indebted to Dr. Tully and the 
question he posed to me during my oral examination regarding the appropriateness of the warrior 
figure as a universal model for processes of ethical self-formation in light of Glen Sean Coulthard’s 
call for gender justice and decolonization. To be sure, I am not suggesting that the indigenous 
warrior figure, as Alfred re-works the construct, is inappropriate for women. I maintain that a 
decolonized, gender-emancipatory, non-violent reinterpretation of the warrior figure informed by 
indigenous languages and traditions and that focuses on virtuous character qualities, can be an 
empowering ideal for indigenous women. However, there are alternative ethical figures and 
constructs that are worth exploring (e.g. the prophet, artist, lifegiver, orator, etc.) for the simple 
reason that these constructs do not carry the negative (e.g. male-gendered, violent) connotations 
associated with the warrior figure. 
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 To clarify the meaning of “warrior” and “prophet’ as people who represent 
(embody, interpret) the law and lead peaceful, virtuous lives, Alfred and Spinoza 
explore the etymology of the terms within their ancestral languages. In Wasáse, 
Alfred explains that the ancient Kanienkeha (Mohawk) word for warrior is 
oyenko:ohntoh which literally translates in English as “the tobacco hanging.” In the 
context of the Mohawk longhouse, hanging tobacco medicine from the rafters is 
understood to protect the house from harm.76 Hence, the word oyenko:ohntoh 
signifies the warrior as a “sacred protector” of the longhouse and “reflects the 
notion of warriors of the people living the values and principles of the 
Kaienerkowa, the Great Law of Peace.”77 Drawing on his ancestral language, 
                                                 
76 Wasáse, 79.  
 
77 Ibid. By grounding his understanding of the “warrior” in his ancestral language, Alfred avoids 
the “male-gendered and soldiery image” of the warrior common in the European imagination. In 
addition to his Mohawk language, Alfred explores a variety of other indigenous languages for an 
understanding of what it means to be a warrior, from Kuna, Dakota, Dakelh, to Pawnee. See Alfred, 
Wasáse, 78-81. Alfred’s linguistic approach to defining the indigenous warrior is important in light 
of his claim that the “mystic warrior” stereotype of European origin has been internalized by some 
indigenous political leaders. See, for example, PPR,, 101: “At the other end of the spectrum is the 
‘Mystic Warrior,’ who thinks every day is a good day to die. For this type of person, Indiannness 
consists in conflict, and the only way to exist as an Indian is to withdraw into the mythic spiritual 
past and attack any semblance of modernity as betrayal. The attraction of this uncompromising 
persona is very powerful for people frustrated (as they inevitably are) by the effort to maintain a 
principled position in relations with non-indigenous governments – until the reality sets in that 
simply causing hell and discontent for white society cannot be a life purpose.” In contrast with the 
“Mystic Warrior,” Alfred identifies several kinds of warriors in Wasáse, from ordinary people 
applying a warrior ethic to their daily conflicts, to “sacred protectors” who place themselves in 
dangerous situations to contest colonial authority, to “knowledge warriors” who battle colonialism in 
the realm of ideas. For the modern origins of contemporary indigenous warrior societies, see 
Taiaiake Alfred and Lana Lowe, “What are warrior societies?” New Socialist 58 (September-
October 2006): 4-8. Alfred is not the only contemporary indigenous scholar in Canada who employs 
warrior discourse in his work. Dale Turner develops the notion of “word warriors” to describe 
indigenous intellectuals who engage the political and legal discourses of the state to defend the rights 
and sovereignty of their indigenous nations. See This Is Not a Peace Pipe, 88-93. For a Canadian 
scholar who reviews the way in which settler society has historically projected stereotypes and 
myths onto indigenous people like the “noble savage” warrior, see Daniel Francis, The Imaginary 
Indian: The Image of the Indian in Canadian Culture (Vancouver, BC: Arsenal Pulp Press, 1992). 
Compare, for example, Alfred’s Mohawk conception of the warrior with Benjamin West’s famous 
historical painting, “The Death of General Wolf”, which inaccurately depicts the English General 
James Wolf dying on the Plains of Abraham outside the walls of Quebec with a Mohawk warrior 
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Spinoza likewise explains that the ancient Hebrew word for “prophet” is navi and 
can be translated as “orator and interpreter.”78 Just as Alfred understands the 
ancestral word for “warrior” in the context of ceremony, Spinoza understands navi 
in the context of scripture. “Yet in Scripture,” Spinoza goes on to say, “navi is 
always usurped for an interpreter of God, as is gathered from Exodus 7:1.”79 In the 
annotation to this passage, Spinoza clarifies that “an interpreter of God is one who 
interprets God’s decrees [or laws] to others.”80 As upholders of their peoples’ laws, 
the peaceful warrior and prophet are equally known for their moral qualities. In 
PPR, Alfred explains that an appointed chief in the Kaienerekowa is chosen by clan 
mothers for their “personal adherence to the values of patience, courage, fairness, 
and generosity.”81 Given his high moral character, Alfred explains that an appointed 
chief is known as “royaner (literally ‘he is of the good’ in the Kanien’keha 
language).”82 Just as a chief of the Kaienerekowa “is of the good,” Spinoza explains 
that the most salient feature of a prophet is “a spirit inclined solely to the equitable 
and the good.”83 Prophets had a “special virtue above the common” and they 
“cultivated piety with extensive steadfastness of spirit.84” For example, Spinoza 
                                                                                                                                        
posing by his side as a “muscular sage” and “symbol of the natural virtue of the New World.” See 
The Imaginary Indian, 13-15.  
 
78 TPT, 1.  
 
79 Ibid.  
 
80 Ibid., 239.  
 
81 PPR, 114.  
 
82 Ibid. 
 
83 TPT, 19.  
 
84 Ibid., 13.  
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writes that prophets like Abraham, who “admonished his household to do the 
equitable and the good,” are to be praised and diligently commended “for piety and 
a steadfastness of spirit.”85 Both the warrior and the prophet are thus equally 
committed to upholding the people’s laws, protecting the household, and leading by 
virtuous example.   
 Alfred and Spinoza additionally represent the ancient warriors and prophets 
of their traditions as diverse individuals with exceptional imaginative, intellectual 
and political talents and skills. In Wasáse, for example, Alfred reflects on ancient 
warriors like Tecumseh and Crazy Horse who were successful against colonial 
military forces and identifies the characteristics that made them sought after 
military allies:  
They were adaptable, independent thinkers and flexible in responding to 
changes in plans and in situations. They had skills, were well-trained, and 
possessed the specific knowledge required to be effective in various types of 
battles and environments. They were disciplined, tough and stoic in the face of 
the extreme deprivations of war, including harsh mental and physical 
conditions. And they were motivated by the martial attitudes pervading 
Onkwehonwe societies.86 
 
At the end of Wasáse, Alfred returns to Tecumseh’s legacy, highlighting his 
contentious attitude towards political authority in his efforts to create more just 
indigenous-settler relations. “Tecumseh’s goal was to clear space on the ground for 
the free and unfettered existence of Onkwehonwe. His goal was not to live without 
white government, culture and society, but to live against them.”87 Spinoza 
                                                 
85 Ibid., 24-25.  
 
86 Wasáse, 84-85.  
 
87 Ibid., 282. The Shawnee/Creek Chief Tecumseh is regarded as one the greatest indigenous 
leaders during the period of resistance to European settlement. In the War of 1812-14, Tecumseh led 
A Post-Delgamuukw Philosophical Feast:  
Feeding the Ancestral Desire for Peaceful Coexistence   
 
160 
similarly highlights the strengths and qualities of the diverse prophets of the biblical 
tradition. For instance, just as Alfred regards the ancient warriors as independent 
and flexible thinkers Spinoza celebrates the way in which the prophets were 
endowed with a “more vivid power of imagining than the rest.”88 Spinoza goes so 
far as to say that the imagination of the prophets, “insofar as God’s decrees were 
revealed through it, could also be called the mind of God, and the prophets could be 
said to have had the mind of God.”89 While Spinoza generally evaluates the 
prophets to have stronger imaginations than intellects, he recognizes Solomon as a 
prophetic figure known more for his rational understanding than his prophecy. For 
instance, Spinoza describes Solomon as the author of the book of Proverbs “who 
speaks by force of the natural light [i.e., reason]” and whose “prophecy and piety 
are not commended in the sacred books so much as his prudence and wisdom.”90 In 
addition to their imaginative and intellectual abilities, Spinoza highlights the 
Tecumseh-like political contentious actions of the prophets. In chapter18 of TPT, 
Spinoza writes that it is “worthy of being noted that the Prophets—being private 
men—by their freedom to admonish, scold and reprove, provoked rather than 
corrected human beings.”91 Spinoza goes on to say that the prophets were so 
                                                                                                                                        
warriors of more than 30 indigenous nations and was ultimately killed in battle. For a biography, see 
John Sugden, Tecumseh (New York, NY: Henry Holt, 1997). For Tecumseh’s legacy in the context 
of indigenous-settler history, see Olivia Patricia Dickason with David T McNab, Canada’s First 
Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times, 4th ed. (Don Mills, ON: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 186-192. 
 
88 TPT, 17.  
 
89 Ibid., 13.  
 
90 Ibid., 50.  
 
91 Ibid., 213.  
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politically contentious that “they were often intolerable even to pious Kings, on 
account of the authority they had to judge what was done piously or impiously, and 
even to chastise the Kings themselves if they continued to enact public or private 
business contrary to their [moral] judgement.”92 Overall, then, the ancient warriors 
and prophets not only embodied moral integrity and respect for the principles and 
values of the law, they also had well-rounded skills and qualities ranging from 
creativity and rationality to martial and political bravery. 
 In order to ensure these multi-skilled ethical figures of peace remain 
relevant as universal models of human nature to both men and women of all 
heritages, Alfred and Spinoza carefully eschew sexism and ethnocentrism in their 
respective analyses of the warrior and prophet. For example, in light of the fact that 
men traditionally held the warrior roles in indigenous societies, Alfred insists in 
Wasáse that it is untenable to “hold on to a concept of the warrior that is gendered 
in the way it once was and that is located in an obsolete view of men’s and 
women’s roles.”93 Since the battles indigenous people are fighting are no longer 
primarily physical, Alfred concludes “any idea of the indigenous warrior framed 
solely in masculine terms is outdated and must be rethought and recast. . . [in terms 
of] what really counts in our struggles: the qualities and the actions of a person, 
man or woman, in battle.”94 In contrast with the traditionally male-gendered 
                                                                                                                                        
 
92 Ibid.  
 
93 Wasáse, 84.  
 
94 Ibid. For an insightful commentary on Alfred’s placement of gender in his theoretical 
framework, see Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks, 157: “I would suggest that there are two reasons 
that inform the inclusion of a gendered component to Alfred’s more recent position. First, and most 
importantly, the crucial interventions of Indigenous feminist scholarship and activism over the years 
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understanding of the indigenous warrior, Spinoza celebrates the fact that biblical 
prophets were not exclusively male. For example, Spinoza recognizes that “indeed, 
young women, too, like Abraham’s handmaid Hagar, were endowed with the 
Prophetic gift” and implicitly praises and commends such young women as models 
of “piety and a steadfastness of spirit” as much as he praises patriarchs like 
Abraham.95 In addition to their feminist sensibilities, Alfred and Spinoza articulate 
respect for culturally diverse understandings of the universal ideals of the warrior 
and prophet. Alfred acknowledges that far from “Onkwehonwe ancients” being “the 
only people who were strong warriors” there are a “myriad of examples of cultures 
bringing to reality the universal [warrior] concept of devotion to service, self-
discipline, and the ethic of courage.”96 Alfred draws on the specific examples of 
Buddhist and Japanese Samurai teachings that encourage kindness, generosity, 
                                                                                                                                        
have made it impossible for any credible scholar working within the field to ignore the centrality of 
sexism to the colonial aims of land dispossession and sovereignty usurpation. . . Second, I also think 
that gender figures its way into Alfred’s more recent work because of the explicit collapse of any 
ends/means distinction in his notion of resurgence.”  
 
95 TPT, 17, 24. Spinoza’s recognition of prophetic women as models of true virtue and 
steadfastness of spirit contradicts his later remarks made in PT that “women do not naturally possess 
equal right with men” because they are not “equally endowed with strength of mind and ability—
qualities wherein human power and consequently human right consists” (11.4). There are two 
reasons for privileging Spinoza’s views of (prophetic) women in TPT over his remarks about women 
made in PT. First, Spinoza’s PT remarks are found at the end of an incomplete chapter and text. As 
well, Spinoza’s recognition of women like Hagar as virtuous prophets in TPT implies that women 
not only have the strength of mind and requisite ability to be equal citizens of democracy but to be 
exemplary citizens. I therefore agree with Beth Lord’s thesis that Spinoza’s remarks in PT are not 
meant to be read as true statements but as prompts for critical consideration of the place of women in 
the progressive democratic polity. See Beth Lord, “Disempowered by Nature: Spinoza on the 
Political Capabilities of Women,” in British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19, no. 6 (2011): 
1085-1106. For the leading feminist scholars working in the field of Spinoza studies, see Moira 
Gatens, ed., Feminist Interpretations of Benedict Spinoza (University Park: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2009). For a discussion on Spinoza’s relevance to feminist philosophy, see Susan 
James Interviews Genevieve Lloyd and Moira Gatens, “The Power of Spinoza: Feminist 
Conjunctions,” in Hypatia 15, no. 2 (2000): 40-58.  
 
96 Alfred, Wasáse, 85, 87. For a Gitxsan understanding of the warrior concept inspired by the 
Mohawk of Kahnasatake, see ‘Wii Muk’ Willixw (Art Wilson), Heartbeat of the Earth, 66-67. 
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honesty, and altruism.97 In a similar way, Spinoza admits “there is no doubt that all 
nations had Prophets and that the Prophetic gift was not peculiar to the Jews.”98 
While Spinoza writes that “both the profane [i.e. secular] and the sacred [i.e. 
biblical] histories attest” to the fact that all nations had prophets, he does not cite 
specific examples of prophets from other nations. 99 Rather, Spinoza cites several 
Gentile prophets in the Old Testament to demonstrate that diverse peoples outside 
                                                 
97 For Alfred’s reference to the Japanese Samurai prayer see, Wasáse, 87: “The ideal [of the 
warrior] was expressed most elegantly, perhaps, in the fourteenth century Japanese Samurai prayer 
that has come to be widely known among practitioners of the martial arts as the Warrior’s Creed[:] I 
have no divine power. I make honesty my divine power. I have no magic secrets. I make character 
my magic secret. I have no sword. I make absence of self my sword.” And for Alfred’s Buddhist 
warrior reference see, 88: “Are they [people who claim to be indigenous warriors] kind and 
generous, living for others, especially the poor, in what Buddhist teachers call accepting 
responsibility for being ‘the strength of the weak’. . . ”  
 
98 TPT, 36.  
 
99 Ibid. I differ here with Polka on the implications of Spinoza’s lack of non-biblical sources of 
Gentile prophets. To defend his overall project of locating Spinoza and the Bible in modernity, 
separate from the premodern Greco-Roman pagan tradition, Polka goes to great lengths to show that 
the logic Spinoza uses to arrive at the conclusion that all nations had prophets (including the Greco-
Roman nations) actually demonstrates the opposite, viz. that prophets (teachers of universal love as 
true virtue) were exclusive to the biblical tradition. Polka further argues that Spinoza’s neglect to cite 
examples of Gentile prophets from Gentile sources suggests that pagan (i.e. Greco-Roman) nations 
did not have knowledge of the prophetic teaching of love. For Polka, this nicely explains the absence 
of any (modern) democratic form of governance based on the golden rule of love in Greco-Roman 
history, a form of governance he contends only emerged with the modern and biblical Spinoza. 
Polka therefore concludes, to maintain the integrity of his thesis, that the prophetic teaching, while 
accessible to all, was revealed first and only in the biblical tradition despite Spinoza’s explicit claims 
to the contrary. While I agree with Polka that what is at stake in Spinoza’s claim that all nations had 
prophets is the content of biblical prophecy, viz. the universality of true virtue, and hence the 
prophet figure as a universal model of human nature, I take Spinoza to mean what he says when he 
states that both “profane and the sacred histories attest” to the fact that all nations had prophets and 
thus all nations had knowledge of the universal teaching of love (TPT, 36). Further, the fact that 
Spinoza chooses to support his claim vis-à-vis biblical logic rather than by citing evidence from 
Gentile sources should not be viewed as a decision made due to a lack of evidence from Gentile 
sources. Rather, Spinoza’s decision to use biblical logic rather than Gentile sources to support his 
claim can be read as an attempt to accommodate his ideas to his predominantly Christian audience. 
In other words, Spinoza believed it to be more persuasive to argue in biblical terms that all nations 
had prophets rather than cite (profane, pagan, secular) texts that were not regarded as authoritative in 
the minds of his Christian readers. However, even if we read this as a Spinozistic accommodation, 
sharp Calvinist readers, in Straussian terms, regarded TPT as blasphemous for ridiculing their claims 
to chosenness (esoterically) while disputing Hebrew claims (exoterically). I am indebted to Dr. 
Grant Havers for bringing this Straussian point to my attention. For Polka’s full treatment on this 
matter, see Between Philosophy and Religion: Spinoza, the Bible, and Modernity Volume 1: 
Hermeneutics and Ontology (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 60-63.  
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of the Hebrew nation had prophetic leaders with a “spirit inclined solely to the 
equitable and the good.”100 By acknowledging women as warriors and prophets and 
the presence of warriors and prophets in other traditions, Alfred and Spinoza 
maintain the universality of these historical figures as virtuous models of human 
nature.  
While our philosophical guests believe there are very few warriors and 
prophets living in their present societies, if any at all, they equally recognize the 
need for the colonized and vulgar to cultivate the qualities and skills of the ancient 
warriors and prophets in order to achieve peace with the self. Alfred explains that 
there are no movements for change among indigenous peoples because of the “sad 
fact that there are hardly any more warriors, sacred or otherwise” as a result of 
colonization.101 Alfred elaborates on this point:  
Colonization has changed everything about the way we live our lives. Our 
nations were made up of strong families that supported each other by intense 
extended affiliations and the supportive networks of clans. . . Most clearly 
different from the way we live our lives, our ancestors lived in a culture and 
society of warriors.102 
 
Just as Alfred understands contemporary warriors to be few and far between, 
Spinoza expresses uncertainty as to whether there are any prophets at all in his age. 
“And since nowadays we do not have any prophets that I know of,” Spinoza 
tentatively concludes, “nothing is left for us except to roll out the sacred scrolls left 
                                                 
100 TPT, 37-38.  
 
101 Wasáse, 82.  
 
102 Ibid., 83-84.  
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to us by the Prophets.”103 By adding the caveat “that I know of,” Spinoza maintains 
the possibility that there may be prophets in his times. More provocatively, 
Spinoza’s philosophical guidance offered in Ethica to achieve peace with the self 
tacitly recommends the cultivation of the qualities and skills possessed by the 
ancient prophets.104 For example, Spinoza stresses the importance of his readers 
disciplining their power of imagining, the very quality the ancient prophets held 
above the common, in order to achieve freedom and peace from passions and 
superstitions:  
The best thing, then, that we can do, so long as we do not have perfect 
knowledge of our affects is to conceive a correct principle of living, or sure 
maxims of life to commit them to memory, and to apply them constantly to the 
particular cases frequently encountered in life. In this way our imagination will 
be extensively affected by them, and we shall always have them ready.105 
 
Spinoza’s “sure maxims” serve to cultivate the moral qualities or “true virtue” 
possessed by the ancient prophets. For instance, one of the maxims of life is that 
“hate is to be conquered by love, or nobility, not by repaying it with hate in 
return.”106 Through the power of imagining, individuals meditate on the “common 
wrongs of men” and how they may be “warded off” by love and nobility. “For if we 
join the image of a wrong to the imagination of this maxim,” Spinoza ensures his 
readers, “it will always be ready for us when a wrong is done to us.”107 Spinoza 
claims that what stems from this “right principle of living” or “true plan of life” is 
                                                 
103 TPT, 2, italics mine.  
 
104 PT, 5.2.  
 
105 E V p10s.  
 
106 Ibid.  
 
107 Ibid.  
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the “highest satisfaction [i.e. peace] of mind.”108 He further adds that bravery and 
courage, the qualities embodied by the ancient prophets who contested political 
authority, can be similarly cultivated through the power of imagining. “To put aside 
fear,” Spinoza advises, “we must think in the same way of tenacity: that is, we must 
recount and frequently imagine the common dangers of life, and how they can be 
best avoided and overcome by presence of mind and strength of character.”109 
Spinoza’s remarks imply that the ancient prophets were able to cultivate true virtue, 
peace, and political bravery through the practiced disciplining of their vivid 
imaginations. More importantly, he advises the vulgar of his own time—those with 
“imperfect knowledge of their affects”—to do likewise in order to achieve peace 
with the self.110  
 While Spinoza guides the vulgar to cultivate the moral, imaginative, and 
intellectual qualities and skills that are tacitly inspired by the ancient prophets, 
                                                 
108 Ibid.  
 
109 Ibid.  
 
110 Michael A. Rosenthal has provided a similar scholarly analysis of how the rational maxims 
stated in E V p10s requires the power of imagining, the affects, and a fictive model of ideal human 
nature. However, although Rosenthal interprets Spinoza’s TPT as recommending that human beings 
critically draw on exemplary historical narratives as guides for collective ethical action, when he 
turns to E V p10s he does not connect its rational maxims to the “prophet” model of ideal human 
nature as I have done here. See “Spinoza and the Philosophy of History,” in Interpreting Spinoza, ed. 
Charlie Heunemann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 125-126: “In the Theological-
Political Treatise, instead of suggesting that we do away with historical narratives, he argues that we 
need to use reason in order to properly understand them, and then use them to guide our collective 
action. In the Ethics, although he criticizes inadequately conceived grand narratives, such as those 
concerning God’s providential direction of the world, Spinoza does think that there is a role for 
narratives in his ethical project. In order to realize the model of human nature towards which we 
strive, the fictional ideal of the ‘free man,’ we must conceive our life as a kind of story that we write. 
Not only are the methods of the two works related, but so is the content. Since our ability to achieve 
our individual goals depends in part on the political situation in which we find ourselves, the 
individual ethical narrative will be related in myriad ways to the collective historical imagination. 
The rational individual will demand a reform of national history as an essential part of the reform of 
his or her self-understanding.”  
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Alfred explicitly draws on the warrior figure to inspire the colonized to achieve 
peace with the self. “The same independence and flexibility, skills and training, 
discipline and motivation that were the marks of our warrior ancestors,” Alfred 
writes in Wasáse, “are the very things that we need to recreate and channel among 
our people today.”111 In Alfred’s view, the ethos and ethic of “the new warrior” is 
reflected in the “free speaker, an independent and creative thinker, and to live direct 
and radical action.”112 Moreover, the new warriors live by the creed of being 
“motivated in action by an instinctual sense of responsibility to alleviate suffering 
and to recreate the conditions of peace and happiness.”113 Just as Spinoza 
emphasizes an experiential process of meditating on “sure maxims” of love and 
courage and acting on these maxims in situations that provoke hate and fear, Alfred 
describes the experiential nature of learning to think and act as a warrior:  
The process is definitely one of experience, risk, experiment, and exploration of 
new-found psychological, intellectual, and emotional terrains. . . There are 
relationship costs to be paid by the warrior on the path of truth. The ignorance, 
hostility, jealousy, scorn, and even aggression of still-colonized Indians and 
aboriginals are very real factors. But to persevere in spite of these negative 
attitudes is to break through to the freedom to recreate our persons, identities, 
and relationships.114 
 
To support indigenous peoples in their personal decolonization process, Alfred 
recommends the “ancient warrior way” of self-transformation encouraged through 
“one-to-one mentoring, face-to-face interaction, and small group dialogue to effect 
                                                 
111 Wasáse, 85.  
 
112 Ibid., 83.  
 
113 Ibid., 86.  
 
114 Ibid., 88.  
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the regeneration of our minds, bodies, and spirits.”115 Similarly, Spinoza informs 
readers of Ethica who are committed to cultivating prophet-like qualities that it is 
“especially useful to men to form associations, to bind themselves by those bonds 
most apt to make one people of them, and absolutely, to do those things which serve 
to strengthen friendships.”116  
 So while Alfred and Spinoza express doubt about the presence of warriors 
and prophets in their times, the philosophical guidance they offer holds the 
colonized and vulgar responsible for transforming their human natures to reflect the 
exemplary, peaceful character of the ancient warriors and prophets. For Alfred and 
Spinoza equally, to become a warrior or a prophet is to engage in a process of 
personal de-vulgarization or decolonization. Such a process allows individuals—
men and women alike—to discipline their imaginations in a way that cultivates a 
steadfast obedience to the higher principles of their legal traditions.117 In other 
words, our philosophical guests ultimately demonstrate that peace with the self is 
achieved by emulating the virtue that springs from the strength of mind and 
character possessed by the ancient warriors and prophets.118   
                                                 
115 Ibid., 279.  
 
116 E VI App.XII.  
 
117 For a perceptive scholarly analysis of Spinoza’s notion of the imagination as it bears on the 
development of democratic laws within a polity, see Susan James, “Democracy and the Good Life in 
Spinoza’s Philosophy,” in Interpreting Spinoza, 129: “My aim in this chapter is to explore. . .  
Spinoza’s view of the role played by the imagination in the exercise of sovereignty. Successful 
sovereigns, as he describes them, need to deploy the skills of prophets in order to devise legal 
systems that their subjects will obey (All politics, one might say, is in this sense prophetic). While 
Spinoza gives us reasons for concluding that the ends of the state are in principle best realised under 
a democratic constitution, the art of creating and sustaining a democracy depends on the imaginative 
ability of sovereign. . . subjects to legitimate and realize a democratic way of life.” 
 
118 It is important to note the similarities and differences between Alfred and Spinoza’s respective 
warrior and prophet narrative texts—Wasáse and TPT—in relation to their homelands. In light of 
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4.4  Serving Wo’os: Wiigyat and His Wife 
 
We have feasted on several ideas to help us in our personal work of making 
peace with our selves and our legal traditions. We began by remembering Gwaans 
and her gawagaani teaching that the Gitxsan ayook or law, far from being an 
archaic thing of the past, is an on-going intergenerational process sustained between 
the Elders and youth of each wilp network. Such a dynamic and dialogical 
conception of ayook challenged Mr. Macaulay’s limited and fixed conception of the 
colonial legal order. By engaging Alfred and Spinoza’s ideas, the premise of 
colonial legal supremacy held by Mr. Macaulay was further deconstructed as an 
empty pretension of an autocratic legal order. Our philosophical guests then 
expanded our legal horizons with their complementary visions of legal pluralism 
based on their respective notions of natural and natural divine law. Next, we 
witnessed how Alfred and Spinoza self-consciously reconstructed the warrior and 
prophet figures of their traditions to inspire the people—the Onkwehonwe and 
multitudo—to steadfastly obey the higher principles of their legal traditions and 
achieve peace with the self.  
                                                                                                                                        
how colonization has disconnected indigenous peoples from their responsibilities and respect for 
their homelands, Alfred understands the purpose of his warrior-spirited Wasáse to be one of 
reconnecting indigenous people to their land inspired by the warrior ethic (see his Preface to PPR, 
5). Although Spinoza does not self-identify as a prophet or explicitly endorse a prophet ethic for his 
Dutch readers to emulate in TPT, I would argue that one can read Spinoza’s prophet-spirited TPT as 
narrating biblical (prophetic) histories in the context of Dutch politics of the seventeenth century in 
order to inspire the Dutch people to democratic action and self-transformation in their religious and 
political practices. Reading TPT in this way helps us appreciate the way in which Spinoza begins 
and concludes TPT—he respectfully submits his theologico-political narrative text to the “Powers” 
and “laws” of his “Fatherland” (TPT, xxiii, 237). These are the only passages where Spinoza 
identifies the Netherlands as his homeland. Thus, while Alfred seeks to re-connect to the homelands 
he and his people were dispossessed of through colonization, Spinoza seeks to connect to a new 
homeland as a Dutch citizen born of Portuguese-Jewish immigrants displaced from their Portuguese 
homelands through Catholic imperial persecution. It is therefore due to their different historical 
experiences with disruptive imperial processes that accounts for their distinct understandings of the 
relation between their narrative texts and their homelands.    
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Informed by the ideas shared by Gwaans and our philosophical guests, I 
conclude by self-consciously serving a trickster story of matrimonial law. In 
Wiigyat and His Wife, the trickster’s marriage crumbles after he practices infidelity 
towards the ayook or laws of the land.  
   Wiigyat’s fortunes had changed. He had found a wife who supplied him with 
all the food he could eat! Wiigyat gorged and gorged on salmon, yet for every 
salmon he ate his busy wife hung two new ones on the drying racks. They had 
houses full of dried salmon. Whenever his wife went fishing salmon 
miraculously appeared at her feet.  
 
While the vulgar Wiigyat may think his wife’s fishing success miraculous, as we 
will soon see the true cause of her success is her steadfast obedience to the laws of 
the land expressed in respect for all diverse modes of nature.  
    This wife was not only busy, she was beautiful. Her flame-colored hair 
sparkled like those chips off the sun, the stars. Wiigyat greatly admired this hair 
and wished his could be the same.  
    Wiigyat’s wife knew, without being told, that Wiigyat wanted hair like hers. 
So because she was two-spirited like Wiigyat, possessing both human and 
divine spirits, and because she loved the Big Man she had married, she gave 
Wiigyat hair that gleamed like her own.  
    Wiigyat was so happy! A good wife, a full stomach, and radiant hair! What 
more could a man ask for? His journeying seemed at an end.  
 
When one lives by the laws of the appetite, as Wiigyat shamelessly does, the 
journey indeed ends with the gratification of base desire. Governed as he is by the 
passions and superstitions, Wiigyat cannot fathom the higher telos or purpose of 
living by the principles and values of the natural divine law, the ayook of the land. 
    One day, as Wiigyat walked through the smokehouse, a drying humpback 
salmon caught in his hair.  
    Quick-tempered Wiigyat tore the humpback off the drying bar on which it 
hung and flung the fish to the floor where it landed among the ashes.  
    As Wiigyat did this, he spoke roughly to the salmon. ‘You of the big, ugly 
hump, how dare you disturb the order of my fine, red hair. The ashes are too 
good for you, clumsy, careless one!’  
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Like a true autocrat, Wiigyat acts as though he has no relations, as though he were a 
“dominion within a dominion.”119 The Big Man falsely believes he has the authority 
to verbally debase and violently attack anything that threatens his sense of 
superiority. The moral ugliness of his degrading actions towards the humpback 
salmon betrays the beauty of his red hair gifted to him by his wife. While Wiigyat 
does not respect the humpback as a member of a dignified salmon people, his better 
half thinks and acts otherwise.120 
    Without saying a word, Wiigyat’s wife put down her cutting tool and left the 
house. She walked to the water. There, making a sound that was half whistle 
and half the moaning of the surf, she disappeared in the water.  
    When she gave her whistling call, the fish in the houses came to life and one 
by one they followed the red headed woman into the water. They never came 
back.  
 
                                                 
119 E III pref.  
 
120 In her legal analysis of the Gitxsan story of the First Salmon Celebration, Val Napoleon 
highlights how regarding the salmon as a distinct people is a precondition for making explicit the 
legal principles implicit in the story, see Ayook: Gitksan Legal Order, Law, and Legal Theory 
(Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Victoria Faculty of Law, 2009), 269: “The Gitksan 
antamahlaswx [stories shared by all Gitxsan] and adaawk [personal stories owned by each wilp 
network] are integral to the Gitksan legal order – at an informal, implicit level as well as at a formal, 
explicit level. . . In the story, ‘The First Salmon Celebration’, the man who is taken by the salmon 
returns and tells the Gitksan the laws of the salmon. These laws are still in effect today.’ The laws of 
the salmon are recognized by the Gitksan through an understanding of the salmon as a people with 
whom the Gitksan have a reciprocal partnership. This is at once an implicit and explicit 
understanding of the salmon – the background of tacit shared understandings must enable an ability 
to imagine and understand the salmon as a people, and it is on this implicit basis that explicit law is 
revealed over time.” This level of appreciation and respect for non-human natures is not present in 
Spinoza’s philosophy. Compare, for example, Napoleon’s views with Spinoza’s statements made in 
E IV p37s1: “It is clear that the law against killing animals is based more on empty superstition and 
unmanly compassion than sound reason. The rational principle of seeking our own advantage 
teaches us to establish a bond with men, but not with the lower animals, or with things whose nature 
is different from human nature. . . Indeed, because the right of each one is defined by his virtue, or 
power, men have a far greater right against the lower animals than they have against men. Not that I 
deny that the lower animals have sensations [as Descartes did]. But I do deny that we are therefore 
not permitted to consider our own advantage, use them at our pleasure, and treat them as is most 
convenient for us. For they do not agree in nature with us, and their affects are different in nature 
from human affects.” 
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Here we discover Wiigyat’s wife, a woman equally endowed with human and 
divine spirits, upholding the laws of the land. As the authoritative legal decision-
maker, she immediately responds to the harm caused by her husband. Her legal 
reasoning is transparently based on the principle of respect. By calling the 
humpback salmon back to the waters, she restores balance and peace to the harmed 
community.  
    As the fish disappeared, Wiigyat’s hair began to fall out. ‘Don’t, hair! Don’t, 
oh don’t!’ begged Wiigyat. But the hair continued to fall. It lay on the ground in 
a pile. Wiigyat picked it up and tried to replace it on his head but his own black 
coarse hair had grown back. His own hair seemed very ugly indeed. 
 
When the laws of the land are practiced and maintained, the hideousness of an 
autocratic legal order is naturally exposed. More importantly, the loss of Wiigyat’s 
radiant locks reveals the mental grief that comes with violating the laws of the land. 
Peace, as a state of mind unencumbered by grief and suffering, is not possible 
without steadfast obedience to the higher principles revealed in the legal traditions 
of the land.121  
    Too late Wiigyat realized he had committed an unpardonable crime, he had 
broken the law that decreed that no one must speak roughly or rudely to a 
creature of nature. As a punishment, his good fortune, like his wife and his hair, 
had vanished. Sadly he journeyed on alone.122 
 
Wiigyat’s solitary journey prefigures the fate of all those who chase after the false 
idol of finite colonial legal supremacy: they will find themselves divorced from the 
channels of peace and power implicit in indigenous legal traditions and as a result 
                                                 
121 Recall Audra Simpson’s Mohawk description of peace in her dialogue with Alfred, Wasase, 
161: “[Peace] is when people’s minds are aligned—when your mind or the collective mind is 
unencumbered by grief or by suffering.”  
 
122 K’san Book Builders, “We-gyet and His Wife,” in We-gyet Wanders On, 22. I have 
interrupted and made minor modifications to parts of this story for style and content. 
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lack well-being. Unlike his two-spirited wife, the trickster refused to faithfully 
practice law as an inter-societal process. Hence, it is not the Big Man but rather the 
Big Woman that is the true model of virtuous human nature for the wilp-centric 
Gitxsan Nation. Wiigyat’s eco-feminist warrior wife inspires all Gitxsan wilp 
members living today to work towards regenerating, honouring, and defending 
ayook for the benefit of all peoples, human and non-human alike. Ultimately, it is 
only in our collective striving to be like the trickster’s better half that we can 
individually experience peace of mind as contemporary Gitxsan eco-feminist 
warriors.    
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CHAPTER 5: 
GAWAGAANI DI ‘NIIN 
This [indigenous] spiritually rooted notion of revolution differentiates between 
opponents as adversary or enemy. Ascribing the term enemy means that we seek 
his annihilation or obliteration through the application of forces driven by hatred, 
a relationship which throughout history has generated countless and endless 
cycles of violence. Considering him as an adversary, on the other hand, implies 
that we have the objective of transformation driven by compassion achieved 
through teaching generating relations of love. 
–Taiaiake Alfred1  
 
He who wishes to avenge wrongs by hating in return surely lives miserably. On 
the other hand, one who is eager to overcome hate by love, strives joyously and 
confidently, resists many men as easily as one, and requires the least help from 
fortune. Those whom he conquers yield joyously, not from a lack of strength, but 
from an increase in their powers.  
–Benedict Spinoza2  
 
Gawagaani di ‘niin announces the relational shift in our feast dialogue from making 
peace with the self to making peace with the other. While ni’y signifies the “I” rooted in 
the Gitxsan wilp network, ‘niin signifies the relational “you.” In response to our new 
topic, our philosophical guests express their shared understanding that love is the central 
force that can ultimately overcome hostile relations between the self and the other, the 
ni’y and the ‘niin. A critical precondition for loving the hostile other is the will to 
imagine him as a human being with dignity; the revolutionary act of regarding the other 
as an adversary rather than an enemy as Alfred puts it. Indeed, far more than competing 
claims about land and governance, we will see that what was at stake in the Delgamuukw 
trial were competing ways of imagining the other.  
 Continuing with the li’ligit protocol of am goosinsxw, we begin our feast dialogue 
by remembering Gisdaywa and his Wet’suwet’en understanding of the Gitxsan other as a 
                                                 
1 Wasáse, 202.  
 
2 E IV p46s.  
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civic partner and loving kin. We will contrast Gisdaywa’s imagining with Justice 
McEachern’s hostile imagining of the Gitxsan-Wet’suwet’en peoples as uncivilized 
others. As part of the li’ligit protocol of k’otsgesxw, we will dialogically engage and 
receive Alfred and Spinoza’s ideas and witness how Justice McEachern’s notion of the 
uncivilized indigenous other is a defective product of the European imagination. We will 
then critically compare the way in which our philosophical guests draw on their traditions 
for constructive tools capable of building democratic relationships of love. Whether it is 
the Two Row Wampum or the Hebrew Pactum, our philosophical guests find inspiration 
in their ancestral treaty models for extending love towards the foreign other. Mentally 
nourished by the ideas of Gisdaywa and our philosophical guests, I conclude by serving 
wo’os in the form of a trickster story about negotiating alterity. In Wiigyat and Lynx, we 
learn how peaceful relations with the other always involve mutual consent, great effort, 
and reciprocal respect and gratitude for the other’s differences.  
5.1 Remembering Gisdaywa 
Gisdaywa (Alfred Joseph) of the gitumden clan from the village of Tse Kya 
(Hagwilget) was the fourth sim’oogit to take the stand and share his kungax with the 
court on behalf of his wilp and wil’naa’t’ahl. On January 12, 1988, under cross-
examination by Ms. Koenigsberg, legal counsel for the government of Canada, Gisdaywa 
responds to questions about one of his adopted house members named Rita George:  
Ms. Koenigsberg: And she was adopted, was she, before she became a member of 
Gisdaywa in another House? 
Gisdaywa: Yes.  
Ms. Koenigsberg: What House was that?  
Gisdaywa: Spookw 
Ms. Koenigsberg: And is that a House in the Gitksan nation? 
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Gisdaywa: Well, it’s Spookw’s—Spookw had, as I said before, close ties with the 
Wet’suwet’en, so they had relations on both sides.3  
 
Gisdaywa attempts to teach Ms. Koenigsberg that Gitxsan-Wet’suwet’en relations are a 
shared form of existence in which the ni’y and the ‘niin are intimately linked by wilp 
networks. Ms. Koenigsberg, however, is not interested in the way in which the 
Wet’suwet’en understand and relate to the Gitxsan other but in undermining the 
legitimacy of the Gitxsan-Wet’suwet’en feast system. To this end, she questions 
Gisdaywa about a trapline allocated to Rita George at a “trapline workshop” held in 
Morricetown in 1982:  
Ms. Koenigsberg: Now Rita George is a holder of trapline in the territory of Woos. 
Gisdaywa: I believe she has. 
Ms. Koenisgberg: That trapline was not allocated at a feast then, isn’t that correct?  
Gisdaywa: Well, at times, if, it’s going to a Gitdumden person, they are told that you 
may use that territory. If Rita was a Gitdumden [clan member], she could be 
instructed, if she wanted to go to the, to go ahead.  
Ms. Koenigsberg: All right. Why would Rita George, who in 1982 was a member of 
the House of Gisdaywa, be allocated a trapline in the House of Woos? 
Gisdaywa: The same reason my grandmother, who was in the House of Kaiyweniits, 
was given permission to use the territory around New Hazelton by Chief Spookw. 
She was – my grandmother was a Gitdumden, and Chief Spookw told her you can use 
that territory around New Hazelton.  
Ms. Koenigsberg: Well, you’re saying, if I understand you, that permission was 
given and that there was a clan relationship.  
Gisdaywa: Yes.4 
 
The civic system of wilp networks and clan alliances is the relational basis of the 
Gitxsan-Wet’suwet’en nation-to-nation partnership.5 It is a partnership based on the 
                                                 
3 Trial Transcripts, Delgamuukw v. The Queen in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Action No. 
0843, Smithers Registry, 2541. 
 
4 Ibid., 2543. 
 
5 I am describing the Gitxsan-Wet’suwet’en relationship as a “civic” rather than a “civil” partnership in 
light of Tully’s distinction between the imperial tradition of “civil” and “cosmopolitan” forms of 
citizenship grounded in the European nation-state’s legal, rights-oriented approach, and the non-imperial, 
grassroots, praxis-oriented “civic” and “diverse” forms of citizenship that Tully refers to as “glocal” 
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guiding li’ligit principle of hlo’omsxw expressed through the sharing of resources 
between clans. While Ms. Koenigsberg appears here to understand the shared civic 
existence between the Wet’suwet’en and Gitxsan Nations, Justice McEachern imagines 
the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en otherwise. In his 300-page “Reasons for Decision,” 
written three years after Gisdaywa’s oral testimony, Justice McEachern portrays the 
Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en as uncivilized savages located in a state of nature prior to 
contact with European settlers:  
It would not be accurate to assume that even pre-contact existence in the [Gitxsan-
Wet’suwet’en] territory was in the least bit idyllic. The plaintiff’s ancestors had no 
written language, no horses or wheeled vehicles, slavery and starvation was not 
uncommon, wars with neighbouring peoples were common, and there is no doubt, to 
quote Hobbs [sic], that aboriginal life in the territory was, at best, ‘nasty, brutish, and 
short.’6 
 
By drawing on Hobbes to nourish his historical and political imagination, Justice 
McEachern leaves no room for Gisdaywa’s Wet’suwet’en imagining of the Gitxsan other 
as a peaceful civic partner.  
5.2  Deconstructive Tools for the Imaginary Uncivilized Other 
Justice McEachern’s ruling illustrates that peaceful coexistence between the 
Gitxsan and other people living amongst them cannot be achieved so long as his way of 
imagining the indigenous other continues to dominate the political and historical 
imagination of settler society. To deconstruct this disparaging premise of colonialism we 
                                                                                                                                                 
citizenship. For more on Tully’s distinction between these two fields of citizenship, see Tully, Public 
Philosophy in a New Key: Volume II, 243-309.  
 
6 “Reasons for Judgements”, Delgamuukw v. Her Majesty the Queen, March 8, 1991, 13. Justice 
McEachern’s Hobbesian portrayal of the Gitxsan-Wet’suwet’en past further illustrates Fanon’s insightful 
remarks about colonialism’s perverted interest in disparaging the history of the colonized. See Fanon, The 
Wretched of the Earth, 148-149: “Perhaps it has not been sufficiently demonstrated that colonialism is not 
content merely to impose its laws on the colonized country’s present and future. . . With a kind of perverted 
logic, it turns its attention to the past of the colonized people and distorts it, disfigures it and destroys it. 
This effort to demean history prior to colonization today takes on a dialectical significance.” 
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need to attend to its philosophical roots in Western political theory. Hereditary Nuu-
Chah-Nulth chief and scholar Umeek (E. Richard Atleo) shares how Justice McEachern 
later attributed his Eurocentric reasoning in the Delgamuukw case to his liberal education 
in Enlightenment philosophy:  
At the ninety-fifth birthday party of Walter Koerner, Allan McEachern told me that, 
given the schooling he had received, his decision against the Gitksan-Wet’suwet’en in 
the Delgamuukw case could not have been avoided. . . McEachern did not study the 
issues of Indian land and rights because such studies were unavailable; instead, he 
studied various Enlightenment authors and based his decision on their ideas about 
Aboriginals. These authors, such as Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and 
John Locke, continue to be studied for their contributions to political science, 
including their misguided views about Aboriginality.7 
 
McEachern’s education suggests the British and French Enlightenments historically 
contributed to the formation of the idea of the indigenous other as uncivilized. While the 
British classical liberal philosophers Hobbes and Locke portray indigenous peoples of the 
Americas as violent savages, the French republican philosopher J.J. Rousseau portrays 
indigenous peoples as noble savages. Whether innately violent or noble, the indigenous 
other remains uncivilized.  
Noticeably missing from McEachern’s reading list of canonical Enlightenment 
thinkers is our philosophical guest Benedict Spinoza. Unlike Hobbes, Locke, and 
Rousseau, our philosophical guest is not a privileged member of the majority society. 
Rather, as a minority Jew, Spinoza finds himself the “theological other” in a 
predominantly Calvinist Dutch society.8 It is not surprising, then, that Spinoza breaks 
                                                 
7  Umeek, Principles of Tsawalk, 126. 
 
8 See, for example, Smith, Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Question of Jewish Identity, xiv: “At the onset 
of modernity Jews and Judaism were regarded as the quintessential Other, the cultural alien whose 
assimilation was evidence that society was becoming more rational and more tolerant as a result of the 
expenditure of conscious moral energy. The cultural differences of the Jews were even exaggerated to 
demonstrate the universality of human nature. In Spinoza’s time the problem of the Other was understood 
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ranks with the privileged class of Enlightenment philosophers by treating the notion of 
the uncivilized other as a confused and inadequate product of the European imagination. 
In fact, following the li’ligit protocol of k’otsgesxw, we will witness how Spinoza’s 
ideas, in tandem with the ideas of our “other” Mohawk philosophical guest, effectively 
deconstruct the two central presuppositions of the imaginary uncivilized other. In 
response to the assumption that human beings have fixed and static natures, Alfred and 
Spinoza will offer dynamic conceptions of human nature. In response to the related belief 
that non-Western others are located at a lower developmental stage compared with people 
in the West, our guests will engage their ancestral and Western histories to show how all 
people are vulnerable to undemocratic cycles of political violence akin to a “state of 
nature.”9 Finally, Alfred and Spinoza will expose the way in which the notion of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
through largely theological categories and concepts. Seeing it mainly in terms of secular categories like 
race, ethnicity, and gender does not alter the fundamental problem.” 
 
9 The “state of nature” concept has historically been employed to justify the dispossession and 
colonization of indigenous peoples. In its Hobbesian and Lockean formulations, for example,  the “state of 
nature” concept has functioned as a point of origin out of which ‘culture’ emerges (e.g. an initial state of 
lawless violence between people demands a centralized (European form of) government that distributes 
liberal property rights to free and equal citizens under a formalized civil law). Given the Eurocentric, 
colonial function of the “state of nature” concept, it is important to clarify my employment of the term in 
this section. Following James Tully’s public philosophy methodology, I maintain the Wittgensteinian thesis 
that there are no necessary or sufficient criteria for political concepts, including the state of nature concept. 
Rather, as Tully explains, understanding political concepts like the state of nature, consists in “the practical 
activity of being able to use a general term in various circumstances and being able to give reasons for and 
against this or that use. . . being able to see the strength of the reasons given against this use by one’s 
interlocutors, and then being able to give further reasons, and so on. This is done by describing examples 
with similar or related aspects, drawing analogies or disanalogies of various kinds, finding precedents, 
exchanging narratives and redescriptions.” Informed by Tully’s methodology, I regard Alfred and Spinoza 
as public philosophers attempting to contest conventional understandings of the “state of nature” and re-
describe the concept as an ever-possible state of political culture, a state that can equally arise in Western 
and non-Western civilizations. In this state of political culture, to borrow Tully’s description, “power is 
exercised over [the people] without their say, non-democratically.” Further, in these states of political 
culture, the “activities of ‘citizenisation’ are unavailable or arbitrarily restricted, [and] the members of a 
political association remain ‘subjects’ rather than ‘citizens’ because the laws are imposed on them without 
their say.” For Tully’s Wittgensteinian approach to political concepts see, Public Philosophy in a New Key: 
Volume I, 27-28, 39-70, and for his description of a non-democratic state of political culture, see 147 and 
165 in the same volume. For an indigenous scholar who deconstructs the Hobbesian and Lockean 
formulations of the state of nature concept, see James (Sákéj) Youngblood Henderson, “The Context of the 
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uncivilized other lingers in state-constructed identities designed in their historically 
different locations to assimilate their people—whether as “aboriginals” or “Marranos”—
into the state’s “civil” society.  
 Alfred and Spinoza categorically reject all fixed and negative representations of 
the Western and non-Western other as false ideas inadequately formed by the European 
imagination. In his letter to his grieving friend Peter Balling dated July 20, 1664, Spinoza 
responds to  Balling’s report of hearing groans while his son was still well, groans that 
his son later uttered before dying. Spinoza assures his friend that the sounds “were not 
real groans but only your imagination.” To explain the power of the imagination, Spinoza 
shares how he visually hallucinated while awakening from a deep dream just before dawn 
on a winter day in Rijnsburg the previous year:  
When one morning just at dawn I awoke from a very deep dream, the images which 
had come to me in the dream were present before my eyes as vividly as if they had 
been real things, in particular the image of a black, scabby Brazilian whom I had 
never seen before. This image disappeared for the most part when, to make a 
diversion, I fixed my gaze on a book or some other object; but as soon as I again 
turned my eyes away from such an object while gazing at nothing in particular, the 
same image of the Ethiopian kept appearing with the same vividness again and again 
until it gradually disappeared from sight.10  
 
Spinoza explains that while his own image of the uncivilized other in the form of the 
“black scabby Brazilian/Ethiopian” was not an omen, the groans heard by Balling were. 
To support his conjecture, Spinoza articulates a theory of the imagination that tacitly 
                                                                                                                                                 
State of Nature,” in Reclaiming Indigenous Voice and Vision, ed. Marie Battiste (Vancouver, BC: UBC 
Press, 2000), 11-37.  
 
10 Ep17.Antonio Negri calls this letter “Spinoza and Caliban” as it discloses the “complexity of the 
character and problem of Caliban, viz. how “the problem of the liberatory force of the natural imagination – 
is located within the highest abstraction of philosophical meditation.” See Negri, The Savage Anomaly: 86-
87. For a scholar who speculates about the meaning of Spinoza’s dream, see Lewis Feuer, “The Dream of 
Benedict de Spinoza,” American Imago 14 (1957): 225-242.  
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explains the cause of Spinoza’s image of the uncivilized other.11 “Effects of the 
imagination,” Spinoza writes, “arise from either the constitution of the body or mind.” 12 
While fever may cause delirium and thick blood may cause aggressive ideations, Spinoza 
clarifies that the mind links together and interconnects “images and words just as the 
intellect does its demonstrations, so that there is nothing we can understand without the 
imagination instantly forming an image.”13 Effects of the imagination that arise from the 
constitution of the body can never be omens because, Spinoza reasons, their causes do 
not involve any future things. By contrast, Spinoza tells Balling that the effects of the 
imagination that result from the constitution of the mind, as Balling’s did, can have “a 
confused awareness beforehand of something that is to come. . .  [and] can imagine it as 
firmly and vividly as if such a thing were present to it.”14 Moreover, Spinoza assures 
Balling that he shares in the “ideal essence” of his beloved son which allowed him to 
imagine things that followed from the essence of his son “as vividly as if he had it in 
front of him.”15 What is noteworthy here is that while Spinoza states that his image of the 
“black scabby Brazilian/Ethiopian” was not an omen, he does not explicitly attribute his 
visual hallucination to be the result of the constitution of the body. For example, he does 
not report experiencing a fever on the morning he hallucinated the uncivilized other. 
Further, given that Spinoza never left Europe in his short 44 years of life, Spinoza’s 
hallucination of the uncivilized other can only have been constructed by the linking 
                                                 
11 For Spinoza’s placement of the imagination in his theory of knowledge, see E II p40s2.  
 
12 Ibid.  
 
13 Ibid.  
 
14 Ibid.  
 
15 Ibid.  
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together of “images and words” circulating in seventeenth century Dutch society. Thus, 
Spinoza indirectly suggests that the uncivilized other is an “effect of the [European] 
imagination.”16 Spinoza’s epistolarly deconstruction of the image of the uncivilized other 
is consistent with his claim that “all men everywhere, whether barbarian or civilised, 
enter into relationships with one another and set up some kind of civil order.”17 That is, 
Spinoza thinks no one is outside of the civil order—from indigenous peoples of Brazil to 
Ethiopia—and invites his European readers to imagine all peoples to be capable of 
contributing to the achievement of peaceful civilization.18 
While Spinoza identifies the notion of the uncivilized indigenous other to be a 
confused and inadequate creation of the European imagination, Alfred argues indigenous 
scholars who portray the Western other as uncivilized have been influenced by the 
                                                 
16 From a historical point of view, it is noteworthy that Spinoza identified the notion of the uncivilized 
indigenous other as a product of the European imagination a year before writing TPT, the founding 
philosophical document of liberal democracy. It is possible that Spinoza’s revelation in Riijnsburg shaped 
the way in which Spinoza adopted Hobbesian concepts. For example, while Spinoza draws on Hobbes’ 
state of nature concept in chapter 16 of TPT, he does not follow Hobbes in locating the indigenous peoples 
of the Americas in the state of nature. Hence, modern liberal democrats may turn to their philosophical 
ancestor Spinoza and find new possibilities for understanding indigenous nationhood in relation to liberal 
democracy.  
 
17 PT, 1.4. This is the only passage where Spinoza employs the barbarian/civilized binary opposition in 
his philosophical work, and, tellingly, he does so in a way that subverts the idea that so-called “barbarians” 
are without or outside of the civil order.  
 
18 Spinoza’s invitation remains relevant to contemporary American audiences in light of Samuel 
Huntington’s depiction of global politics as a clash of civilizations. See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 
Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 33: “At the end of 
the twentieth century, when the cold war is over and even the sovereignty of nation-states is in decline, it is 
unclear how global order can be configured and how the violence necessary to maintain that order can be 
deployed and legitimated. Huntington’s advice is that the organizing lines of global order and global 
conflict, the blocs that cluster nation-states in allied and enemy camps, should be defined no longer in 
‘ideological’ terms but rather as ‘civilizations.’[Samuel Huntington] has conjured up the phantasm of these 
civilizations to find in them a grand schema that rearranges the friend-enemy division that is basic to 
politics. Those who belong to our civilization are our friends; other civilizations are our enemies. Gather 
round and hear the good news: war has become a clash of civilizations! Spinoza aptly calls this conjuring 
up of enemies and fear superstition, and such superstition, he knew well, will always lead to the ultimate 
barbarity of perpetual war and peace.”  
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Western tradition’s tendency to imagine and construct fixed racial distinctions.19 In PPR, 
Alfred questions whether there is in fact an inherent difference between indigenous and 
non-indigenous peoples. He considers the work of indigenous scholar Donald Fixico 
whose racial polarization between indigenous peoples and settlers implies that settlers are 
incapable of attaining the level of moral development Fixico claims to be naturally 
possessed by indigenous peoples.20 Not only does Alfred maintain that there is a “real 
danger” in believing that cultures are fixed, he argues that such static representations of 
the non-indigenous other as uncivilized betray “the traditional Native belief in a universal 
rationality” possessed by all peoples.21 Similar to how Spinoza provides a theory of the 
imagination to trace the cause of his image of the uncivilized other, Alfred offers a 
psychological theory to explain indigenous scholars’ tendency to imagine Western others 
as uncivilized. “Although it may be emotionally satisfying for indigenous people to 
ascribe a greedy, dominating nature to white people, taking such an approach leaves one 
in self-defeating intellectual and political positions.”22 On Alfred’s psychological 
account, ressentiment prevents indigenous peoples from imagining the non-indigenous 
other in more intellectually and politically productive ways. Similar to Spinoza’s 
approach in PT, Alfred invites his indigenous readers of PPR to imagine all peoples to be 
capable of achieving peaceful civil order. “It is more hopeful to listen to the way 
traditional [indigenous] teachings speak of the various human families: They ask that we 
                                                 
19 Edward Said makes the same point when he argues that for indigenous scholars to accept nativism 
(i.e. a form of nationalism based on essentialist identities) is to accept the consequences of imperialism, viz. 
the racial, religious, and political divisions imposed by imperialism. See Culture and Imperialism, 228.  
 
20 PPR, 44.  
 
21 Ibid.  
 
22 Ibid., 45, italics mine.  
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consider each one to be gifted and powerful in its own way, each with something 
different to contribute to the achievement of peace and harmony.”23  
While our philosophical guests maintain that all peoples are capable of 
establishing a civil order and achieving peace and harmony, they equally hold that all 
peoples are susceptible to undemocratic cycles of political violence comparable to a state 
of nature. In PPR, a book dedicated to the regeneration of indigenous cultures and 
political traditions, Alfred cautiously advises his indigenous readers that they “must be 
careful not to romanticize the [indigenous] past.”24 Hence, while Alfred holds up the 
Iroquois Confederacy as an ideal example of democratic governance that remains 
relevant for contemporary indigenous-settler relations, he also recognizes a brutally 
violent period in Iroquois political history. In HVA, Alfred cites research that indicates, 
for reasons still not known, that the Iroquois fell into a “state of constant warfare” in the 
period of 700 A.D. 25 He also notes how archaeological records and indigenous oral 
traditions demonstrate that the first incidence of ritualized torture and cannibalization 
associated with the historic Iroquois dates from the same period.26 Furthermore, he states 
that the norm among all Iroquoian people in the seventeenth century (the time of contact 
with settlers) was the “mourning war” in which captivity led to “assimilation from one 
                                                 
23 Ibid.  
 
24 Ibid., 53. Heeding his own advice, Alfred writes that the “vast majority”  (rather than all) of 
indigenous peoples had “true civilization” at the time of contact with Europeans in terms of practicing 
gender equality, maintaining a non-abuse relationship with the land, promoting communal responsibility, 
and respecting individual autonomy. See Peace, Power, Righteousness, 45.  
 
25 HVA, 26.  
 
26 Ibid.  
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nation to the other.”27 Just as Alfred portrays his people as experiencing undemocratic 
cycles of political violence akin to a state of nature prior to their ideal democratic 
federalist system of governance, Spinoza acknowledges that prior to establishing their 
democratic form of governance the Hebrews temporarily suffered in a quasi state of 
nature. After the Hebrews had been freed from the “intolerable oppression of the 
Egyptians,” Spinoza narrates how the Hebrews “acquired their natural right to everything 
they could do, and each could resolve anew whether he wanted to retain or, in truth, yield 
and transfer it to another.”28 Spinoza explains that in this “natural state” the Hebrews 
collectively possessed “more or less [a] crude mental cast, and [were] done in by a 
miserable slavery” which made it difficult for them to collectively establish jurisdictions 
and retrain their state .29 Thus, Alfred and Spinoza equally avoid romanticizing their 
ancestral political histories while highlighting commendable cultural achievements.  
In addition to their own ancestral histories, our philosophical guests identify 
undemocratic cycles of political violence in Western histories. In PPR, Alfred criticizes 
Canada and the United States for claiming their legitimacy rests on the rule of law in light 
of colonial processes that violate the rule of law. “There is no moral justification for state 
sovereignty. The truth is that Canada and the United States were established only because 
indigenous peoples were overwhelmed by imported European diseases and were unable 
to prevent the massive immigration of European populations.”30 To use Spinoza’s famous 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 33-34.  
 
28 TPT, 195.  
 
29 Ibid., 60.  
 
30 PPR, 83.  
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aquatic description of the state of nature, Alfred suggests the founding of Canada and the 
United States on Turtle Island is similar to how “fish take possession of water, and large 
ones eat smalls ones, by the highest natural right.”31 In his analysis of the BC Treaty 
Process, Alfred goes on to describe how Canada in particular continues to equate its right 
with its power in its negotiations with indigenous peoples. “One reason the state has been 
able to impose its racist, anti-historical view [of land ownership is because] the state still 
negotiates from a position of strength based on its false claim to morality, justice, and 
authority.”32 What Alfred highlights with his concise analysis of Canadian and American 
political histories is that an undemocratic state of political culture can emerge wherever 
power is equated with right and unilaterally imposed on people without their consent.   
Like Alfred’s analysis of undemocratic colonial processes in Canada and the 
United States, Spinoza analyzes the  undemocratic cycles of violence that were 
maintained by the Greco-Roman states and similarly by the English monarchy of his 
time. In the context of discussing how an imperium is more endangered by its citizens 
than by its enemies, Spinoza cites the example of the “Republic of the Romans” and its 
perpetual civil wars:  
The Republic of the Romans, highly invincible to enemies, is witness: So often was it 
conquered and most miserably oppressed by its own citizens, and especially in the 
civil war of Vespasian against Vitellius. . . Because of this therefore – to keep 
themselves secure – kings who had usurped the imperium long before, endeavoured 
to persuade that they drew their descent from the immortal Gods. No doubt it was 
since they deemed that, if only their subjects and everyone else did not look on them 
as equal but believed them to be Gods, they would readily suffer being ruled by them 
and would easily give themselves to them.33 
                                                 
31 TPT, 179.  
 
32 PPR, 145, italics mine.  
 
33 TPT, 194.  
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From Augusts attempting to persuade the Romans he originated from the son of Venus to 
Alexander convincing the Greeks he was Jove’s son, Greco-Roman rulers claimed to be 
Gods in their efforts to preserve themselves against their own people. 34 Spinoza likewise 
implies the English people of his own time were trapped in a violent state of political 
culture under monarchy. From the execution of King Charles I in 1649, to the 
appointment of Oliver Cromwell as “Lord Protector” (1653-58), to his successor Richard 
Cromwell, to finally a return to monarchy under King Charles II in 1660, Spinoza 
describes the bloody history of early modern England:  
The English populace have given a fatal example of this matter, in seeking the causes 
with which to remove a monarch from their midst by a show of right. Yet once he 
was removed, they were unable to do anything less than change the form of the 
imperium; but after much blood had been spilled, they reached the point of hailing a 
new monarch by another name (as if the whole question were about the name alone) 
and he was unable to last by any plan except by utterly destroying the royal line, 
slaughtering the kings friends or those suspected of friendship, and disturbing the 
leisure of peace—which was conductive to rumours—with a war, so that the plebs, 
occupied with and attentive to new matters, would divert elsewhere their thoughts 
concerning the royal murder. Too late, therefore, did the populace notice that they had 
done nothing for the welfare of the fatherland but violate the right of the legitimate 
king and change everything to a worse state.35  
 
As if to suggest that undemocratic cycles of political violence have been constant 
throughout Western civilization, Spinoza draws a family resemblance between the 
ancient Greco-Romans and the English. He claims that the Romans constantly struggled 
                                                 
34 My analysis of Spinoza’s remarks about the Greco-Roman draws on Polka’s commentary. See 
Between Philosophy and Religion: Volume 2, 206: “Unlike Machiavelli, Spinoza recognizes that the 
Roman civil state cannot be a model for the free republic. We cannot appeal to the history of Rome in 
support of freedom. What Roman history fatally displays, rather, is an imperium, which, because it is not 
founded on the principle that all people possess the natural right of sovereign power, is subject to 
irresolvable, contradictory opposition and hence to inevitable destruction. Roman history thus serves as a 
cautionary tale of the civil state, which, riven by civil conflict feeding imperial lust, is fatally destroyed by 
the irreconcilable contradictions of both internal dissention and external conquest.” Hence, while Spinoza 
does not explicitly draw a parallel between political cycles of violence in the Roman republic and his state 
of nature concept, he certainly implies it. 
 
35 TPT, 216.  
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“miserably with external and internal war, until at last the imperium yielded to a monarch 
again with only the name changed, just as in England.”36 Contrary to Enlightenment 
philosophers like Hobbes and Locke, Spinoza believed no civilization was immune from 
undemocratic, violent states of political culture. Whether it erupts among the Iroquois or 
Hebrew peoples or perpetuated by the Greco-Roman, English, Canadian or American 
nation-states, Alfred and Spinoza understand all peoples to be vulnerable to cultural and 
political conditions akin to a violent “state of nature.”  
 In addition to challenging the underlying presuppositions of the imaginary 
uncivilized other, our philosophical guests perceptively expose how the notion lingers in 
the state-constructed identities designed in their historically different locations to 
assimilate their people. In Wasáse, for example, Alfred critically analyzes the 
“aboriginal” identity:   
In many countries, the term ‘aboriginal’ is seen as inoffensive and innocuous 
substitute for more caustic words like ‘Indian’ or ‘Native.’ Unpacked as a social, 
political, and intellectual construction, however, it is a highly offensive word. It 
reflects the prevailing colonial mentality in its redefinition of Onkwehonwe away 
from our original languages, because it fashions ‘the people’ as a symbol and concept 
constructed on, and totally amenable to, colonialism.37 
 
While the “aboriginal” identity appears politically correct and benign, Alfred shows how 
the term is actually a cultural strategy employed by the state to assimilate indigenous 
peoples in three ways. First, “aboriginal” is a state-centric term that empties indigenous 
identity of all authenticity by excluding indigenous origins, languages, names, land, 
heritage, and rights.38 By erasing all meaningful reference points for an authentic 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 216-217.  
 
37 Wasáse, 126.  
 
38 Ibid., 127.  
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indigenous existence, it allows indigenous people to reference themselves exclusively in 
terms of the state. Secondly, Alfred explains that the various aboriginal identities on the 
state’s cultural menu, from the “aboriginal litigant” to the “aboriginal victim of history,” 
reflect the “essential colonial process of civilizing the Onkwehonwe, making us into 
citizens of the conquering states.”39 Finally, given that the aboriginal identity is based on 
“the rarely stated belief in Euroamerican cultural and racial superiority” and rooted in the 
state’s “monological thinking” and simple “us-versus-them dichotomy,” Alfred argues 
the self-identified aboriginal can in the end only hope to become a European:  
Aboriginalism, with its roots in this dichotomizing essentialism, plays the perfect foil 
to the Euroamerican mentality. Settlers can remain who and what they are, and 
injustice can be reconciled by the mere allowance of the Other to become one of us. 
What higher reward or better future is there than to be finally recognized as achieving 
the status of a European?40 
 
Taken together, Alfred exposes the “aboriginal” identity to be a state construct designed 
to carry out the original colonizing mission of assimilating the “uncivilized” indigenous 
other. The only difference is that while the original civilizing mission intended to convert 
heathen indigenous peoples into Christians, as “aboriginals” they are now converted into 
consumers of capitalist society and citizens of liberal democratic institutions.41 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 130, italics mine.  
 
40 Ibid., 135.  
 
41 For Alfred’s attempts to teach indigenous political leaders about the implications of embracing state-
constructed identities like the “aboriginal,” see his policy paper written for the Assembly of First Nations, 
“First Nation Perspectives on Political Identity”, First Nation Citizenship Research & Policy Series: 
Building towards Change (March 2009): 1-36. For Alfred’s analysis of the various scholarly portrayals of 
indigenous identity in the social sciences and humanities, see his article co-authored with Cherokee scholar 
Jeff Corntassel, “Being Indigenous: Resurgences against Contemporary Colonialism,” Government and 
Opposition Ltd., 2005, 597-614; and for his theoretical conceptualization of nested Mohawk identity, see 
HVA, 18-19.  
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 Just as Alfred critiques the Canadian colonial state’s non-violent attempts to 
assimilate indigenous peoples, Spinoza critiques the way in which the Portuguese and 
Spanish Empires sought to assimilate his Marrano ancestors through identity politics.42 
At the end of chapter 3 of TPT, Spinoza suggests that experience teaches that the “hatred 
of the [Gentile] Nations” has preserved the Jewish people up to his own time.”43 To 
support his claim, Spinoza reviews the policies of cultural genocide practiced by both the 
Spanish and Portuguese Empires. Instead of focusing on the overt imperial expressions of 
hate towards the Jewish people who refused to convert to Catholicism, Spinoza focuses 
on the less overt hatred directed towards the Jews who willing converted to Catholicism. 
While these Catholic converts were homogenously identified as “Marranos,” Spinoza 
explains how they endured different forms of cultural genocide in Spain and Portugal.44 
Spinoza first describes the political experience of the Spanish Marranos:   
When the King of Spain [Ferdinand of Aragon, in 1492] once compelled the Jews to 
adopt the [Catholic] Religion of the Kingdom or go into exile, most Jews adopted the 
Religion of the pontiffs. But since all the privileges of natural Spaniards were granted 
to those who adopted the religion, and they were figured to be entitled to all honors, 
                                                 
42 Alfred and Spinoza share an uncanny aptitude for the less overt forms of assimilation facing their 
people. While both could have easily invested their analyses on the state’s violent systemic efforts to 
implement a policy of cultural genocide (e.g. burning Jews at the stake; killing the “Indian” in the child at 
residential schools), they share an interest in deconstructing the cultural violence implicit in identities that 
appear to have the consent of their people. I am indebted to Coulthard’s commentary on how colonial 
relations have been reproduced non-violently through liberal recognition and identity politics since 1969. 
See Red Faces, White Masks, 4.  
 
43 TPT, 41.  
 
44 See, for example, Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Marrano of Reason, 16: “These efforts [of 
the Spanish Inquisition] combined to produce, in less than a quarter century, new social phenomenon in 
Spain that was to evolve and mark the history of Iberia for several centuries to come: the conversos, or 
Jewish converts to Christianity, and their descendants. To distinguish from the rest of the population, they 
were also called New Christians, a name that clung to their offspring from generation to generation and 
soon took on a pejorative connotation. The Jews called them the ‘forced ones’ (Heb. anussim) and debated 
their legal and religious status. And, from early on, they were also known as Marranos, an originally 
abusive name that has become descriptive.” For an in-depth history of the Marranos and their 
characteristics in relation to Spinoza’s thought, see 15-39.  
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they at once mixed with the Spaniards, so that after a short time no traces or memory 
of them remained.45 
 
Spinoza contrasts the success of the Spanish King’s policy of erasing Jewish culture and 
identity vis-à-vis integration as Marranos with the approach taken by the Portuguese 
King. “Now plainly the opposite happened to those whom the King of the Portuguese 
[Manuel I, in 1496] compelled to convert to the religion of his imperium. Though 
converted to the [Catholic] religion, they always lived separate from everyone, no doubt 
since he declared them not entitled to any honors.”46 While the Spanish Marranos were 
integrated within Spanish society, the Portuguese Marranos experienced segregation. 
However, whether integrated or segregated, Spinoza’s perceptive point is that the 
Marrano identity is an expression of Gentile hate. Just as the “aboriginal” identity 
assumes the incivility of indigenous people, the “Marrano” identity is a state-constructed 
identity that presupposes the incivility of Jewish people, culture, and traditions. More 
importantly, what Alfred and Spinoza show is that such state constructed identities are 
equally met with indigenous and Jewish resistance that ultimately works to preserve their 
cultured identities. 
 Although Alfred and Spinoza’s ideas serve to expose the notion of the uncivilized 
other as a fiction of the imagination in their historically different locations, the fact that it 
continues to persist in the state-constructed “aboriginal” identity suggests the fiction will 
not disappear overnight. Rather, like Spinoza’s own waking dream of the “scabby 
Brazilian,” Justice McEachern’s “nasty” and “brutish” image of the Gitxsan-
Wet’suwet’en remains vivid and reoccurring in the politically correct imagination of 
                                                 
45 TPT, 42.  
 
46 Ibid.  
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settler society. For members of settler society who no longer wish to “dream with open 
eyes”47 about uncivilized Indians domesticated as aboriginals, Alfred offers an 
indigenous way of imagining the other:  
From an indigenous point of view radical imagination is not an exercise of pie-in-the-
sky dreaming nor does it even require much creativity. Radical imagination is simply 
Euroamericans deciding to leave the old visions of conquest and privileges of empire 
behind and focusing on their responsibilities as human beings today. . . If you could 
imagine a renewal of our relationship built on these premises, on your responsibility 
and action to undo colonization, and if you have the integrity to dedicate yourself to 
working with us Indigenous people towards its realization, towards a renewed regime 
governing this land, then and only then could you truthfully call yourself a radical.48  
 
In other words, for the imaginary uncivilized other to gradually disappear like Spinoza’s 
nightmarish hallucination, settlers along with indigenous people need to responsibly work 
together to build peaceful coexistence based on equality and respect for the other’s 
human dignity and historical differences.   
4.3  Constructive Tools for Democratic Relationships of Love   
 In their historically different locations, Alfred and Spinoza go beyond mere 
theorizing—itself a waking dream state of sorts—and make peaceful coexistence a lived 
reality. Through a critical comparison of our philosophical guests’ self-conscious 
engagements with their traditions, we will witness how their theoretical concepts are 
grounded in their personal lives. Alfred and Spinoza’s spiritual and philosophical notions 
of the person blur the boundary between self and other and allow them to challenge the 
political and psychological tendencies that result in regarding the hostile foreign other as 
separate and deserving of retribution. To overcome these divisive reactions, our 
                                                 
47 I borrow this phrase from Spinoza, see E III p2dem.  
 
48 For Alfred’s full discussion of radical imagination, see his article “What is Radical Imagination? 
Indigenous Struggles in Canada”, Affinities: A Journal of Radical Theory, Culture, and Action, Volume 4, 
Number 2 (Fall 2010):  5-8.  
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philosophical guests draw on their tradition’s treaty models to extend love to the foreign 
“enemy.” Whether it is Alfred’s Two-Row Wampum or Spinoza’s Hebrew Pactum, these 
treaty models serve as constructive tools in building democratic and covenantal relations 
of love between individuals with different national affiliations. Finally, we will witness 
how Alfred and Spinoza display in their personal lives the way in which peaceful treaty 
partnerships between nations proceed not from the top-down with political elites but from 
the ground up with the grassroots people committed to on-going good relations.  
 In contrast with Cartesian notions of the self as an independent cogito, our 
philosophical guests articulate spiritual and philosophical understandings of the self as a 
shared form of existence with the other. In Wasáse, Alfred draws on the culture and 
worldview of overseas Filipino workers to illustrate an indigenous conception of the self. 
“Filipino identity is based on kapwa, a Tagalog word meaning ‘shared being,’ meaning 
that there is no concept of a separate existence from others, and everything is shared.”49 
This notion of the self as a shared being helps explain why “loneliness and alienation is 
much less of a problem among Filipinos, even in their many expatriate communities.”50 
Alfred observes that “many Onkwehonwe embody the culture of ‘shared being’,” 
especially indigenous women who practice love by “going between the fighting factions 
in their colonized villages to talk of how it could be a better life for the people if they 
came together as one and worked for their common good.”51 Comparable to the 
                                                 
49 Wasáse, 188.  
 
50 Ibid.  
 
51 Ibid., 189. For an example of an indigenous heroine who practices shared being, see Alfred’s 
interview with Sximina who discusses the challenges she faces in her efforts to decolonize her people and 
rebuild the Nuxalk Nation, see 189-196.  
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indigenous notion of shared being, Spinoza articulates a philosophical conception of the 
self in Ethica that implies a shared existence with the other. Spinoza explains that man 
“consists of mind and body and. . . the human body exists as we are aware of it.”52 For 
Spinoza, the mind and the body are “one and the same individual” which is conceived 
either under the attribute of thought or extension.53 With this understanding of the self, 
Spinoza describes the intimate relation between an individual’s body and the bodies of 
others:  
[T]he idea of each mode in which the body is affected by an external body involves 
the nature of the human body and of the external body. From this it follows, first, that 
the human mind perceives the nature of a great many bodies together with the nature 
of its body. It follows, second, that the ideas which we have of external bodies 
indicate the condition of our own body more than the nature of the external bodies.54  
 
Since the human mind always perceives other bodies simultaneously with its own body, 
Spinoza suggests that for the mind to come to a true understanding of itself as the essence 
of the body of which it is the idea, it must understand other bodies together with its 
own.55 In this regard, Spinoza’s metaphysics of the self—as a monistic union of mind and 
body—shares a family resemblance with the indigenous understanding of self as kapwa 
or shared being.  
Informed by their conceptions of the self as shared being, Alfred and Spinoza 
seek to transcend natural human reactions that effectively separate the self from the other. 
In Wasáse, Alfred analyzes the global pattern of revolutionary movements that have 
                                                 
52 E II p13c. 
 
53 E II p21.  
 
54  E II p16dem, c1-2.  
 
55 I am drawing here on the interpretive insights of Spinoza scholar Genevieve Lloyd as cited by 
Michael Mack in Spinoza and the Spectres of Modernity:The Hidden Enlightenment of Diversity from 
Spinoza to Freud (New York, NY: Continuum, 2010), 13 n.7.  
 
A Post-Delgamuukw Philosophical Feast:  
Feeding the Ancestral Desire for Peaceful Coexistence  
 
195 
sought freedom from oppressive regimes through violent means. By understanding the 
oppressor as the “enemy,” Alfred explains the oppressed seek the oppressor’s 
“annihilation or obliteration through the application of forces driven by hatred, a 
relationship which throughout history has generated countless and endless cycles of 
violence.”56 While Alfred provides a political analysis of violent relations, Spinoza 
provides a psychological analysis of the way in which individuals react to out-group 
members who cause harm:  
If someone has been affected with joy or sadness by someone of a class, or nation, 
different from his own, and this joy or sadness is accompanied by the idea of that 
person as its cause, under the universal name of the class or nation, he will love or 
hate, not only that person, but everyone of the same class or nation. 57  
 
Spinoza’s psychological principle states that individuals tend to generalize their hate to 
the foreign other’s entire national group, creating the relational hostilities necessary to 
sustain the violent revolutionary actions analyzed by Alfred. As members of oppressed 
minorities who personally understand the horrible consequences of ethnic prejudice, 
Alfred and Spinoza seek to transcend these political and psychological reactions that 
maintain hateful relations between nations. In his indigenous conception of a spiritually-
rooted revolution, Alfred makes a distinction between enemy and adversary. While 
regarding the oppressor as an “enemy” promotes violent reaction, Alfred explains to his 
                                                 
56 Wasáse, 202.  
 
57 E III p46. Yovel notes that this proposition, located in the middle of Part III of Ethica, shifts 
Spinoza’s analysis from individual psychology to sociological theory. Interpreting Spinoza’s reference to 
the “nation” as a tacit reference to the Jewish nation, Yovel relates proposition 46 to Spinoza’s personal 
experience of “double-rejection” (i.e. the fact that his own people, the Amsterdam Jews, rejected him as a 
heretic while the Gentiles did not fully accept him as a Jew). See Yirmiyahu Yovel, Spinoza and Other 
Heretics: The Marrano of Reason, 185: “Yet what erupts from beneath that dry sociological generalization 
and its irregular position within the text, is the singular fate of the Jewish people, and with it, the Marannos. 
Who more than members of that ‘nation’, as they were commonly called, had collectively suffered from 
hatred and prejudice nourished by invidious individual-collective stereotypes? Moreover, this is Spinoza’s 
own ‘nation’, subsumed under the same universal name. . .  on behalf of which he continues to suffer even 
after he has withdrawn from the [Jewish] community.” 
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indigenous readers that regarding the oppressor as an adversary “implies that we have the 
objective of transformation driven by compassion achieved through teaching generating 
relations of love.”58 In addition to transformational teaching motivated by compassion, 
Alfred’s spiritual form of revolution identifies respect and love to be the preconditions 
for reconciliation. “Before any agreement or reconciliation can happen,” Alfred advises, 
“there must be a connection made between people, there must be a demonstration of 
respect and love must be generated. Then and only then can ‘issues’ and interests be 
spoken of sincerely and resolved. This is what a commitment to coexist means.”59 Alfred 
explains how this vision of respectful and loving relations between diverse peoples is 
rooted in his Mohawk people’s Two-Row Wampum treaty model:   
The notion of a universal relation among autonomous elements of Creation is 
embedded throughout indigenous cultures, for example, in the Tekani Teioha:te, 
known as the Two Row Wampum, or the widely used Four Directions teaching. The 
idea of recognizing our universal connection and at the same time respecting our 
differences is the fundamental theme in these teachings; it is the first principles that 
must be regenerated in our lives and brought to meaning in non-indigenous cultures 
and society. Without a recognition of the holism of the universe, there can never be 
peace among peoples here on earth.60 
 
For Alfred, peaceful coexistence with the other is more than the absence of war. It is 
ideally an open-ended and on-going connection between peoples, a shared existence 
nourished and sustained by reciprocal love and respect.  
 While Alfred explicitly draws on the Two Row Wampum as a treaty model for 
loving and respectful relations between indigenous people and settlers, Spinoza’s rational 
vision of democratic relations of love between diverse peoples in Ethica is tacitly drawn 
                                                 
58 Wasáse, 202.  
 
59 Ibid., 266.  
 
60 Ibid., italics mine.  
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from his analysis of the Hebrew Pactum in TPT. In Ethica, Spinoza promotes love as the 
rational response to hate:  
He who lives according to the guidance of reason strives, as far as he can, to repay the 
other’s hate, anger, and disdain toward him, with love or nobility. . . Now hate is 
increased by being returned, and on the other hand, can be destroyed by love, so that 
the hate passes into love. . . He who wishes to avenge wrongs by hating in return 
surely lives miserably. On the other hand, one who is eager to overcome hate by love, 
strives joyously and confidently, resists many men as easily as one, and requires the 
least help from fortune. Those whom he conquers yield joyously, not from a lack of 
strength, but from an increase in their powers.61  
 
When Spinoza concludes that an individual who avenges wrongs by reciprocating hate 
“surely lives miserably” he alludes to his analysis of the Hebrew Pactum. At the end of 
chapter 17 of TPT, Spinoza describes the Hebrew Pactum as teaching that freedom from 
the miserable state of nature can only occur through love, not by force:    
 For after they had been freed from the intolerable oppression of the Egyptians and 
were not committed to any compact of mortals, they again acquired their natural right 
to everything they could do, and each could resolve anew whether he wanted to retain 
or, in truth, yield and transfer it to another. Therefore, constituted in this natural state, 
they resolved on the basis of the counsel of Moses—in whom everyone had the 
greatest faith—to transfer their right to no mortal but only to God. . . For by an 
express compact and oath (see Ex. 24:7), they yielded their natural right freely, not 
compelled by force or frightened by threats, and transferred it to God.62 
  
True to his psychological principle that human minds are not conquered by arms but by 
love and nobility,63 Spinoza explains how the Hebrews were not compelled by force or 
frightened by threats but consented to a Pactum based on reciprocal love. He concludes 
that “on the basis of what we have shown in this Chapter, it is established that the divine 
right, or that of religion, arises from a compact, without which there is none but natural 
                                                 
61 E IV p46.  
 
62 TPT, 195, italics mine.  
 
63 E IV App.XI 
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right.”64 That is, without a pact or commitment to democratic relations of love, people 
live miserably in a political culture akin to a “state of nature” where big fish eat little 
fish.65 Spinoza highlights how the Hebrew people “were not bound by any piety [viz. 
love and justice] toward peoples who did not enter the compact, but only vis-à-vis fellow 
citizens.”66 While Spinoza describes in TPT how his ancestors yielded their natural right 
and paradoxically increased their own powers under the Hebrew Pactum that bound them 
to love their fellow citizens, in Ethica he describes how individuals “yield” joyously to 
the force of love and paradoxically increase their own powers. The critical difference is 
not simply that Spinoza is speaking of a nation in TPT and individuals in Ethica. Rather, 
the key difference is that Spinoza reasons in Ethica that the obligation to love reaches 
beyond one’s nation. That is, the psychological principle that stipulates that an individual 
who is harmed by a foreign other will reciprocate with hate works equally in cases where 
the individual experiences joy in his relations with the other. “If someone has been 
affected with joy. . . by someone of a. . . nation, different from his own, and this joy. . . is 
accompanied by the idea of that person as its cause, under the universal name of the. . . 
nation, he will love, not only that person, but everyone of the same. . . nation.”67 Spinoza 
theoretically suggests that peaceful nation-to-nation relations emerge from reciprocal acts 
of love between individuals rather than from formal treaties signed by political elites. 
This suggestion is consistent with Spinoza’s empirical claim that “daily experience” 
                                                 
64 TPT, 210.  
 
65 Ibid., 179.  
 
66 Ibid., 210.  
 
67 E III p46.  
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confirms that “man is a God to man” when he lives by reason and love.68 It is therefore 
worth exploring how Alfred and Spinoza personally confirm their theories of peaceful 
coexistence with the other in their own daily experience.    
 In their personal efforts to transcend colonialism and war, our philosophical 
guests remain true to their treaty-inspired political and psychological principles by 
maintaining friendships with those regarded as “adversaries” in their historically different 
locations. For example, Alfred’s friendship with the Canadian public philosopher James 
Tully relationally grounds the Two-Row Wampum principles of respect, honour, and 
trust. Signs of their mutual respect are evident in their scholarly works. In PPR, for 
instance, Alfred regards Tully as “one of the most progressive Western thinkers today” 
and expresses respect for how Tully has shown in his book Strange Multiplicity that 
“intellectual demands [by liberals] for conformity to a single [liberal] language and way 
of knowing” pose obstacles for reconciliation between indigenous people and settler 
society.69 Likewise, in Public Philosophy in a New Key, Tully expresses respect for 
Alfred’s scholarly insights: “I am greatly indebted to this Kanien’kahaka Mohawk 
political scientist for helping me to understand the system of internal colonisation and the 
two arts of resistance and freedom practiced by Indigenous peoples.”70 On a more 
personal level, Alfred and Tully formally honour each other in their acknowledgements. 
In Strange Multiplicity, Tully acknowledges how his lectures “have many friends who 
have kindly commented on earlier sketches of sections at different presentations.” While 
                                                 
68 E IV p35s.  
 
69 PPR, 87.  
 
70 Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key: Volume 1, 260 n. 4.  
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expressing thanks to all who made comments, he specifically mentions “those who have 
been most influential,” including “Gerald [Taiaiake] Alfred. . . in Aboriginal 
nationalism.”71 In Wasáse, Alfred similarly expresses gratitude to the people who helped 
him in “many and varied ways” with the work he needed to do on Wasáse and on 
himself, and who inspired him “through their own struggles and successes.”72 Of the 
many people listed, including family, the first to be mentioned is James Tully. Beyond 
their scholarly references and acknowledgements, as colleagues in the Indigenous 
Governance programs at the University of Victoria, Alfred and Tully are together 
transforming indigenous-settler relations “through teaching generating relations of 
love.”73 As teachers driven by compassion, Alfred and Tully are helping indigenous and 
settler students alike find “their way out from under the burden of their intellectual 
heritage of empire” and embrace “alternative ways of living [that] seek to create a 
balanced, respectful set of relations with other peoples and the earth.”74 As friends and 
                                                 
71 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, xiii-xiv.  
 
72 Wasáse, 17.  
 
73 Ibid., 202.  
 
74 Ibid., 102.  For example, Alfred and Tully co-supervised the first student to achieve a PhD in the 
Indigenous Governance program in 2006. See Yvonne Lynette Regan, Unsettling the Settler Within: 
Canada’s Peacemaker Myth, Reconciliation, and Transformative Pathways to Decolonization 
(Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Victoria, 2006). It is important to mention that Regan is a 
self-proclaimed “settler” in light of Widdowson and Howard’s characterization of the Indigenous 
Governance programs as an instance of affirmative action for indigenous students. See Disrobing the 
Aboriginal Industry, 74: “Another ambitious program in this [Native studies] genre has emerged at the 
University of Victoria, which offers certificates in the Administration of Indigenous Governments, as well 
as an M.A., Concurrent M.A./LLB, and Ph.D. in Indigenous Governance. The program is headed by 
Taiaiake Alfred, one of the best-known scholars studying indigenous politics today. This program is largely 
oriented toward ‘personal decolonization’ and spiritual renewal rather than academic achievement.” Not 
only do Howard and Widdowson construct a false dichotomy between personal decolonization and 
academic achievement, they make no mention of the fact that James Tully, one of the most academically 
accomplished Canadian philosophers of our time, teaches in the Indigenous Governance programs. 
Unfortunately, Howard and Widdowson’s assessment of Native studies programs is the standard view 
taught in the mainstream textbooks on indigenous peoples. See, for example, James S. Frideres and Rene R. 
Gadacz, Aboriginal Peoples in Canada , 9th ed. (Toronto, ON: Pearson Canada Inc., 2012), 117: 
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colleagues, then, Alfred and Tully have fully consented to translating indigenous and 
Canadian theoretical positions on peaceful coexistence into a practical reality of living 
peacefully together. Their “daily experience” as friends brilliantly illustrates the tangible 
meaning of the Two Row Wampum: two vessels sailing side-by-side, sharing the same 
river, but neither attempting to steer the other’s ship.75  
Similar to the way Alfred’s friendship with Tully transcends colonialism, 
Spinoza’s friendship with the English theologian Henry Oldenburg transcended the 
Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667). Spinoza and Oldenburg first met in the early spring of 
1661 during one of Oldenburg’s periodic trips to the continent as the correspondent 
secretary for the Royal Society in England.76 While touring the Dutch Republic, he heard 
of a gifted young philosopher and lens grinder and travelled to Rijnsburg to visit the 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Aboriginal Studies were created in the late 1980’s at various Canadian universities, which allowed 
Aboriginals to gain entrance to the schools under conditions different from those of non-Aboriginal 
students. . . These programs started small but have grown in size over the years, and in some schools, 
graduate programs in Aboriginal Studies have been implemented. Nevertheless, as universities continue to 
experience budget cuts, Aboriginal Studies programs are currently under review as ‘untraditional programs’ 
and are vulnerable to budget cuts.” 
 
75 My “shared existence” representation of the Two Row Wampum eschews criticisms advanced by 
settler scholars that the Two-Row wampum approach is separatist and even racist. See, for example, Alan 
C. Cairns, Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2000), 
92: “The two-row wampum model so frequently proposed as the arrangement that will fit our needs, 
stresses the permanence of difference. As an image it postulates parallel paths that never converge. The 
image is of coexistence with little traffic between the solitudes. It does not suggest shared endeavours for a 
common purpose. Further, of course, parallelism has little to offer the growing urban Aboriginal 
population, jumbled up with other Canadians. Its vision is of distinct peoples coexisting side-by-side 
relationship – friendly, perhaps, but with little appetite for common endeavours. Parallelism – the two-row 
wampum – does not address the reality of our interdependence, and of our intermingling. It speaks, 
therefore, to only part of who we are.” Despite this criticism, Cairns celebrates John Borrows’ 
reinterpretation of the two-row wampum for highlighting interdependency between indigenous people and 
Canadians, see 206. Building on Cairns’ separatist depiction of the two-row wampum, Howard and 
Widdowson additionally cast the model as inherently racist, see Disrobing the Aboriginal Industry, 46-47: 
“The lack of critical analysis inhibits the understanding that the prevailing view of aboriginal peoples is 
actually racist. This view maintains that because aboriginal peoples’ culture is tied to their ancestry or 
‘race’. . .  they must retain all their traditions and remain separated from modern society. This perspective 
forms the basis of the ‘two row wampum’ approach to aboriginal/non-aboriginal relations.”  
 
76 For a full account of the Oldenburg-Spinoza friendship, see Nadler, A Book Forged in Hell, 17-18.  
 
A Post-Delgamuukw Philosophical Feast:  
Feeding the Ancestral Desire for Peaceful Coexistence  
 
202 
ostracized Jew.77 From their initial correspondence, it is clear Oldenburg and Spinoza 
made a lasting impression on each other. “With such reluctance did I recently tear myself 
away from your side when visiting you at your retreat in Rijnsburg,” the enthusiastic 
Oldenburg begins his letter written in August 1661, “that no sooner am I back in England 
than I am endeavouring to join you again, as far as possible, at least by exchange of 
letters.”78 In reply, Spinoza reciprocates enthusiasm by informing Oldenburg that “you 
yourself will be able to judge what pleasure your friendship affords me, if only your 
modesty will allow you consider the estimable qualities with which you are richly 
endowed”79 Spinoza goes on: 
And although, with these qualities in mind, I feel myself not a little presumptuous in 
venturing upon this relationship, especially when I reflect that between friends all 
things, and particularly things of the spirit, should be shared, nevertheless this step is 
to be accredited not so such to me as to your courtesy. From your great courtesy you 
have been pleased to belittle yourself, and from your abundant kindness so to enlarge 
me, that I do not hesitate to ensure upon the friendship which you firmly extend to me 
and deign to ask me of in return, a friendship which it shall be my earnest endeavour 
diligently to foster.80  
 
The Dutch Jewish philosopher and English theologian fostered their friendship by 
correspondence between London and Holland over a span of fifteen years, from August 
1661 to February 1676, enduring and overcoming communication complications created 
by the Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667). 81 Moreover, Spinoza and Oldenburg’s wartime 
correspondences illustrate the tangible meaning of Spinoza’s psychological principle in 
                                                 
77 Steven Barbone, Lee Rice, and Jacob Adler, “Introduction,” The Letters (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 
Publishing Company Inc., 1995), 8.  
 
78 Ep1.  
 
79 Ep2.  
 
80 Ep2, italics mine.  
 
81 Oldenburg wrote a final letter to Spinoza in October 1676 and entrusted it to Gottfried Leibniz for 
transmission; however, Leibniz never delivered it. See Ep79 n. 388.  
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Ethica, viz. that those who affect each other with joy will naturally love the other’s 
nation.82 For example, in his letter dated 20 November 1665 to Oldenburg, Spinoza 
laments the fact that “there appears to be no hope of peace with the English.”83  In reply, 
at the end of his letter dated 8 December 1665, Oldenburg likewise disappointingly writes 
that there “seems as yet no hope of peace between England and the Netherlands.”84 
Spinoza and Oldenburg yearned for peace between their nations for they knew the joy of 
their boundary-crossing friendship. Their correspondences between London and 
Voorburg eventually broke down in March 1665 as a result of the war.85 A decade later, 
in a post-war period of peace, they took up their pens and rekindled their friendship. 
“Now that our epistolary intercourse has been so happily resumed, most esteemed Sir,” 
Oldenburg writes to Spinoza from London on 22 July 1675, “I would not want to fail in 
the duty of a friend by any interruption in our correspondence.”86 While Spinoza 
responded in September 1675 and carried on his passionate philosophical and theological 
debates with Oldenburg, it is Spinoza’s final words in his final letter dated February 1676 
that conveys his lifelong commitment to his friend: “Farewell, most honoured Sir, and 
believe me yours in all zeal and affection.”87 Despite their philosophical, theological, and 
national differences, Spinoza and Oldenburg maintained a shared existence grounded in a 
promise to love and be just to the other. That is, just as Alfred instantiates the principles 
                                                 
82 E III p46.  
 
83 Ep32.  
 
84 Ep33.  
 
85 Nadler, A Book Forged in Hell, 17.  
 
86 Ep62.  
 
87 Ep78.  
A Post-Delgamuukw Philosophical Feast:  
Feeding the Ancestral Desire for Peaceful Coexistence  
 
204 
of the Two Row Wampum in his friendship with the Canadian philosopher James Tully, 
Spinoza practices the pact of love inspired by the Hebrew Pactum in his friendship with 
the English theologian Henry Oldenburg. While Alfred and Spinoza provide insightful 
political and psychological analyses of ethnic prejudice in their respective roles as 
political scientist and psychologist, it is as friends with “foreign” others that they most 
clearly demonstrate how their ancestral treaty models can overcome colonialism and war.  
4.4  Serving Wo’os: Wiigyat and Lynx 
 Our feast dialogue has produced many conceptual tools for making peace with the 
other. We first witnessed Gisdaywa share with Ms. Koenigsberg his Wet’suwet’en 
understanding of the Gitxsan other as a civic partner who shares in the resources of the 
land. We then contrasted Gisdaywa’s Wet’suwet’en imagining of the Gitxsan other with 
Justice McEachern’s Hobbesian imagining of the Gitxsan-Wet’suwet’en as uncivilized 
others. Through a dialogical engagement with Alfred and Spinoza’s ideas, we exposed 
the notion of the uncivilized other as a confused and inadequate creation of the European 
imagination. We then attended to the way in which our philosophical guests perceptively 
critiqued the political and psychological reactions that maintain hostile relations between 
diverse peoples. To overcome these reactive patterns of antagonistic behaviour, our 
philosophical guests made the underlying principles of the Two Row Wampum and 
Hebrew Pactum a “daily experience” in their personal lives and friendships.  
Intellectually filled by the ideas shared by Gisdaywa and our philosophical guests, 
I conclude by self-consciously serve a trickster story of treaty-making. In Wiigyat and 
Lynx, we are invited to plummet down from the heights of theory to the ground of 
relationships with the Big Man:  
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After being dropped by a body of swans, Wiigyat landed on a flat rock with such 
force that he was driven deep into the surface of the stone. Imprisoned in his own 
print, Wiigyat bellowed for someone to come to free him.  
 
The beginning of Wiigyat’s new misadventure highlights the principle of relational 
interdependency. Whether it is in the air or on the land, Wiigyat finds himself wholly 
dependent on non-human nature for his safety and freedom. While Wiigyat may behave 
as though he has no relations, his inconvenient settlement on flat stone awakens him to 
the reality of needing others.  
   The animals came by attracted by the noise and curious to learn the cause of the 
bellowing. They tried to help. Even the little squirrel heaved with all his might. But 
Wiigyat was fixed firmly in the rock and one by one they gave up and departed 
leaving the noisy fellow to arrange his own escape.  
 
Even the smallest of non-human others—the squirrel—acts with love towards the 
undeserving Big Man, a trickster who has played the “enemy” towards all edible 
creatures roaming the territories since time immemorial. While they are unable to rescue 
the Big Man, they attempt to teach and transform the trickster with love.  
  Wiigyat was about to give up all hope of escape from the rock when Lynx, who was 
always curious, came along. Wiigyat knew that Lynx owned a tongue like a rasp. The 
Big Man decided to bribe the creature to use that rasp-like tongue to free him from 
the rocky trap.  
   ‘Help me, Great Lynx,’ he begged. ‘I will reward you with whatever gift you 
choose.’  
 
Tricksters always think in instrumental terms. If the other has something of value—like a 
rasp tongue or land—tricksters will “bribe” and use their words to persuade the other to 
achieve their self-interested goals. Rarely, however, do tricksters keep their promises 
when their fortunes change and they no longer need the support of the other.  
Lynx could see that if he succeeded in freeing Wiigyat it would happen only after 
hours and hours of tedious work. Therefore Lynx decided to ask for a payment that 
Wiigyat might not want to give. 
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    ‘I will try to set you free if you will give me the longest hairs on your body but not 
those of your head,’ said Lynx.  
     Wiigyat hesitated. Freedom, however painful, was essential. Wiigyat agreed to 
Lynx’s price.   
 
Trapped in stone, Wiigyat regards himself as separate from the other. Consequently, he 
thinks of his pact with Lynx in strictly economic terms, as giving up something of 
himself in exchange for personal mobility.  
   Patient Lynx began to lick the rock with his rough tongue. He worked day after day. 
Finally one of Wiigyat’s legs was free. Then the other leg. Then an arm. Then the 
other arm. Much, much later Wiigyat’s whole body could move out of the rock. Only 
his head was anchored. At last Lynx loosened it and Wiigyat was free to travel again.  
  The delighted Wiigyat kept his promise. He pulled his body hairs and stuck them 
jauntily on the ears of Lynx. To this day lynx walks with the hair standing out on his 
ears, a payment of gratitude from the Big Man of long ago.88 
 
Together, Wiigyat and Lynx teach us what is needed to achieve democratic relations of 
love in a way that respects the dignity and differences of the other. With his patient 
licking of the rock, Lynx highlights the persistent effort needed to honour a pact with the 
foreign other. Conversely, Wiigyat’s decision to gift his chest hair to Lynx as an 
expression of gratitude demonstrates the importance of each party keeping their word 
even in times of prosperity. In the end, what the newly liberated Wiigyat teaches us, 
surprisingly enough, is that freedom is more than independence and separation from the 
other. It is a shared existence in which part of the self is always involved in and a part of 
the other, a truth symbolized by Wiigyat’s chest hairs resting peacefully on Lynx’s ears. 
Just as the Two Row Wampum and the Hebrew Pactum serve as treaty models for Alfred 
and Spinoza’s personal friendships, Lynx’s distinguished ears inspire the wilp-centric 
Gitxsan Nation to practice the trickster treaty tradition of negotiating alterity and 
                                                 
88 K’san Book Builders, “We-gyet and the Swans” and “We-gyet and Lynx,” in We-gyet Wanders On, 
42, 46. For stylistic reasons, I have only included the ending of Wiigyat’s misadventure with the Swans.  
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realizing loving relationships on the ground with those who have peacefully settled to 
live amongst us.  
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CONCLUSION: 
SO’O 
Space must be created—intellectually and socially—for peace to be 
achieved. 
–Taiaiake Alfred1 
 
Peace. . . consists not in the absence of war but in the union or harmony of 
minds. 
–Benedict Spinoza2 
 
So’o refers to the excess of quality food that is always leftover after a well-hosted 
Gitxsan feast. According to li’ligit protocol, the host is responsible for gifting all in 
attendance with so’o and the guests cannot refuse these take-home gifts.3 At the end 
of our post-Delgamuukw philosophical feast, the so’o comes in the form of excess 
food for thought. Having unified and harmonized the ideas of the Gitxsan and 
Wet’suwet’en Chiefs, our philosophical guests Alfred and Spinoza, and the trickster 
Wiigyat, there are critical questions leftover about the intellectual in-between space 
of peaceful coexistence created in the Feast Hall. How have we, for example, 
transgressed Gitxsan fundamentalism by relocating the Feast Hall from its 
traditional locale in the village to the dialogical site of public philosophy? By 
relocating Alfred and Spinoza from their prominent positions in the pure indigenous 
and Western intellectual traditions to the hybrid space of the Feast Hall, how have 
we disrupted scholarly debates on indigenous politics and blasphemed elitist 
conceptions of liberal education? And how may the boundary-crossing intellectual 
                                                 
1 Wasáse, 266.  
 
2 PT, 6.4.  
 
3 Xsiwis (Dr. M. Jane Smith), The Gitsanimx Teacher (Hazelton, BC: Self-published, 2012), 84: 
“So’o: Excess food at the feast given to the guests to take home. Guests are not allowed to refuse 
food or gifts to them in the feast hall.” 
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space of the Feast Hall transform post-Delgamuukw self-determination efforts from 
a bureaucratic engagement between political elites into a grassroots movement 
capable of feeding the ancestral desire for peaceful coexistence? Before reflecting 
on these tasty conceptual leftovers, let us remember ku’bawilxsihlxw, the children 
of chiefs, and take heart in how they envision their future in a post-Delgamuukw 
era.  
6.1  Remembering Ku’bawilxsihlxw  
 
 Our feast dialogues began by remembering the first four Simgigyat gant 
Sigidim hanaak’ who took the stand at the Delgamuukw trial: Gyolugyet (Mary 
McKenzie), Antgulilbix (Mary Johnson), Gwaans (Olive Ryan), and Gisdaywa 
(Alfred Joseph) .4 Each Elder articulated gawagaani teachings in response to the 
adversarial questions raised by provincial and federal agents of the state that 
erroneously presupposed the primacy of Canadian colonialism. As we conclude our 
philosophical feast, we now remember the ku’bawilxsihlxw the Elders kept in their 
hearts and minds throughout the trial. In their closing statement, the Gitxsan and 
Wet’suwet’en Elders captured the intergenerational significance of Delgamuukw: 
“This case, then, is about learning from the past so we can repair the present and 
pass on a healthier land to our grandchildren. It is not about retrieving frozen rights 
                                                 
4 These were the first four of 19 Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en Chiefs who took the stand at the 
Delgamuukw trial. While we received the gawagaani teachings shared by the first four Chiefs, hosts 
of future philosophical feasts are invited to engage the trial transcripts and translate the gawagaani 
teachings of the other 15 Chiefs. Here we acknowledge the names of the 15 Chiefs who also made 
significant contributions to Delgamuukw: Dzee (Madeline Alfred), Wahtah Keg’ht (Henry Alfred), 
Txemsim (Alfred Mitchell), Wigetimstochol (Dan Michell), Knedebeas (Sarah Layton), Yaga’Lahl 
(Dora Wilson), Tenimgyet (Art Mathews), Hanamuxw (Joan Ryan), Taxwok (James Morrison), 
Saxum Higookw (Vernon Smith), Xamlaxyeltxw (Solomon Marsden), Gityudahl (Pete Muldoe), Ax 
Gwin Desxw (Glen Williams), and Gwis Gyen (Stanley Williams).  
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from a Nineteenth Century ice-box.”5 Twenty-seven years after the Simgigyat gant 
Sigidim hanaak’ spoke their final words to the court, the ku’bawilxsihlxw have not 
forgotten their Elders’ self-determination efforts. Xsiwis (Dr. M. Jane Smith), a 
Gitxsan education scholar, language instructor, and grade 2 teacher at the 
Majagaleehl Gali Aks School in Gitanmaaxs, shares with us how her Gitxsan 
students are imaginatively positioning themselves in the Delgamuukw narrative:  
The principal of Majagaleehl Gali Aks asked my class to do posters of a 
historical event among the Gitxsan. My little students did three posters. First, 
they depicted the Gitxsan Territories in early times with beautiful scenery, the 
sun shining, eagles flying, and plenty of animals in the forest and plenty of fish 
in the rivers. Second, they drew the Elders marching and drumming off to court 
in their regalia. A stern judge sat at the bench with an Elder in the witness stand. 
It was rainy and the judge looked crabby. The Gitxsan looked sad and some 
were crying. They were bleak pictures. Third, the students depicted themselves 
working to keep the Gitxsan Territories unharmed for the next seven 
generations to enjoy. They drew the ‘seven sisters’ mountain range, seven 
bunnies, seven butterflies, seven fish, seven eagles, seven squirrels, and seven 
deer. It was all very precious in kid art but the message was powerful.6 
 
Xsiwis’ students keep the memory of Delgamuukw alive. For the ku’bawilxsihlxw, 
Delgamuukw is more than a legal matter about frozen rights; it is a living, breathing 
story that calls them to continue to strive towards the ideal of peaceful coexistence.  
In this peaceful vision of Delgamuukw, so vividly depicted in their artwork, the 
children of chiefs will grow and flourish to honour the gawagaani teachings shared 
by the Simgigyat gant Sigidim hanaak’.They will honour Gyolugyet’s teaching of 
                                                 
5 Trial Transcripts, Delgamuukw v. The Queen in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Action 
No. 0843, Smithers Registry, 26466. Also in Don Monet and Skanu’u (Ardythe Wilson), 
Colonialism on Trial: Indigenous Land Rights and the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en Sovereignty Case 
(Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 1992), 183.  
 
6 Xsiwis (Dr. M. Jane Smith), Personal correspondence, February 23, 2015. For Xsiwis’ 
innovative scholarship that uses Gitxsan stories as an appropriate pedagogical methodology for 
Gitxsan children, see Xsiwis (M. Jane Smith), Placing Gitxsan Stories in Text: Returning the 
Feathers. Guuxs Mak’am Mik’aax (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of British Columbia 
Faculty of Education, 2004).  
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self-affirming power and creative contention towards the state in order to achieve 
peaceful nation-to-nation relations. They will grow to honour Antgulilbix’s 
teaching of living by love and justice in a democratic interpretive community in 
peaceful coexistence with the presence of the church. They will learn to honour 
Gwaans’ teaching of ayook as an intergenerational process that keeps the 
conversation going between Elders and youth. And they will continue to honour 
Gisdaywa’s teaching of living a shared existence with our civic partners and 
neighbours, the Wet’suwet’en. These gawagaani teachings, which effectively 
responded to and transcended the colonial power relations at play during the 
Delgamuukw trial, are the true inheritance of the ku’bawilxsihlxw. With these 
teachings, memorialized within the intellectual space of the Feast Hall, the children 
of chiefs will be able to responsibly carry out the ancestral work of repairing the 
present and passing on a healthier land to their grandchildren.  
6.2  The Intellectual Space of the Feast Hall  
How can I describe the intellectual space opened up in the Feast Hall, a 
take-home gift for each to unwrap with all their relations? It is like the “constrained 
space” where indigenous peoples have survived centuries of colonization by 
skilfully exercising the “arts of resistance.” 7 Just as our Gitxsan chiefs peacefully 
resisted the authority of the Indian Act between 1884 and 1951 by practicing the 
criminalized li’ligit underground in the constrained space of freedom, our post-
Delgamuukw philosophical feast has acted otherwise within the constrained space 
and scholarly conventions of academia. On the other hand, as a nation-building 
                                                 
7 Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key: Volume1, 278.  
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project of resurgence, the intellectual space of the Feast Hall is like the space or 
“clearing” articulated by our Mohawk Brother and Sister, Taiaiake Alfred and 
Audra Simpson. In PPR, Alfred argues that part of the problem facing indigenous 
people today is that their “space hasn’t been respected” as “structures and ideas” 
have been imposed on their nations. Consequently, Alfred encourages his 
indigenous readers to reclaim their “intellectual, political, and geographical space.”8 
In Wasáse, Alfred shares that in his own tradition, the Rotinohshonni Great Law of 
Peace, “there is reference to the ‘clearing,’ the space between the village and the 
woods, between home, family, safety, and the dangerous space of freedom.”9 In her 
anthropological work, Audra Simpson eloquently conceptualizes the “clearing” as 
an “opening into the poetics of possibility, of cultural creation – a space within a 
world whose horizons are open, where Indian people may be, finally, as we are.”10 
In the “contemporary native landscape,” Simpson goes on, indigenous nationhood 
“may be understood as a movement toward a clearing. It is a Herculean gesture 
away from the enframing efforts of the Canadian state, toward a place and a state of 
being that is our own.”11 By adding to the rafters of the Feast Hall through our four 
feast dialogues, we Gitxsan are moving towards the clearing; not merely resisting 
but thinking and living beyond all imposed colonial structures and ideas. By 
intellectually travelling towards this open clearing, we expand the constrained space 
                                                 
8 PPR, 19.  
 
9 Wasáse, 266.  
 
10 Audra Simpson, “Paths toward a Mohawk Nation: Narratives of Citizenship and Nationhood in 
Kahnawake,” in Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, eds. Duncan Ivison, Paul 
Patton, and Will Sanders (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 124. 
 
11 Ibid., 126.  
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we find ourselves in and move from safe survival to a dangerous Gitxsan freedom 
indeed.  
How else can I describe the intellectual space of the Feast Hall? It is like 
Homi Bhabba’s postcolonial vision of the “transgressive act of cultural 
translation.”12 Bhabba draws on Salmon Rushdie’s Satanic Verses as an example of 
such a transgression. Contrary to the standard framing of the literary scandal, 
Rushdie’s “sin” lay not in simply misinterpreting the Koran but in relocating the 
“Koran’s ‘intentionality’ and repeating and reinscribing it in the locale of the novel 
of postwar cultural migrations and diasporas.”13 Just as Rushdie incited the Islamic 
fundamentalists with his blasphemous cultural translation, the reinscription of the 
Feast Hall in the genre of public philosophy may constitute heresy in the 
conservative minds of some Gitxsan fundamentalists. In the view of these cultural 
conservatives, not only do I lack the daxgyat or authority of a hereditary chief to 
host a feast, not even a philosophical one, but the feast’s intentionality can only be 
expressed at the site of its pure origin, the Gitxsan territories. If “hybridity is 
heresy” in the minds of these Gitxsan fundamentalists, then within the intellectual 
space of the Feast Hall to “blaspheme is to dream.”14 In this dangerous space of 
freedom, the dream is not of recovering a pure Gitxsan tradition or achieving 
Canadian progress but of “living on the borderline conditions of cultures and 
                                                 
12 Bhabba, The Location of Culture, 323.  
 
13 Ibid., 324. For a literary scholar who draws on Spinoza to understand what is at stake in the 
Satanic Verses controversy, see Christopher Norris, Spinoza and the Origins of Modern Critical 
Theory (Cowley Road, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991), 259-274.  
 
14 Bhabba, The Location of Culture, 324.  
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disciplines” which is “the empowering condition of hybridity.”15 Located at the 
dialogical site of public philosophy, the intellectual space of the Feast Hall becomes 
democratically accessible to the un-extinguishable Gitxsan lifeworlds located in-
between the margins of Gitxsan and settler societies. In other words, hybridity 
functions to empower the “least of these” among our Gitxsan Brothers and Sisters.16  
In the world of academia, the re-location of Alfred and Spinoza from their 
prominent positions in the pure indigenous and Western intellectual traditions to the 
empowering hybrid space of the Feast Hall is heretical in two related ways. First, it 
challenges the zero-sum game approach commonly found in the scholarly discourse 
on indigenous politics.17 In this zero-sum game approach, indigenous scholars have 
to be “traditional” in order to be heard in academia while settler scholars need to be 
seen as defending their tradition (liberal, Marxist, etc.) in order to be legitimate. An 
example of this approach is offered by the neo-Marxist duo Frances Widdowson 
and Albert Howard. In Disrobing the Aboriginal Industry, Widdowson and Howard 
employ a racial discourse against Alfred by characterizing his fundamental thesis to 
be “the romanticization of aboriginal traditions and a form of racial essentialism 
                                                 
15 Ibid.  
 
16 My Gitxsan conceptualization of an empowering hybridity cannot be reduced to Canadian 
assimilation or a “modernizing Aboriginality” as Alan C. Cairns has attempted to do with Bhabba’s 
concept of hybridity. See, Citizens Plus, 102-106. Hybridity is neither one (Gitxsan) nor the other 
(Canadian, modern, etc.) but something else besides, in-between: a Mohawk-Spinozistic-Gitxsan 
vision of a shared history, shared existence, and a shared future.    
 
17 I am indebted to Professor Shelvey for bringing this scholarly zero-sum game approach 
practiced by many indigenous and settler intellectuals to my attention. My analysis here builds on 
some of his insights.  
 
A Post-Delgamuukw Philosophical Feast:  
Feeding the Ancestral Desire for Peaceful Coexistence  
 
215 
that pits indigenous people against ‘white power.’”18 In PPR, Alfred clarifies that 
the major dichotomy of his argument is not native versus white, but “tradition” 
based on respect versus “modernity” based on disrespect.19 While Alfred’s 
description of his position complicates Widdowson and Howard’s racial discourse 
levelled at him, it nevertheless plays into their zero-sum game by constructing 
another false dichotomy.20 Moreover, what inevitably results from such scholarly 
debates is an impasse that translates into an “us-versus-them” mentality clearly 
visible in the actual roadblocks on the ground. The hybrid intellectual space of the 
Feast Hall functions as a theoretical way through these divisive roadblocks. By 
welcoming Alfred and Spinoza into the Feast Hall as public philosophers who self-
consciously draw on their traditions as modern practices of freedom, we witnessed 
the way in which the indigenous and Western intellectual traditions can be engaged 
otherwise. In the spirit of gawagyanii, Alfred and Spinoza’s traditions have been 
                                                 
18 Widdowson and Howard, Disrobing the Aboriginal Industry, 74. As we have seen, 
Widdowson and Howard’s portrayal of Alfred as a racial essentialist is clearly a straw-man. The 
reader is directed to read Alfred’s critique of Donald Fixico’s racial polarization and essentialism 
discussed in section 5.3. Alfred has also been portrayed as a divisive figure by the indigenous 
scholar Dale Turner. While Turner respectfully regards Alfred as a fellow “word warrior” in the 
academy and highlights Alfred’s contributions to understanding indigenous politics, Turner also 
casts Alfred in a similar light as Widdowson and Howard. See This is Not a Peace Pipe, 107: 
“[Alfred] follows in the tradition of Vine Deloria, the venerated Lakota thinker whose writings, 
while academic in methodology, project a profound anger at Eurocentric ways of thinking about the 
world. Both Deloria and Alfred are strongly critical of mainstream intellectual culture – especially 
its forms of governance – and quick to lash out against colonial attitudes, both in writing and 
practice.” For Turner’s full analysis of Alfred’s scholarly work, see This is Not a Peace Pipe, 106-
111.  For Alfred’s cultural project of drawing on the best elements in both the indigenous and 
mainstream Western traditions, the reader is directed to read Alfred’s indigenous version of self-
conscious traditionalism discussed in section 1.2 
 
19 PPR, 177.  
 
20 There are many modern moments of respect in indigenous-settler history, including the Treaty 
of Niagara of 1764, the Quebec Act of 1774, the Constitutional Act of 1791, and the early treaties 
between indigenous nations and the Crown. Of course, these modern moments have not been 
celebrated for what they represent, a shared history.  
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transformed from defensive weapons wielded against the other into cultural 
resources for peacefully living with the other. In the in-between space of the Feast 
Hall, Alfred and Spinoza have shown us that the zero-sum game can be transcended 
when scholars on both sides consent to a boundary-crossing partnership that 
commits to interpreting tradition in innovative ways that promote the ideal of 
peaceful coexistence.21   
It is exactly this boundary-crossing conversation occurring in-between the 
indigenous and Western intellectual traditions, however, that makes the hybrid 
space of the Feast Hall heretical to scholars who defend elitist conceptions of liberal 
education. For instance, the German-American political philosopher Leo Strauss, 
arguably the most influential Spinoza scholar of the twentieth century, defines 
liberal education as the study of the “greatest minds,” those “extremely rare” 
individuals who come along maybe once or twice in a lifetime.22 In his essay, 
“What Is Liberal Education?” Strauss makes no mention of an indigenous 
intellectual tradition. However, he does consider, albeit dismissively, a “return to 
nature, to the life of preliterate tribes” as an alternative to liberal education.23 On 
this point, Strauss posits a fixed traditionalism, one which holds that preliterate 
                                                 
21 For a scholar who self-consciously engages the socialist tradition in a way promotes peaceful 
coexistence with indigenous peoples and that critiques Widdowson and Howard’s “socialism from 
above” version of Marxism, see Deborah Simmons, “Socialism from Below and Indigenous 
Resurgence: Reclaiming Traditions,” New Socialist 58 (2006): 13-15.  
 
22 Leo Strauss, “What Is Liberal Education?,” in Liberalism: Ancient and Modern (Chicago, IL: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1965), 5. I am indebted to Grant Havers for incisively 
demonstrating how Strauss’ views on liberal education are elitist. See, for example,  “George Grant 
and Leo Strauss: Modernist and Postmodernist Conservatisms,” in Topia 8 (2002), 104: “For Strauss 
is critical of making education accessible to all, since this is the cause of mediocrity and ‘perverted’ 
commitments in the first place. There is a thinly veiled elitist attack on the very principle of equality 
here (or the triumph of the herd), which he blames for the decline of education in America.”  
 
23 Strauss, “What Is Liberal Education?,” 5.    
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tribes uncritically embrace the ancestral principle that “the best is the oldest.”24 
Since descendants of these illiterate tribes do not have written documents to study, 
they can never verify whether their oral knowledge deviates from what their 
ancestors originally meant. Strauss therefore concludes that “a return to nature” is 
an untenable option for citizens of modern liberal democracies.25 Moreover, Strauss 
argues that the greatest minds of the intellectual traditions of China and India are 
inaccessible because people of the West “do not understand their languages and. . . 
cannot learn all languages.” 26 So although Strauss claims liberal education consists 
in “listening to the conversation among the greatest minds,” it is a conversation 
restricted to the Western (European) tradition. That is, while Spinoza can 
conceivably converse with Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche among other 
canonical figures of the Western tradition,27 Strauss cannot fathom Spinoza 
conversing with the likes of Alfred, a descendant of a “preliterate [Iroquois] 
tribe.”28 On closer inspection, then, Strauss’s dialogical description of liberal 
education amounts to a pedagogical monologue with the Western tradition that 
excludes the voices of non-Western others imagined to be either illiterate or 
untranslatable. The intellectual space opened up in the Feast Hall blasphemes this 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 6.  
 
25 Ibid.  
 
26 While Strauss makes no mention of indigenous intellectual tradition, he argues non-Western 
intellectual traditions are inaccessible because they write in foreign languages, 7: “The greatest 
minds to whom we ought to listen are by no means exclusively the greatest minds of the West. It is 
merely an unfortunate necessity which prevents us fm listening to the greatest minds of India and of 
China: we do not understand their languages, and we cannot learn all languages.”  
 
27 For a Straussian scholar who initiates this conversation between the West’s greatest minds, see 
Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Adventures of Immanence.  
 
28 Strauss, “What Is Liberal Education?,” 6.  
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constricted Straussian space of liberal education by transgressing not only Western 
cultural boundaries but also the disciplinary boundaries of legal studies, history, 
Spinoza studies, Gitxsan humanities, narrative therapy, creative writing, and 
postcolonial theory.29 In this boundary-crossing spirit, our philosophical guests 
were brought together in the Feast Hall in a theoretical “non-imperial relationship 
of dialogue and mutual understanding.”30 If the Straussian version of liberal 
education is “liberation from vulgarity” through “experiences in things beautiful,” 
then the intellectual space of the Feast Hall is liberation from the Euroamerican 
colonial mentality through experiences in things indigenous.31 
As a helpful point of comparison, the destabilizing hybrid nature of the 
intellectual space of the Feast Hall shares a family resemblance with the 
intellectual space opened up by Spinoza’s first political treatise. In 1670, the 
circulation of Spinoza’s anonymously published TPT was immediately regarded 
as a blasphemous treatise capable of causing social, political, and religious 
                                                 
29 For a scholar who argues transgressing disciplinary boundaries is essential objective for an 
Indigenous Humanities, see Marie Battiste, “Animating Sites of Postcolonial Education: Indigenous 
Knowledge and the Humanities”, CSSE Plenary Address, Manitoba, MB: May 29, 2004, 2: 
“Indigenous humanities are a fairly new academic conception, although it has long deep roots and 
traditions in [indigenous] nations. Since humanities have been linked with European traditions as the 
source and foundation for university knowledge, the idea of a humanities linked to [indigenous] 
people has not yet been fully explored. In each of the disciplinary traditions, colonial humanities 
have taken up aspects of [indigenous] knowledge in fragmented forms, such as in literature, art, 
philosophy, and history, but to bring these various aspects together has not been achieved. This is the 
new challenge – to bring Humpty Dumpty of Indigenous Humanities back together again.”  
 
30 This phrase is Tully’s. See Public Philosophy in a New Key: Volume II, 165: “We in the West 
have yet to enter into the difficult kind of dialogue with the others of the world that brings this 
horizon of persisting languages and practices into the space of questions and opens the interlocutors 
to a non-imperial relationship of dialogue and mutual understanding. This would be the beginning of 
an alternative to imperialism.”  
 
31 Strauss, “What Is Liberal Education?,” 7.  
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instability on the European continent.32 Religious and political elites alike cried 
“blasphemy!” at its biblical hermeneutics and democratic ideals that subverted the 
theological and political knowledges that maintained hierarchical power relations. 
Over three centuries later, across the pond on Turtle Island, this philosophical 
feast may similarly be regarded in a Spinozistic-trickster spirit as a blasphemous 
thesis capable of disrupting the cultural, political, and intellectual landscapes 
maintained by Gitxsan and academic elites alike. These elites cry “blasphemy!” at 
the way the intellectual space of the Feast Hall shatters the colonial idols that 
manifest in the form of pure origins and hierarchical silos of culture and 
knowledge. In the witty words of Bhabba, “hybrid hyphenations” like the 
Mohawk-Spinozistic-Gitxsan harmony of peaceful ideas created in the intellectual 
space of the Feast Hall emphasize the “incommensurable elements – the stubborn 
chunks – as the basis of cultural identifications.”33 It is ultimately this non-
imperial act of “practicing proximity”34 where difference is neither One nor the 
Other but something else besides, in-between, that needs to be practiced at a 
                                                 
32  For a historical study of the controversies created by Spinoza’s TPT, see Nadler, A Book 
Forged in Hell.  
 
33 Bhabba, The Location of Culture, 313.  
 
34 The notion of “practicing proximity” is a home-grown concept recently cultivated by the 
intellectual duo of Métis activist Joe Desjarlais and Canadian historian Bruce Shelvey: “Proximity is 
the acknowledgement of, recognition in and tolerance towards historical difference. As an alternative 
to identity, which requires differences to be fixed in definitions or categories that are then regulated 
or legislated, proximity does not remove uniqueness (therefore it is not identity’s opposite or binary) 
but rather it is the practice of relating to historical and contingent difference by respecting and 
negotiating it. Rather than becoming ‘objects’ of a particular identity that ignores certain aspects of 
the past (such as systemic racism or colonial prejudice) people in proximity become agents in their 
own history with the ability to necessarily remember the violence of the past in a way that leads to 
restoration and well-being.” See Bruce Shelvey and Joe Desjarlais, “The Promise and Possibility of 
Being Métis in Canada: Practicing Proximity and Living in Translation,” Published on-line by the 
British Columbia Métis Federation, 7 June 2013. http://bcmetis.com/2013/06/metis-identity-paper/ 
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grassroots level in order to realize a peaceful coexistence truly offensive to 
colonial sensibilities on the ground.  
6.3 Post-Delgamuukw Self-Determination Efforts  
 
The intellectual space of the Feast Hall has the power of transforming post-
Delgamuukw self-determination efforts from a bureaucratic reality dominated by 
political elites negotiating aboriginal title rights to a phenomenological reality 
generated by the grassroots Gitxsan people.35 While we cannot afford to walk away 
from all state negotiations, post-Delgamuukw self-determination efforts should not 
be primarily invested in formal negotiations between the “official” Gitxsan 
leadership and governmental representatives.36 In Latin terms, instead of relying on 
the work of official leaders to negotiate the sui generis status of aboriginal title 
rights, we should reclaim the authority of our self-determination by negotiating the 
meaning of what Spinoza calls causa sui.37 As a principle of self-determination, 
causa sui, translated into English as the cause of itself, suggests independence of 
                                                 
35 For a scholar who highlights the bureaucratic obstacles facing Gitxsan negotiations over title 
rights, see Val Napoleon, “Who Gets to Say what Happened? Reconciliation Issues for the Gitxsan”, 
177: “For the Gitxsan, the reconciliation progress with the province to date has been fraught with 
difficulty. Too few resources, lack of political will, and bureaucratic stumbling blocks have meant 
little meaningful progress for negotiations. At a practical level, the lack of government political will 
has produced a common bureaucratic obstacle called ‘stove-piping,’ where government ministries 
function strictly independently and hierarchically, as if inside a vertical stovepipe.”  
 
36 I agree with Coulthard on this point. Since colonialism has rendered us a “radical minority” in 
our own homelands which prevents us from stepping away from state negotiations and participation 
entirely, Coulthard calls for greater critical self-reflection, scepticism, and caution towards the 
political and legal discourses of the Canadian state. See Coulthard, Red Faces, White Masks, 179. 
Alfred makes a similar point about formal negotiations with government representatives. For Alfred, 
formal negotiations are not “inherently wrong.” Rather, the problem with formal negotiations as 
currently practiced is that indigenous people are settling too easily: “We’re settling for less than 
what we deserve as human beings certainly… [and] were settling for even less than what the treaties, 
and what ethical principles and politics would demand in North American society.” See PPR, 159-
160.   
 
37 E I dI. 
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thought and action.38 In HVA, Alfred shares how his Mohawk community of 
Kahnawake are negotiating and translating the meaning of causa sui amongst 
themselves: “The indigenous idea itself is being expressed, and ‘sovereignty’ is 
being redefined in the process. Sovereignty for the Mohawks of Kahnawake is 
represented by the Mohawk language word Tewatatowie, which translates to 
English as ‘we help ourselves.’ There is a strong sense of self-sufficiency and 
independence in the political usage of Tewatatowie, particularly as it relates to 
group interactions with other communities.”39 In Gitxsanimx, the Gitxsan 
equivalent to Tewatatowie is lippgyt. When applied in the singular it means “to be 
my own person” and when applied in the plural it becomes “free people.”40 By 
focusing exclusively on state negotiations, we have unfortunately bureaucratized 
our sense of lippgyt. For instance, by naming one of their negotiating tables 
‘lippgyt’ to mean “self-determining people” or “people free of central government,” 
the Gitxsan Treaty Society implies that lippgyt is nothing more than an outcome 
dependent on formal negotiations with the state.41 By contrast, the intellectual space 
of the Feast Hall invites us to experience lippgyt as a lived reality of thinking and 
                                                 
38 I am indebted here to Levene’s apt description of Spinoza’s causa sui as a “self-determining 
principle.” See Spinoza’s Revelation, 69. Also see Polka’s commentary on E I d7, Between 
Philosophy and Religion: Volume 2, 8: “‘That thing is called free, which exists from the necessity 
alone of its nature and is determined to act by itself alone [it is the cause of itself or, in Kantian 
language, self-determining].”  
 
39 HVA, 102.  
 
40 For this distinction, I am drawing on Napoleon, “Who Gets to Say What Happened? 
Reconciliation Issues for the Gitxsan?,” 193 n. 9.  
 
41 Ibid., 177. Napoleon explains that this table dealt with “human services” and was intended to 
directly involve the houses as well as representatives from local community agencies working with 
education, training, social services, health, and justice. 
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acting independently from colonial processes, structures, and ideas.42 
Phenomenologically experiencing ourselves as lippgyt truly involves effort, or, 
what Spinoza calls conatus (desire, striving, effort).43 Conatus, as the striving by 
which we endeavour to persevere in our Gitxsan lifeworlds and ways of being, is 
our actual essence.44 In Gitxsan terms, our conatus can be expressed contradictorily 
as “trickster desire” phenomenologically experienced as greed, laziness, envy, 
selfishness, jealousy, and anger, among other passive affects. Or, our conatus can 
be expressed paradoxically as “ancestral desire” phenomenologically experienced 
as joy, love, generosity, courage, and respect, among other active affects.45 As 
Wiigyat’s misadventures with his wooden slave, wooden jaw, warrior feminist wife, 
and the loyal lynx have taught us, trickster desire inevitably ends up disrupting 
human and non-human communities, violating the Gitxsan legal order, and, like 
Wiigyat’s confinement in flat stone, leaving too many Gitxsan today incarcerated 
behind stone walls. It is only when we transform trickster desire into ancestral 
                                                 
42 Indigenous people have distinct ways of articulating this concept of freedom in their 
languages. See, for example, the Cherokee scholar Jeff Corntassel’s article, “To be Ungovernable,” 
in New Socialist 58 (2006), 35: “Cherokees use the [Tsalagi] term Ani-yun-wiya, which means real 
or principal people. Ungovernability means embracing the principles of Ani-yun-wiya. . . our values 
and responsibilities, not settler institutions, govern us. . . Ani-yun-wiya are governed by a continuous 
renewal of our shared responsibilities and relationships.”  
 
43 E III p6. 
 
44 E III p7. For interpreting Spinoza’s Ethica as having implications for Gitxsan lifeworlds and 
ways of being, I am indebted to Gilles Delueze’s insightful commentary. See Spinoza: Practical 
Philosophy, 13: “In Spinoza’s thought, life is not an idea, a matter of theory. It is a way of being, one 
and the same eternal mode in all its attributes. And it is only from this perspective that the geometric 
method [of Ethica] is fully comprehensible.”  
 
45 In making this trickster/ancestral distinction between forms of desire, I am suggesting a 
phenomenological way of being in the world rather than a historical claim about the Gitxsan. In 
other words, when I evoke the term “ancestral desire” for peaceful coexistence, I am not suggesting 
the Gitxsan have throughout history consistently acted on this desire which would be tantamount to a 
disingenuous Rousseauian romanticization. Rather, I am suggesting that the Gitxsan, like all human 
beings, have competing desires that are either translated contradictorily into enmity with others or 
paradoxically into loving relations.  
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desire, by actively feeding our collective conatus in a way that self-generates love, 
courage, generosity, among the other key ingredients necessary for creating 
peaceful coexistence, that we can truly become causa sui or lippgyt. That is, for 
lippgyt to be more than a negotiating table covered in red tape, we need to 
collectively become fully aware of our ancestral desire for peaceful coexistence 
with all our relations and make a conscious effort to actively feed it.  
  When post-Delgamuukw self-determination efforts become the work of 
grassroots Gitxsan people on the ground rather than something conducted at the top 
by elites over a table, such efforts become an instantiation of what Coulthard has 
recently called a “resurgent politics of recognition.”46 A resurgent politics of 
recognition turns away from the liberal politics of recognition oriented towards 
rights-based processes and instead focuses on “Indigenous peoples empowering 
themselves through cultural practices of individual and collective self-fashioning 
that seek to prefigure radical alternatives to the structural and subjective dimensions 
of colonial power.”47 Our post-Delgamuukw philosophical feast has been a work of 
Gitxsan self-fashioning. In place of the settler version of Delgamuukw as a legal 
story about colonial courts denying and then recognizing title rights, our feast has 
narrated a resurgent version of Delgamuukw as a story that signifies and prefigures 
the Gitxsan continually striving to achieve peaceful coexistence on the ground. That 
is to say, our feast has intellectually striven to feed the ancestral desire for peaceful 
coexistence while at the same time anticipating a grassroots gawagaani movement 
                                                 
46 Coulthard, Red Faces, White Masks, 18.  
 
47 Ibid.  
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that, energized by the ideas shared here, continues to actively feed the ancestral 
desire for gawagaani in the real world of politics. In this respect, our feast provides 
a resurgent “narrative technology”48 for contemporary Gitxsan wanderers, those 
roaming on reserves, in cities, prisons, mental institutions, and foster homes; those 
dynamic Gitxsan lifeworlds that have, tragic blunder after tragic blunder, journeyed 
alongside Wiigyat, transgressing the laws and boundaries of their Gitxsan 
homelands even while laying equal claim to that very territory. It is these voices 
from the margins located in-between Gitxsan and settler societies that articulate the 
trickster-like insights needed to reveal the true virtue of post-Delgamuukw self-
determination efforts. For it is only when we bring to the forefront of our minds the 
consequences of unconsciously feeding trickster desire that we will be able to 
wisely and consciously know the goodness of feeding the ancestral desire for 
peaceful coexistence. Conversely, it is only when the voices on the margins are 
encouraged to transform their trickster desire into ancestral desire that they will be 
able to peacefully find space in the Feast Hall for culturally constituting their many 
different life histories and ways of being-in-the-Gitxsan Nation. It is for this reason 
that Fanon’s prophetic words—“the last shall be first”—are so critically important 
to post-Delgamuukw self-determination efforts.49 In our strivings to create a union 
or harmony of Gitxsan minds unencumbered by grief and suffering, we cannot 
forget to invite and transform the tricksters within and amongst us.  
                                                 
48 The anthropologist Robin Ridington employs this term in her article, “Re-creation in Canadian 
First Nations Literature: ‘When You Sing It Now, Just like New,” Anthrpologica 43, no. 2 (2001): 
221-230.  
 
49 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 2 
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The slogan that captures the spiritual significance of this grassroots 
gawagaani movement, as I am envisioning it, is ha gwilii win. In English, ha gwilii 
win translates as “walk gently on a path covered with eagle down.” In the Gitxsan 
tradition, eagle down is a symbol of peace. Historically, after a war between two 
nations the responsible house chief would host a feast to formally make peace. 
Eagle down would be placed in his headdress and as he listened to the feast 
dialogue he would nod his head in approval. The eagle down would drift down 
slowly to the path before him, symbolizing that the path forward would be soft and 
gentle, peaceful and beautiful.50 In our post-Delgamuukw self-determination efforts, 
we are invited to imagine our ancestors dressed in their regalia, looking proudly 
upon us, nodding in approval with eagle down drifting down and creating a 
peaceful path forward for our grassroots gawagaani movement. We should take 
heart that we are not alone in such a spiritual revolution. In fact, the gawagaani 
movement can be understood as a Gitxsan nationhood movement that forges a Two-
Row Wampum treaty alliance with Alfred’s Wasase form of indigenism. In PPR, 
Alfred describes indigenism as a movement that brings together “words, ideas, and 
symbols from different indigenous cultures to serve as tools for those involved in 
asserting nationhood.”51 Indigenism is an important means of confronting the state 
as it provides a unifying vocabulary and basis for collective action. In feasting 
terms, Alfred explains that indigenism and local indigenous nationhood movements 
are “mutually supportive, feeding each other’s intellectual development as well as 
                                                 
50 Xsiwis (Dr. M. Jane Smith), Personal Correspondence, January 2015.  
 
51 PPR, 112.  
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fostering political co-operation.”52 Alfred’s version of indigenism draws from his 
Mohawk heritage which takes the Wasáse, Thunder or War dance, as its emblem. 
As an indigenous movement, Wasáse symbolizes the “social and cultural force alive 
among Onkwehonwe dedicated to altering the balance of political and economic 
powers to recreate some social and physical space for freedom to re-emerge.”53 The 
end goal of Wasáse is spiritual revolution, “a culturally rooted social movement that 
transforms the whole of society and a political action that seeks to remake the entire 
landscape of power and relationship to reflect truly a liberated post-imperial 
vision.”54 Similar to how Delgamuukw and Gisdaywa articulated a galvanizing 
vision of peaceful coexistence on the first day of trial, Coulthard and Alfred 
communicate a radical vision for the Wasase movement:  
Wasáse. . . works by awakening and reculturing individuals so that indigenous 
thoughts are restored to their proper place in the people’s minds and their 
attachment to false identities is broken. Members of the movement are 
committed to the restoration of traditions, ceremonies, and knowledges; 
reconnecting to and loving the land, revitalizing indigenous languages. Wasáse 
challenges indigenous people to reject the authority and legitimacy of the 
colonial system and to rebel against its institutions. . . The movement does not 
use violence to advance its aims. Its political struggle is conducted through 
intellectual confrontation and mass communication; revealing the corruptions, 
frauds, and abuses of colonizers and collaborators; and, supporting direct action 
in defence of indigenous communities, their rights, and the land.55 
 
Alfred makes room in Wasáse for the growing trend of indigenous people moving 
from the colonial spaces of reservations to urban centres and making their presence 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 113, italics mine.  
 
53 Wasáse, 19 
 
54 Ibid., 27.  
 
55 Taiaiake Alfred and Glen Coulthard, “Wasase Movement Statement of Principles,” in New 
Socialist 58 (2006), 20.  
 
A Post-Delgamuukw Philosophical Feast:  
Feeding the Ancestral Desire for Peaceful Coexistence  
 
227 
felt all over Turtle Island. He draws on the Kanienkeha word, Kawatsire, “all of our 
fires are connected,” to capture the spiritual connections and sense of relationship 
represented by the boundary-crossing Wasáse movement. In relation to the Wasáse 
movement, we can envision our grassroots gawagaani movement as a rekindling of 
our collective lakw blazing out from the margins in-between Gitxsan and settler 
societies, connecting with all the fires already burning across Turtle Island, proudly 
being protected by indigenous, settler, and all of our in-between civic partners.56  
6. 4 Hosting Future Philosophical Feasts  
 
 As the grassroots gawagaanii movement moves from the margins and begins 
to transform the intellectual, social, cultural, and political landscapes, we can 
anticipate the need for hosting future philosophical feasts. In rhythm with Tully’s 
public philosophy, future Gitxsan philosophical feasting should aim to build a 
“communicative relationship of reciprocal elucidation and mutual benefit between 
public philosophy and public affairs.”57 Such a communicative relationship will 
begin to be built when the grassroots gawagaani movement engages in direct action, 
                                                 
56 For a scholar who shows how open fires have historically occurred outside of the sphere of 
modern Europe’s influence and how the amount of flame in an area can serve as a measure of 
political or ecological resistance to European colonization, see Stephen J. Pyne, Fire: A Brief 
History (Seatlle, WA: University of  Washington Press, 2001), 153. In light of this history of fire, it 
is not surprising that the symbolic and metaphorical qualities of fire are used much more frequently 
in indigenous knowledges and so little used in Western thought where fire is often understood as 
something to be feared. Thanks to Professor Shelvey for bringing this to my attention. In my own 
wilp network, my grand-uncle ‘Wii Muk’ Willixw (Art Wilson) shared with me an anecdote that 
highlights the power of lakw or fire as a political metaphor. During the Delgamuukw trial, 
Antgulilbix (Mary Johnson) told the Gitxsan community to ‘keep the fire going.’ Many Gitxsan 
thought she specifically meant the blockade they had set up at this time to protect the homelands 
from logging but my grand-uncle believes she was referring more broadly to the Gitxsan struggle for 
peaceful coexistence. By rekindling and connecting our collective Gitxsan lakw with the lakw of the 
Wasase movement, we are heeding the voice of Antgulilbix. ‘Wii Muk’ Willixw, Personal 
Correspondence, January 2013.  
 
57 Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key: Volume I, 37. 
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testing the ideas shared at our post-Delgamuukw philosophical feast and identifying 
its limitations.58 In turn, there will be a need to study the unanticipated difficulties 
and new problems that confront our Gitxsan nationhood movement. This will 
involve hosting additional philosophical feasts to raise awareness of our political 
situation and the ways in which we can continue to self-consciously draw on our 
tradition for constructive tools in re-building our Gitxsan Nation and achieving 
peaceful coexistence with all our relations. Such studies will further help all 
invested in the gawagaani movement to stay committed to transforming their 
trickster desire into ancestral desire and encouraging all those in their wilp networks 
to go and do likewise.  
The unfinished, open-ended, and dialogical nature of our post-Delgamuukw 
philosophical feast additionally moves in the same accountable beat as Alfred and 
Spinoza’s contemporary and classic renditions of public philosophy. “As 
intellectuals, we have a responsibility to generate and sustain a social and political 
discourse that is respectful of the wisdom embedded within our traditions,” Alfred 
writes at the end of PPR. “We must find answers from within those traditions, and 
present them in ways that preserve the integrity of our languages and 
communicative styles. Most importantly, as writers and thinkers, we should be 
answerable to our nations and communities.”59 Likewise, at the end of TPT, 
Spinoza’s first political treatise dedicated to transforming the political situation in 
Dutch country, the exiled public philosopher’s final words express the same spirit 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 
 
59 PPR, 179. 
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of ancestral accountability conveyed by Alfred. “With these things, I have 
discharged what I had set out to do in this Treatise. . . I have been painstakingly 
careful not to err, and first and foremost in what ever I wrote would altogether 
answer to the laws of the fatherland, to piety, and to good morals.”60 Alfred and 
Spinoza’s civic spirit of accountability is beautifully balanced by the principle of 
accountability expressed in Gitxsan philosophy of art. When designing our button 
blankets, symbols of power proudly worn by the Simgigyat gant Sigidim hanaak’ in 
the Feast Hall and passed down to future generations, we are encouraged to always 
leave one mistake on our blankets as the Gitxsan do not insist on perfection from 
anyone. 61 Gitxsan aesthetics teaches that one need not be so “painstakingly” 
invested in avoiding error. As a cultural practice of self-fashioning, this philosophy 
further ensures that there will always be something for the next generation to do. 
That is to say, other Gitxsan will fly farther.62 With this in mind, in harmony with 
the teachings of accountability presented by our civic-minded Mohawk and 
Portuguese-Jewish philosophical guests, I say to all who have feasted with the 
house of Hawow, ha gwilii win—may you walk gently on a path covered in eagle 
down. 
 
Sabax 
                                                 
60 TPT, 237.  
 
61 Xsiwis, The Gitxsanimx Teacher, 4.  
 
62 Drawing on Nietzsche’s remarks in Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality (§575), 
Tully offers the same encouragement to future political philosophers in the area of globalization and 
democracy, Public Philosophy in a New Key: Volume II, 72: “This chapter is a defeasible sketch of 
some forms of democracy in the context of contemporary globalisation. Much of it will have to be 
revised as humans exercise their strategies of freedom in these circumstances over the twenty-first 
century. Other political philosophers ‘will fly farther.’”  
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